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BACILLI AND BULLETS

AN ADDRESS TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN IN THE CAMPS AT CHURN

I HAVE been asked to say a few words on the question of health in war-time, that you may realize its importance. Formerly an army marched on its belly ; *now* it marches on its brain. Only by utilizing existing knowledge, in all grades from Commander-in-Chief to private, is the maximum of success available. To put the largest number of the enemy out of action with a minimum of loss to his own men is the aim of every general. While in one way modern war merges the individual in a great machine, on the other hand the intelligent action of the unit has never been so important a factor in making the machine work smoothly and efficiently. After all, it is the man behind the gun who wins the victory.

What I wish to urge is a true knowledge of your foes, not simply of the bullets, but of the much more important enemy, the bacilli. In the wars of the world they have been as Saul and David—the one slaying thousands, the other tens of thousands. I can never see a group of recruits marching to the dépôt without mentally asking what percentage of these fine fellows will die legitimate and honourable deaths from wounds, what percentage will perish miserably from neglect of ordinary sanitary precautions ? It is bitter enough to lose thousands of the best of our young men in a hideous war, but it adds terribly to the tragedy to think that more than one-half of the losses may be due to preventable disease. Typhus

fever, malaria, cholera, enteric, and dysentery have won more victories than powder and shot. Some of the diseases I mention need no longer be dreaded. Typhus and malaria, which one hundred years ago routed a great English army in the Walcheren expedition against Antwerp, are no longer formidable foes. But enough remain, as we found by sad experience in South Africa. Of the 22,000 lives lost in that war—can you believe it ?

—the bullets accounted for only 8,000, the bacilli for 14,000 ! In the long arduous campaign before us more men will go into the field than ever before in the history of the Empire. Before it is too late, let us take every possible precaution to guard against a repetition of such disasters. I am here to warn you soldiers against enemies more subtle, more dangerous, and more fatal than the Germans, enemies against which no successful battle can be fought without your intelligent co-operation. So far the world has only seen one great war waged with the weapons of science against these foes. Our allies the Japanese went into the Russian campaign prepared as fully against bacilli as against bullets, with the result that the percentage of deaths from disease was the lowest that has ever been attained in a great war. Which lesson shall we learn ? Which example shall we follow, Japan, or South Africa with its sad memories ?

We are not likely to have to fight three of the greatest of former scourges, typhus, malaria, and cholera, though the possibility of the last has to be considered. But there remain dysentery, pneumonia, and enteric, against two of which we should be able to bring to bear successfully resources of modern science.

Dysentery, an inflammation of the large bowel, has been for centuries one of the most terrible of camp

diseases, killing thousands, and, in its prolonged damage to health, one of the most fatal of foes to armies. So far as we know, it is conveyed by water, and only by carrying out strictly, under all circumstances, the directions about boiling water can it be prevented. It is a disease which, even under the best of circumstances, cannot always be prevented ; but with care the incidence should be reduced to a minimum, and there should never again be widespread outbreaks in the camps themselves.

Pneumonia is a much more difficult disease to prevent. Many of us, unfortunately, carry the germ with us. In these bright days all goes well in a holiday camp like this ; but when the cold and the rain come, and the long marches, the resisting forces of the body are lowered, the enemy, always on the watch, overpowers the guards, rushes the defences, and attacks the lungs. Be careful not to neglect coughs and colds. A man in good condition should be able to withstand the wettings and exposures that lower the system, but in a winter campaign pneumonia causes a large amount of sickness and is one of the serious enemies of the soldier.

Above all others one disease has proved most fatal in modern warfare—enteric, or typhoid fever. Over and over again it has killed thousands before they ever reached the fighting line. The United States troops had a terrible experience in the Spanish-American War. In six months, between June and November, inclusive, among 107,973 officers and men in 92 volunteer regiments, 20,738, practically one-fifth of the entire number, had typhoid fever, and 1,580 died. Fortunately, in this country typhoid fever is not prevalent in the districts in which camps are placed. The danger is chiefly from persons who have already had the disease and who carry the germs in their intestines, harmless messmates in

them, but capable of infecting barracks or camps. You can easily understand how flies lighting on the discharges of such typhoid carriers could convey the germs far and wide. It was in this way probably, and by dust, that the bacilli were so fatal in South Africa. Take to heart these figures : there were 57,684 cases of typhoid fever, of which 19,454 were invalided, and 8,022 died. More died from the bacilli of this disease than from the bullets of the Boers. Do let this terrible record impress upon you the importance of carrying out with religious care the sanitary regulations.

One great advance in connexion with typhoid fever has been made of late years, and of this I am come specially to ask you to take advantage. An attack of an infectious disease so alters the body that it is no longer susceptible to another attack of the same disease ; once a person has had scarlet fever, small-pox, or chicken-pox, he is not likely to have a second attack. He is immune, or has what is called immunity. When you expose a solution of sugar to the air, or if you add to it a pinch of yeast, a process goes on which we call fermentation, accompanied by a growth of little germs of the yeast in the fluid, and by an increase in temperature (in fact the solution has a fever), and the composition of the fluid alters, so much so that you can inoculate it afterwards again and again with the same germ, but no further change takes place. Now this is what happens to us when bacilli make a successful entry into our bodies. They overcome the forces that naturally protect the system, and grow just as the yeast does in the sugar solution ; but the body puts up a strong fight, all sorts of anti-bodies are formed in the blood, and if recovery takes place, the patient afterwards has immunity, for a time at least, from subsequent attacks. The body has mobilized its

forces, and is safe for a few years at least against that disease. It was an Englishman, Jenner, in 1798, who found that it was possible to confer this immunity by giving a person a mild attack of a disease, or of one very like it. Against small-pox all of you have been vaccinated—a harmless, safe, and effective measure. Let me give you a war illustration. General Wood of the United States Army told me that, when he was at Santiago, reports came that in villages not far distant small-pox was raging and the people without help of any kind. He called for volunteers, all men who showed scars of satisfactory vaccination. Groups of these soldiers went into the villages, took care of the small-pox patients, cleaned up the houses, stayed there until the epidemic was over, and not one of them took the disease. Had not those men been vaccinated, at least 99 per cent. of them would have taken small-pox. Now what I wish to ask you is to take advantage of the knowledge that the human body can be protected by vaccination against typhoid fever. Discovered through the researches of Sir Almroth Wright, this measure has been introduced successfully into our own regular army, into the armies of France, the United States, Japan, and Germany. I told you a few minutes ago about the appalling incidence of typhoid fever in the volunteer troops in America during the Spanish-American War. That resulted largely from the wide prevalence of the disease in country districts, so that the camps became infected ; and we did not then know the importance of the fly as a carrier, and other points of great moment. But in the regular army in the United States, in which inoculation has been practised now for several years, the number of cases has fallen from 3.53 per thousand men to practically nil. In a strength of 90,646 there were in

1913 only three cases of typhoid fever. In France the enteric rate among the unvaccinated was 168·44 per thousand, and among the vaccinated ·18 per thousand. In India, where the disease has been very prevalent, the success of the measure has been remarkable. In the United States, and in France, and in some other countries this vaccination against the disease is compulsory. It is not a serious procedure ; you may feel badly for twenty-four hours, and the site of inoculation will be tender, but I hope I have said enough to convince you that, in the interests of the cause, you should gladly put up with this temporary inconvenience. If the lessons of past experience count, any expeditionary force on the Continent has much more to fear from the bacillus of typhoid fever than from bullets and bayonets. Think again of South Africa with its 57,000 cases of typhoid fever ! With a million of men in the field, their efficiency will be increased one-third if we can prevent enteric. It can be prevented, it *must be prevented* ; but meanwhile the decision is in your hands, and I know it will be in favour of your King and Country.

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THE WORSHIP OF POWER IN MODERN GERMANY

I

DURING the great days of the French Revolution and the War of Liberation Germany produced two great thinkers. One was Kant : the other was Hegel. Kant was the philosopher of Duty, stern daughter of the voice of God—duty, supreme over all alleged ‘ interests ’, and dominant over all pretensions of power. He held before Europe the ideal of a permanent peace achieved by ‘ a federal league of nations, in which even the weakest member looks for protection to the united power ’. An austere sense of law, pervading and controlling at once individual life, the life of the State, and even the life of the European comity or commonwealth of States—this was the note of his teaching. Hegel, in reaction against what he regarded as the bare austerity of Kant, preached a different doctrine. Duty, he held, was the fulfilling of a station in the community. It was an empty concept apart from the State. Faithfully to discharge his function as a member of his State—this is the duty of man. Along this line Hegel—perhaps influenced by admiration for Prussia—advanced to a conception of the State as something of an absolute, something of an ultimate, to which the individual must be adjusted, and from his relation to which he draws his meaning and being. The State, he could write, is the Universal, which has become ‘ for

itself', consciously and explicitly, all that it is 'in itself', in its latent and potential nature. Thus self-conscious and self-moved, it is a real individual, which can exist by itself in the world as an ultimate. As for the citizen, the apparent individual—why, he is an atom, which, 'seeking to be a centre for itself, is brought by the State back into the life of the universal substance'. Absolute, ultimate, universal—the State becomes a sort of transcendental majesty, *cui nihil viget simile aut secundum*. It is significant that Hegel, in his philosophy of the State, devotes less than a page to international law: it is still more significant that he can say, 'the state of war shows the omnipotence of the State in its individuality; country and fatherland are then the power, which convicts of nullity the independence of individuals.' It is here—in this neglect of international law, and in this glorification of war—that one lays one's finger on a permanent and essential attribute of German political thought and practice. If Kant is the philosopher of one side of Prussia, if he expresses that deep sense of duty which made Frederic the Great the first servant of the State, Hegel is the philosopher of another side, and Hegel expresses that sense of the absolute finality of the State which made Frederic seize Silesia in spite of an international guarantee of the integrity of the Austrian dominions, and impelled him to carry Prussia further and further along the paths of militarism.

Since the days of Sadowa and Sedan Germany has produced two other thinkers, Nietzsche and Treitschke. Both were ultimately of Slavonic origin; both were professors, the one of philosophy, the other of history; both lived and thought and taught in the new Germany which sprang from the great wars of 1866 and 1870.

They caught the spirit, and they helped to make the spirit, of that new Germany whose note, it has been well said, is *subdual*. Power, more power, and always power—this was the gospel which they found, and preached. ‘Political questions are questions of power’ was Bismarck’s principle. ‘Two souls dwell in the German nation,’ a Berlin professor wrote.

The German nation has been called the nation of poets and thinkers, and it may be proud of the name. To-day it may again be called the nation of masterful combatants, as which it originally appeared in history.

The spirit of mastery was abroad : it could be seen in State policy ; it could be seen in a vast economic expansion ; it could be seen in the grandiose massiveness of those buildings, ‘veritable mastodons of masonry’, which modern Germany loves to erect. Of that spirit Nietzsche and Treitschke have, in very different ways, both been the prophets. The one was a bitter enemy of Christianity : the other was a stern Protestant. The one detested the ‘bovine spirit of nationality’ and denounced Prussian militarism : the other preached exclusive Germanism and the glory of the sword. But both alike made power their watchword ; both alike loved war, and striving for mastery, and subdual ; both hated England.

II

The name Nietzsche is said to be derived from a Slavonic word signifying ‘humble’. Nietzsche, however, was inclined to claim a noble origin from the counts of Nietzki, and he certainly did not love humility. It is another paradox that the man who boasted himself ‘the most essential opponent of Christianity’ should

have been the son of a village pastor. He was born in 1834: he died in 1900. He served in the army for a few months in 1867, and during the campaign of 1870 he worked for a little time in the German Ambulance Corps. For ten years, from 1869 to 1879, he acted as professor of Classical Philology in the University of Bâle; for the next ten years he was a wandering invalid; for the last eleven years of his life he was insane.

The stuff on which his mind worked was partly Greek literature and art, and partly biology, of which he acquired in later years a somewhat superficial knowledge. From the one he drew an aesthetic interpretation of the world, as a thing non-moral but potentially beautiful; from the other he drew the vision of the new beauty which might enter the world through the evolution of the superman. It was, perhaps, from both, or rather his own interpretation of both, that he drew his primary premiss. Life, that premiss ran, is essentially 'amoral'. The world is simply an aesthetic phenomenon, neither good nor bad—that is to say, in effect, neither beautiful nor ugly. All things in the world—all intentions and actions of men—are amoral. 'There are no moral phenomena; there is merely a moral interpretation of phenomena.' Nothing is, but thinking makes it so; and all so-called moral values are the creations of human interpretation. To these creations we must address a simple question. Are these existing valuations of intentions and acts as moral or immoral, as beautiful or ugly, of any real value? Or must they be 'transvalued' to suit a new and higher standard?

To answer such a question we must first of all examine existing values critically. If we do so, we find that

they are not absolute but relative. They are relative to race, and differ from race to race : they are relative to time, and vary from time to time.

Good and evil which would be everlasting—it doth not exist. All is in flux. Everything good is the evil of yore which has been rendered serviceable.

The morality of to-day is thus a phase, and nothing more ; and it is a phase to be condemned. This is plain, if we examine first its content, and then its source. The content of its rules shows that they are intended to adapt the individual to the advantage of the community or herd. Truthfulness is praised because it lets the herd know what to expect ; lying is blamed because it leaves the herd in a state of uncomfortable mystification. But is the advantage of the herd, after all, an ultimate criterion ? Morality makes that assumption : is it entitled to its assumption ? All is not necessarily for the best, when

lofty independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, are felt to be dangers ; when everything that elevates the individual above the herd is called evil, and the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition attains the moral distinction and honour.

Nor does the source of this morality entitle it to any more respect. The source is alleged to be conscience ; and this conscience professes to condemn actions on the assumption of the free will of their agents and on the ground of the wrong use of that will. The profession and assumptions are baseless. There is no freedom of the will. Heredity and environment are the sources of our acts : what we call free will is really the ‘ complex state of delight ’ of a personality as it issues inevitably in action ; and the supposed free will of the moralist is

really 'the most egregious theological trick . . . for the purpose of making mankind responsible in a theological manner—that is to say, dependent upon theologians'. As we cannot speak of free will, so we cannot speak of conscience. Conscience is not the source of valuations. The herd creates values by an emotion, an emotion of the same aesthetic nature as that of the artist contemplating his work—an emotion of comfortable contentedness with all that is pleasing to its senses. But shall we be foolish enough to accept the aesthetic sense of the herd as the final determinant of our values?

Thus the community or herd creates, on the impulse of a sensuous emotion of contentedness inspired by certain kind of acts and intentions, a herd-morality which assigns moral value to acts and intentions advantageous to the herd. Once created, this morality is imitated: the force of mimicry, so potent in nature, as Nietzsche learned from his biological studies, is equally potent in man. But it is no guarantee of the truth of this morality that it was created by a majority, or that it has lasted through the centuries. The herd is a herd of slaves, contented just to live. But there are masters as well as slaves; and masters are determined not only to have life, but to have it abundantly. For in truth—so Nietzsche held—any real life is not the issue of a mere 'will to live', as Darwin taught; nor does the world show any mere 'struggle for existence', in which those who are fittest just to exist survive the ordeal. Life is the issue of a 'will to power'; and the world shows a struggle for power in which the greatest power wins not only survival but dominance.

Life is a state of opulence, luxuriance, and even absurd prodigality: where there is a struggle, it is a struggle for power. Life is essentially appropria-

tion, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation, at the least and in its mildest form exploitation. The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.

That then is true which enables me to expand in the full opulence of power : that is good which contributes to the unfolding of my power in the full blossom of action. Power is of the few, ultimately perhaps of the one, the Caesar or Napoleon ; and since power is the standard, it is therefore the few whose truth is the *vraie vérité des choses*, and whose morality is the true morality. Herd-morality, slave-morality, is untrue and immoral—untrue, that is to say, and immoral, if one seeks to apply or enforce it among masters, but true enough and moral enough for the slave. Let the slave demand and cultivate truth and pity—for himself and for his like. Truth and pity are the conditions of living—of bare living : and since that is all the slave can expect, truth and pity are his *métier*. They are not the *métier* of the master. What he expects and demands is power ; and power can only be attained in war ; and in war all things are fair,¹ and pity is misplaced.

There were preachers of power before Nietzsche. In the *Gorgias* of Plato Callicles already expounds the doctrine of herd-morality and master-morality. Convention, says Callicles, is one thing : nature is another. Convention is made by the majority or herd, who are weaklings and slaves ; ‘and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and their own interests.’ But ‘nature herself intimates

¹ ‘It matters greatly to what end one lies, whether one preserves or destroys by means of falsehood.’

that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker ' ; and ' a man who had sufficient force would trample under foot all formulas and spells and charms ', rising in the strength of his power and asserting the just right of his might. Let him who would see sophistry of this sort blown to the winds turn to his Plato ; for Callicles is just Nietzsche, and Nietzsche is just Callicles. But he is a Callicles with some twenty-three added centuries of experience ; and it is worth while to see how, not in its essence but in its trappings and adornments, the doctrine has grown in all these years.

There are for Nietzsche, as for Callicles, two moralities, each for its appointed class—the slave-morality based on the calculus of general advantage or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and the master-morality founded on the rock of power. Of the two the latter is ultimate and absolute ; the former has only relative truth. This herd-morality, this slave-morality, is the morality of democracy and of Socialism : it is also the morality of Christianity. Democracy, Socialism, Christianity, all stand for the advantage of the weak. They are all anarchical, for they all contravene the just hierarchy of nature, whereby the strong rules the weak ; and they all encourage a temper of unstable sentimentality at the expense of disciplined power. Especially does Nietzsche denounce Christianity. It defeats the operations of natural selection : ' Christian altruism is the mob ego-tism of the weak.' It is a religion of maudlin pity, which preserves the botched, the weak, the degenerate. It is the religion of the infirmary ; and yet again it is the religion of Anarchy, because its object is destruction and the pulling down of the mighty from their seats. Not the dogma but the morality of Christianity is the

object of Nietzsche's attack ; and it is not our Lord, but St. Paul, whom he regards as the founder of this morality. St. Paul was the standard-bearer in a revolt of the decadents. He began the work of destroying the fruits of 'the will to the future of mankind, the great Yea to all things, which was materialized in the *imperium Romanum*' ; and henceforth a legion of 'crafty, stealthy, invisible, anaemic vampires'—St. Augustine for instance—continued his work of destruction. 'St. Paul was a slave-mind . . . with a bad conscience and a thirst for power' (though Nietzsche, by the way, has already denied the existence of conscience and deified the thirst for power) ;

and Paul, this appalling impostor, pandered to the instincts of Chandala (or Slave) morality in those paltry people when he said : Not many mighty, not many noble are called, but God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise.

So through Paul came to pass the revolt of decadence, and the turning of the world into an infirmary peopled by anaemic ascetics, who 'succeeded in transforming Eros and Aphrodite—sublime powers, capable of idealization—into hellish genii and phantom goblins'.

Nietzsche seeks to destroy Christian destruction, and to return to a healthy paganism in which there shall be the drunk delight of battle with peers on ringing windy plains. Not peace, but a sword wielded by the will to power—that is the true way of the world.

Horribly clangs its silvery bow ; and although it comes like the night, war is nevertheless Apollo, the true divinity for consecrating and purifying states. . . . National consumption, as well as individual, admits of a brutal cure. . . . Let the little schoolgirls say : 'To be good is sweet and touching.' Ye say, a good cause will hallow even war ? I say unto you : a good war hallows every cause. War and courage have done greater

things than love of your neighbour.¹ . . . Against the deviation of the State-ideal into a money-ideal the only remedy is war, and once again war, in the emotions of which this at any rate becomes clear, that in love to fatherland and prince the State produces an ethical impulse indicative of a much higher destiny.

Passages such as these would seem to indicate an aggressive and militant nationalism. But Nietzsche is not consistent ; and nationalism, as has already been said, is one of his many *bêtes noires*. His constructive ideal is not national, and the war he would preach is not an ordinary battle of the nations. What he seeks is the gradual evolution of the type of man upwards and onwards to the superman. What he desires is an evolution working not through the will to live, but through the will to power, and not blindly, but under the direction of man's progressive intelligence. He would have the strong and vigorous to sort themselves out by struggle, to train themselves for further struggle, and to produce children who should at once inherit², continue, and improve that training, in order that finally, through successive improvements of the stock, a super-species should arise. His ideal may be said to be a sort of combination of Comte and Galton, of Positivism and Eugenics. Like the Positivist, he would abandon theology, and seek a goal in manhood, here on earth ; like the Eugenist, he would create the manhood by pure breeding.

Let your will say : the superman shall be the meaning of the earth. I conjure you, my brethren, remain true to the earth, and believe not those who speak to you of hopes beyond the earth. I love him who liveth

¹ This passage is inscribed on the title-page of Bernhardi's *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg*.

² Nietzsche seems to have believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

in order to know, and seeketh to know in order that hereafter the superman may live. I love him who laboureth and investeth that he may build the house for the superman.

At first Nietzsche seems to have thought of the superman as a single individual: he repeatedly speaks of Napoleon. Gradually, however, superman passed into super-species. Of the evolution there were apparently to be three stages: first, an aristocracy to rule all Europe; next, a new European race of 'higher men'; and finally, the race of supermen. It is significant that Nietzsche dreams of a united Europe, or a United States of Europe. Nationalism, in his later years, he abandoned.

Is there a single idea behind this bovine nationalism?'

We are not nearly German enough to advocate nationalism and race-hatred.' He emphasizes the unity of European culture, and the coming unity of European economics; he looks to the day when men shall be called in honour Good Europeans, 'the heirs of Europe, the rich, overwealthy heirs, the heirs, only too deeply-pledged, of millennia of European thought.' Already, he feels, in the nineteenth century itself the profoundest spirits have been seeking to anticipate the good European of the future, and they have only fallen back into patriotism when their wings flagged from carrying them further. Of such stuff were Napoleon and Goethe, Beethoven and Heine—men who transcended nationality and transcended the State, 'that coldest of monsters and most frigid of liars', which pretends to be the People, and by the People is detested.

Meanwhile this generation must travail for the future.

Talk not of 'land of my fathers': our bark must steer for the land of our children. Oh my brothers, I consecrate and lead you to a new nobility; ye shall

be to me begetters and trainers and sowers of the future.

In this duty of preparation for the superman the old egoism seems forgotten, or at any rate transmuted into a grave and austere altruism. True, the superman who is to come is a lover of power and not of contentment, of war and not of peace ; true, they from whose loins he shall come must be of like substance. And yet the sacrifice remains. This generation shall not see the superman, but it must surrender itself to his production. That production thus becomes as it were a categorical imperative, and indeed a religion. The will to power abides ; but it is the will to power as it will be embodied in the future race, and not the will to power as it lives in the men of to-day. The men of to-day must possess their souls in rigorous patience, not expanding in opulence, but contracting themselves to a rigid austerity of self-discipline and training. Here Nietzsche turns to Eugenics, and preaches the need of legislation for the race rather than for the individual ; for the future rather than for the present. He turns too to education, not of the masses but of the few men picked for great and lasting work—the aristocracy of good Europeans, the higher men, who shall be bridges to the supermen—men self-disciplined, obedient, faithful ; men of a good courage and a burning hope. So shall heroism (*Heldentum*) come back into honour, and an age shall arise ‘ which will carry heroism into knowledge and wage war for the sake of ideas and their consequences ’—a phrase in which one seems to detect in advance the idea of the culture-war intended to disseminate higher culture among less cultured nations.

It would be difficult to prove that Nietzsche’s doctrine is consistent. His books are a chaos of separate aphor-

isms and aperçus ; and he can at once denounce the State and hold that in war it produces a great ethical impulse—at once laud the will to power, and extol a Spartan self-discipline. His dream of the United States of Europe, and of mankind perfected by Eugenics, may attract, and rightly attract, many noble souls. He did not pander to that exclusive and jealous nationalism which has consumed modern Germany—‘that national heart-itch and blood-poisoning’ which he detested. But as Luther once said, ‘the Word goes into the ordinary man excellent, and comes out of him fleshly.’ *Quicquid recipitur secundum modum recipientis recipitur*. Now Nietzsche, neglected in his lifetime, has been held in great honour since his death ; and tens of thousands of his books have been sold in Germany.¹ He has been ‘received’ ; and it is difficult to believe that he has not been received according to the temper of modern Germany. Anti-nationalist himself, he has nevertheless ministered, by his gospel of power, to the national instinct for subdual. The Germans have felt, no doubt vaguely and almost unconsciously, that they are the European aristocracy, destined to ‘carry heroism into knowledge and to wage war for the sake of ideas’. Their militarism has drawn new encouragement from a praise of struggle which has indeed nothing to do with the mere soldiers’ battle, but which easily slips into a fleshly interpretation. It is quite natural that Bernhardt should quote Nietzsche by name ; and indeed much of Bernhardt is simply Nietzsche transcribed. Take for instance these sayings : ‘Without war, inferior or demoralized races would only too easily swamp the healthy and vital ones, and a general decadence would

¹ The writer’s copy of *Also sprach Zarathustra*, dated 1906, bears the imprint, ‘58th to 61st Thousand’.

be the result. War is one of the essential factors of morality.' So has Nietzsche ministered to that which he despised.

Finally, he has helped to swell the contempt and hatred of England which, if one may judge from much recent German literature, is almost a national passion. That 'nation of consummate cant', that 'fundamentally mediocre species', that 'herd of drunkards and rakes', in which slave-morality has reached its zenith, infallibly attracted on its thick head the lightnings of Nietzsche's indignation—as it also attracted on its cunning and diabolical policy the thunders of Treitschke.

III

Treitschke was already a professor of history in Berlin while Nietzsche was a professor of philology at Bâle. Unlike Nietzsche, who was unknown to his own generation, Treitschke had great and abounding vogue during the twenty-two years, from 1874 to 1896, in which he lectured at Berlin. The German professor has always been more closely in contact with affairs of State than the teachers of our English Universities, probably because German Universities are themselves more closely in contact with the State, and probably because learning carries more weight and exerts more influence in Germany than it does in England. German professors of law, like Savigny and Gierke, have left a deep mark on the history of German law, and German professors of history, like Dahlmann and Treitschke, have left a deep mark on the history of German politics. None of them has left a deeper mark than Treitschke. His lectures at Berlin were attended by soldiers and by administrators as well as by students; and the version of German history and the interpretation of political

theory which he taught are living and moulding forces to the present day.

In a country like Germany, with a new Empire not yet irrefragably grounded, and with lines of division still present to separate the Prussians of the north from the Bavarians and other Germans of the south, it is natural that the interpretation of past history should be influenced by, and should in turn be used to influence, the politics of the present. In what is called the Prussian School of History this blending of politics and history is most remarkable. Droysen writes a *History of Prussian Policy* to laud and magnify Prussia; Sybel writes the story of *The Foundation of the German Empire* to justify the ways of Bismarck; Treitschke, greatest of all, writes his *German History* to point the moral that Prussia is the chosen nation of Germany. Thus he has served, in the national politics of Germany, to aid the movement towards Prussianization. He would indeed have preferred to see the incorporation of all Germany in Prussia as a single unitary State in 1870, rather than witness, as he had to do, the institution of a federal Empire. But he consoled himself by thinking and teaching that the Empire was in reality only a greater Prussia, and that, federal as it might seem, it was essentially a unitary State under the King of Prussia in his capacity of Emperor; and he did what in him lay to make his teaching true.

It is in the external politics of Germany, and in her policy in Europe, that the most striking side of Treitschke's influence is to be seen. Here his *Politik* is the crucial book. The *Politik* consists of two volumes based on the notes of the lectures delivered by Treitschke at Berlin, from 1874 onwards, on the science of politics.

Its central tenet and cardinal principle may be summarized in four words: 'the State is Power'. And if we should attempt to descry in advance the bearing of these words, it may be seen in another pithy phrase: 'war is politics *par excellence*'. The cult of power and the praise of war are as much articles of faith with Treitschke as they are with Nietzsche; but the power is the power of Prussia, and the war is the war of Prussia. And then, despite some fundamental similarities, Treitschke had no love for Nietzsche. Nietzsche's 'good European' is a bad Prussian; his 'will to power' is an individual will, and the only power that Treitschke tolerates is the power of the collective national State.

Nationalism, which Nietzsche condemned, is the starting-point and goal of Treitschke. His fundamental postulate may be simply stated. The German nation is and must be supreme and only sovereign of its destinies, and must freely and for itself determine its place in the world. 'Agreed,' most of us will instantly answer. Perhaps we shall not agree so readily if we realize what 'sovereignty' and 'place in the world' really mean. Sovereignty, we shall find, means practical immunity from international obligation; place in the world, we shall find, means nothing fixed or determinate, but all that the sword can carve.

The State is power, says Treitschke, as Machiavelli had said before. It is power, because its highest duty is its self-preservation, and the primary means of its self-preservation is power. But even so, power after all is not an end, but only a means; and it will only be justified if the end is just. Now that end is the preservation of the State. Is the preservation of the State, then, an end so absolute as to justify absolute

power ? To Treitschke the question only admits of an affirmative answer. But why should the preservation of the State be an end so absolute as to justify absolute power ? Because, Treitschke answers, the State is the home and the organ of culture. Now this answer raises difficulties. In the first place, if the fundamental cause of the existence and preservation of the State is culture, then the essential attribute of the State is not power but culture : and the State should be defined not as power, but as the organ of culture, which only uses power as a means to culture, and so far as it is such a means. In the second place, this culture needs definition. Is it something exclusive, something *sui generis*, something absolutely peculiar to each particular State ? If that be assumed, some question may arise of the relative values of the different cultures of different States, and it may be asked whether each and every culture of each and every State is equally valuable and equally final. Or again, is culture something general, something common, something to which all States contribute and in which all States share ? If that be assumed, some question may arise of the need of common action to preserve such common culture, and it may be asked whether such common action, issuing, let us suppose, in a Concert of Europe and a public law of Europe, does not involve some limitation on the absolute and exclusive sovereignty and self-sufficiency of the State.

The assumption which Treitschke makes, and which the Germans generally seem to make, is that the ' culture ' of which they love to speak is exclusive, *sui generis*, peculiar to their State. The real hypothesis of all their reasoning is an exclusive nationalism. We read of *Deutsche Treue*, *Deutsche Tapferkeit*, *Deutsche Kultur*, until we begin to realize that the German mind

lives in an exclusively German world of its own. The wind of the spirit, that blows freely through Europe, stops at the Rhine, and a new wind of the German spirit takes its place. East of the Rhine, everything must bear the German print ; the vocabulary must be pure German and only German ; the very commodities must be German and only German. Now this exclusive national culture of Germany is assumed to be a thing final and ultimate of final and absolute value ; and therefore the State which sustains it is equally final and equally ultimate.

The State is the highest thing in the external society of man ; above it there is nothing at all in the history of the world.

This once assumed, its self-preservation, and to that end its power, become imperative.

To care for its power is the highest moral duty of the State. Of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most abominable and despicable : it is the sin against the Holy Spirit of politics.

This exclusive nationalism is perhaps not natural to the German ; and that may explain why it is so truculently inculcated by Treitschke. In the face of 'particularism', into which the Southern German falls, in the face of cosmopolitanism, for which the assimilative German has a natural instinct, and which some of its greatest thinkers have preached, the Prussian cult (for it is fundamentally Prussian) naturally runs to the other extreme. If that extreme only affected the internal conditions of Germany, as it springs from the internal conditions of Germany, it would be a matter of less concern to the world at large. But it affects all Europe ; for the conclusions to which it leads are conclusions that go to determine the policy of Germany

towards other States. And exclusive nationalism, expressing itself in the cult of power, issues in an attitude to the comity of Europe which constitutes a menace to international law and a constant threat of aggressive war.

In discussing international law, Treitschke first states, in order to dismiss, what he regards as two extreme and therefore untenable views. One is the Machiavellian view, which regards the State as mere physical power, able to do whatever it will. This he rejects, because the State is not mere power, but a power with a moral content, which cannot secure its moral ideals internally unless it binds itself by some law externally. The other is the 'Liberal' theory, which 'regards the State as a fine young fellow, who is to be washed and combed and sent to school, and to be thankful and just and God knows what besides'. This theory preaches an imaginary law, laid down *ex cathedra* by professors; but such a law has no sanction and therefore no value, and it would in the last resort demand a Roman pontiff with supreme authority as its executor—a demand which would banish freedom from our beautiful world.

There remains a third view, which Treitschke holds. This view postulates a positive international law, historically developed, which goes on the basis that one must not demand too much from human nature. The foundation of such a law is the principle of give and take, among great States of equal size, which have to live together. That principle demands a system of *great* States, because 'history shows the continuous growth of great States out of decadent small States'—a growth which ends in the great State of adequate size, which is at last ready for peace to protect its existence and its culture. It demands in the second place a system of *equal* States, because no one State should be able to permit itself

to do what it likes without danger to itself. Small States like Belgium and Holland, 'so long the home of international law, to its great loss', are prone to a sentimental view, because they fear aggression; and they demand in the name of humanity concessions at once contrary to the power of the State, unnatural, and unreasonable.

Few people realize to-day how ridiculous it is that Belgium should feel itself the home of international law. A State in an abnormal position must have an abnormal view of international law. Belgium is neutral; it is emasculated (*verstümmelt*); it cannot produce a healthy international law.

On the other hand, over-great States like England have a still worse influence. The overgrown sea-power of England destroys equilibrium at sea. England thus treads international law under her feet; she maltreats neutrals abominably; she insists on a law of war at sea far more inhuman than the law of war on land. Only by building a navy which will produce an equilibrium on the sea can any Power secure humanity and the observance of proper international law.

International law thus represents the rules that result from the equilibrium of great and equal States. But even so it is precarious: it is a law of imperfection. It cannot diminish the sovereignty of the State. 'The State is no violet that blushes unseen: its might must stand out proudly in the light.' When the Ego of its sovereignty is threatened vitally, all bonds are more honoured in the breach than the observance.

It is ridiculous to advise a State which is in competition with other States to start by taking the catechism into its hands.'

Not the catechism but the necessity of self-preservation is the canon of its action; and from this canon two results may be deduced. In the

first place, international treaties are no absolute limit, but a voluntary self-limitation, of the State. It has freely restricted itself; it may as freely remove or repudiate the restriction, if there be any vital question of the preservation of itself, its power, and its culture. In the second place, every treaty or obligation of a State must be held to be limited by the proviso *rebus sic stantibus*. 'A State cannot bind its will for the future over against other States'. If historical development changes circumstances, treaties and obligations are *ipso facto* changed and, it may be, nullified. Whether there has been such change is a point which the State itself alone can judge. There is no judge set over the State, and any judgement on this grave issue must be and can only be its own.¹

The ultimate effect of this doctrine is to leave decision not to the scales of justice, but to the arbitrament of the sword. Let us take, for instance, an international guarantee of the neutrality of a State. We may read in Treitschke that 'if a State is not in a position [if, in

¹ How exclusive nationalism affects a writer's attitude to international law may be seen from Bernhardi:

Each nation evolves its own conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical life. Even if a comprehensive international code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highest ideals: it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an injustice.

Bernhardi's references to Belgium are as curious as those of Treitschke. He uses the proviso *rebus sic stantibus* to raise a doubt whether Belgium is neutral to-day:

When she was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is not *ipso facto* a breach of neutrality.

He adds that 'the conception of permanent neutrality is contrary to the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other States'.

other words, it has not a sword of sufficient power] to maintain its neutrality, it is empty words to talk of its neutrality'. To the sword therefore Treitschke turns. Since there is no supreme court of international law, he argues, since history is in a perpetual flux, and historical development makes things stand otherwise than they did, war is justified, and must be conceived as ordained of God.

In 1866 Treitschke thought and said that any dragoon who had struck a Croat down had done more for the cause of Germany than the subtlest head with the best pen. As time went on, this subtle head fell more and more under the glamour of the sword. The German professor lent his pen, as has happened more than once in Germany, to put an ideal interpretation on given facts which in themselves and without such interpretation were somewhat gross; and learning bowed the knee before the soldier as the saviour of culture. Two functions, says Treitschke, belong to the State—the administration of law, and the making of war. It is war that is politics *par excellence*, and war therefore is the great function of the State. It is the great healer; it cannot be thought or wished out of the world, because it is the only medicine for a sick nation. It heals the State by renewing the spirit of membership and of sacrifice. It makes men realize that they are members one of another, and all limbs of one body politic. 'Therein lies the majesty of war, that the petty individual altogether vanishes before the great thought of the State.' And thus 'it is political idealism that involves war'. Nor is war only the sovereign remedy of States; it is also the nurse of the finest virtue of the individual.

What a perversion of morality it were, if one struck heroism out of humanity. . . . But the living God

will see to it that war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.'

This hymn to war carries us back to Nietzsche. But whereas Nietzsche looked to war as a way of evolving a European superman, Treitschke looks to war as the expression of an exclusively national super-nation; and while Nietzsche loved neither nationalism nor militarism, Treitschke is the lover of both. The danger with which his doctrine menaces Europe is simple. An ardently national State, proud of an exclusive culture which it conceives as the highest thing in the world, is released by his teaching from any real obligations to the public law of the European comity of nations, and armed with the sword for the preservation of its own exclusive culture. The fate of Europe seems to depend on the interpretation which Germany will place on the word 'preservation'. It is difficult not to think that that interpretation has been growing wider and wider. The preservation of German culture has come to mean, as far as one can see, not merely the preservation of the German State but the retention within the Germanic fold of all emigrants, and even the ingathering into the German fold of all the separate elements of the German stock. The policy of retention appears in the efforts made to maintain German schools, German speech, German newspapers in countries, like Brazil, in which there is a large German colony; the policy of ingathering appears in the Pan-German attitude to countries like Switzerland and Holland. Pan-Germanism is perhaps a matter of words rather than of actual policy. But even a sober judgement may well fear that this concept of the preservation of an exclusive German culture is a real and driving force -so real that it has become something of a religion. It is perhaps extravagant to feel that the Germans have

tended to a certain attitude of mind like that of early Mohammedanism, an attitude of mind based on the conviction that there is one culture, so precious that it may well be spread by the sword ; and yet one may read in the writings of German savants phrases which make one uneasy. One thinker, for instance, can argue that just as a small State cannot afford a *Dreadnought*, so it cannot build any whole and rounded body of culture. A small State, he feels, must be dependent on the great culture-State for the greater part of its spiritual life, and its incorporation in that greater State will only enrich and invigorate its real vitality.

After all, the conception of power, however defensive it may be in the honest opinion of its votaries, and however much it may be used as the servant of the preservation of the State, tends in the long run, and must tend in the long run, to twist round in their hands and to show its offensive edge. Power cannot be the servant of defence ; power in its nature becomes the master of offence. It is true that Germany has to keep watch and ward on the Rhine and the Vistula ; it is true that there are internal forces of cosmopolitanism and particularism against which she has to guard. It is perhaps also true that the means designed to this end are in danger of becoming themselves the end. German culture may seem a precious thing when it is conceived as standing on the defence against the ' Slav menace ' of the East. It does not seem so precious when it becomes a menace itself ; and that follows inevitably when it betakes itself to power as the means of its defence. Culture, after all, is a thing of the spirit ; by the spirit it grows, and by the spirit it is defended. German culture is not really defended against the Slav by the spirit of power which prohibits the use of the Polish language and expropriates

Polish landowners. Not only is it not defended; it is killed. The culture which allies itself to power ceases to be culture and becomes a mere power.

In the year 416 B.C., Thucydides records, a debate was held between the great State of the Athenians and the inhabitants of a small island called Melos, to whom the Athenians offered the alternative between the sword and submission. 'You know as well as we do,' say the Athenians, 'that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.' The Melians plead for consideration of what is fair and right. That, they urge, is a common good. 'Surely you are as much concerned in this as any, since your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance, and an example to the world.' 'We feel no uneasiness about the end of our Empire,' answer the Athenians; 'that is a risk we are content to take.' And they reiterate their faith in the necessary law of human nature, by which men rule wherever they can. Thus did Athenian culture become Athenian power, and thus did Athens preach that might was right. Even so to-day does Bernhardi, faithful disciple of Treitschke in his attitude to the 'common good' of international law and to the rights of the strong nation armed, preach the equivalence of power and right. Where a growing nation seeks to conquer new territory, 'might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war', which, he adds with a modern refinement, gives 'a biologically just decision'. Marvellous too in his eyes, as in the eyes of the Athenians, is the doctrine 'that the weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation'. Well did Mommsen say to these new Athenians, 'Have a care, gentlemen, lest in this

State, which has been at once a power in arms and in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military State should remain '.

It is as a great military Power that Germany now stands before the world. She has taken unto herself the ideals of power and might, of massivity and grandiosity. It is colossal ; it is not culture. What we may hope, and hope earnestly and in anguish, is that she will return to worship with her heart the culture to which she pays abundant service of the lips ; that she will enter again into the comity of European States, by sacrificing the false ideal of an exclusive culture guarded by the sword, which in its nature cannot guard it, to the true ideal of a common culture guarded by the Spirit, which alone can kill and make alive ; and that she will again be a king's daughter all glorious within, as she was in those days when, disunited and devoid of ' power ', she gave of her spirit to Europe great music, great poetry, and great philosophy. Thus may she shed that curious paganism, which sees in ' heroism ' the cardinal virtue, and finds heroism only in war ; thus may she return from Nietzsche's ' will to power ' to Luther's justification by faith—from Treitschke's praise of war to Kant's vision of permanent peace.

F. B.

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GERMANY AND THE 'FEAR OF RUSSIA'

OF all the arguments used to enlist the sympathies of the British public on the German side during the crisis which led up to the war, none made so wide an appeal to British sentiment as Germany's 'fear of Russia'. The average Englishman knows very little about Russia, and what he knows about her is often derived from violently though not unnaturally prejudiced witnesses—political refugees, Jews, Poles, Finns, and other victims of the repressive methods to which the Russian governing classes have clung, in many directions, tenaciously, in spite of the marked movement towards progress in other directions. Many Englishmen, therefore, see in Russia a remote but formidable and scarcely half-civilized Power, sprawling across two continents, imbued with an insatiable lust of conquest, herself ignorant of freedom and bent on confiscating the freedom of other peoples brought under her sway. This, of course, is a very distorted picture, but it fitted in admirably with Germany's purpose, which was to represent the coming war as a war for German 'culture' against Russian 'barbarism'. That it is nothing of the kind, many distinguished Russians, who cannot be suspected of subserviency to the Russian Government, have now undertaken to tell the British public. Amongst these are Professor Vinogradoff, whose admirable letter to *The*

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Times has been republished by the Clarendon Press ; Professor Struve, one of the founders of the Russian Constitutional Democratic party of the Duma, and M. Bourtseff, a leader of the advanced revolutionary party. They all speak on this aspect of the question with an authority to which I cannot pretend.

All that I desire to show is how incompatible is this theory of the German 'fear of Russia' with the relations of close intimacy and co-operation with Russia which Germany has always sought to cultivate, and has successfully cultivated until quite recently, with great advantage to her own immediate political purposes, but to the detriment of all the best interests of Russia.

The 'fear of Russia' is, it is true, not quite a new bogey in Germany. Even Bismarck used to trot out the danger of Pan-Slavism on sundry occasions when he wanted to make the German people's flesh creep, in order to procure acceptance of fresh military burdens. But he quickly put it away again as soon as it had fulfilled its purpose. Friendship with Russia was one of the cardinal principles of his foreign policy, and one thing he always relied upon to make Russia amenable to German influence was that she should never succeed in healing the Polish sore. In his own *Reflections and Reminiscences*, he boasts with the most extraordinary cynicism of the agreement which he made with Russia in 1863 for the repression of the Polish insurrection. There was a powerful party in Russia, to which the Tsar Alexander II himself at first inclined, which favoured large concessions to Poland. Bismarck threw the whole weight of Prussian influence into the scale of the reactionary party at St. Petersburg ; and the result was, as he himself describes it, 'a victory

in the Russian Cabinet of Prussian over Polish policy. . . . An agreement between Russia and the German foe of Pan-Slavism [i.e. Prussia] for joint action, military and political, against the Polish "fraternization" movement was a decisive blow to the views of the philo-Polish party at the Russian Court.' What Bismarck also defeated at the same stroke was the possibility of a triple *entente* between Russia, France, and England, even in those far-off days. For the two Western Powers were then working together to win Russia over to the liberal policy towards Poland, which Bismarck succeeded in checkmating. In regard to Poland, the Emperor William II, except for a couple of years under the more liberal Chancellorship of Bismarck's immediate successor, Count von Caprivi, has adhered steadily to the Bismarckian tradition. Germany, down to the present day, has oppressed her own Poles not less ruthlessly than Russia, but a great deal more scientifically.

In just the same spirit, Bismarck always sided with the party of German ascendancy in Vienna against the Austrian Slavs; and he used openly to resent any concessions made to them, until the Austro-German alliance was signed and sealed in 1879. Then he felt he could henceforth rely upon the still more anti-Slav tendencies of the Hungarian Government to counteract, as far as foreign policy was concerned, the tenderness which the Emperor Francis Joseph was inclined to display towards his Slav subjects in the Austrian part of his dominions. Here again, the Kaiser has walked in Bismarck's footsteps.

Nevertheless, when the Kaiser came to the throne and dropped the old pilot overboard, the relations between Germany and Russia entered upon a new phase.

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Bismarck preferred, on principle, the friendship of Russia to that of Austria; for he believed that there could be no more solid basis for political co-operation between great European Powers than common principles of internal government. At bottom, he remained a Prussian *junker* all his life long, and absolutism was and still is the ideal of all Prussian *junkers*. Thus, when the Tsar Nicholas I died in 1855, during the Crimean war, the Berlin *Kreuz-Zeitung*, then and still their chief organ, appeared in the deepest mourning with a leading article headed, 'Our Emperor is dead.' There was, of course, no German Emperor in those days; and, though there was an Austrian Emperor at Vienna, it was towards the Russian autocrat that the Prussian *junkers* turned in worship, just as every Mohammedan turns in prayer towards the Prophet's shrine at Mecca. After the Franco-German war, when Bismarck concentrated all his energies on the preservation of the great German Empire he had created, the combination which above all commended itself to him was the 'Three Emperors' Alliance', i.e. an alliance between Germany, Austria, and Russia, based upon common dynastic interests and, to a great extent, common principles of domestic government. It was only when Russian policy with regard to Turkey and her subject races began to alarm Austria-Hungary that, compelled to make his choice between Russia and Austria, Bismarck chose rather reluctantly the latter. He did not himself care twopence about the fate of the Christian races in the Balkans, which, as he once said, were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. But Russia could not remain indifferent to them. The whole nation regarded the emancipation of the Balkan peoples from the Turkish yoke as the historic mission of Russia. It was the Russo-Turkish war of

1827-9 which consummated the independence of Greece. The Crimean war was, for the Russian people, a war waged primarily for the overthrow of Turkish misrule. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 resulted in the liberation of a large part of what is now the kingdom of Bulgaria. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, had quite different views about the Balkans. The Austrians had played a great part in driving back the tide of Turkish conquest in Eastern Europe, but they had retained for themselves large territories inhabited by Slav races, Serbs, Croats, and others ; in the same way, after the last Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8, they had occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, also largely peopled by Slavs. Their ultimate object was to get down to Salonica and the Aegean Sea, and they did not want to see Turkey dismembered merely to make room for independent Balkan States, least of all for Balkan States under Russian protection. When Bismarck saw the growing friction between Russian policy and Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans, he could not run the risk of falling between two stools. He therefore concluded an alliance with Austria-Hungary, partly because she was far more likely than Russia to be content with the position of a subordinate ally. At the same time, to borrow one of his favourite expressions, he was not going to 'cut the wire to St. Petersburg' altogether ; and, a few years later, when the wire was becoming rather shaky, he did not shrink from the famous Reinsurance Compact with Russia which, concluded behind Austria's back, fell only very little short of a treacherous bargain that Germany would put her own interpretation, when the time came, upon her treaty obligations towards Austria in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict.

That was the position when William II dismissed

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Bismarck. Now Bismarck's chief object was to safeguard the position of undisputed pre-eminence which the German Empire had acquired on the European continent, and to prevent, at all costs, any hostile combination of Powers which might imperil his life's work. This did not satisfy the young Emperor. He wanted Germany not merely to remain the most powerful State in Europe but to become a world Empire. The Near East, Constantinople, Asia Minor, and Syria—first attracted his attention, and, as he could not very well conquer the Sultan's dominions, he set to work to capture the Sultan himself. All the other Powers were constantly warning the Sultan to introduce reforms and to set his house in order. The Kaiser said to him in effect: 'Deal with your house as you think fit, and I will protect you against these busybodies, if you will make it worth my while. All I want is railway concessions, commercial concessions, banking concessions, privileges for my German colonists in Syria and elsewhere, and the employment of German officers to reorganize and equip your army with German war materials.' To seal this bargain, he was quite willing to go to Constantinople and pay his court to the 'Red Sultan', Abdul Hamid, when the rest of the civilized world was boycotting him on account of the Armenian massacres. Austria-Hungary followed the lead of Germany, though not without occasional hesitation; for she knew that it was only with the help of Germany that she could achieve her own ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula.

But to Russia, German ascendancy at Constantinople could not fail to be most unpalatable; and, as one of the first acts of the Kaiser after he had dismissed Bismarck was to drop his Reinsurance Compact with Russia, the German wire to Petrograd, if not actually

cut, was again very much weakened, and a tariff war between Russia and Germany tended further to make bad blood between the two countries. The Kaiser was by no means ready at that time to break with Russia, and the policy of adventure which Russia was then entering upon in the Far East proved a godsend to Germany. The construction of the Siberian railway, linking up the Tsar's dominions in Europe with his possessions on the remote Pacific, was opening up to Russian statesmen the possibility of finding in the Far East that access to the warmer waters of the world from which they were practically cut off in Europe. The victories of Japan over China in 1894-5 introduced, however, a new and very disturbing factor into their calculations. The Emperor William was quick to seize his opportunity. If he did not, as the Japanese firmly believe, actually instigate Russia to prevent Japan from reaping the fruits of her Manchurian campaign against China, he was prompt to lend her his heartiest co-operation; even at the cost of sowing in Japan a harvest of bitter resentment which has even now come to maturity in the investment of Kiaochao by the Japanese forces, Germany helped Russia and her (on this occasion) somewhat unwilling ally France to eject the Japanese from the territories ceded to them by China. She of course very soon required payment, and Russia was not overwell pleased when, two years later, the Mailed Fist descended upon Kiaochao. On the other hand, she was able to rely on the Kaiser's eager acquiescence when, shortly afterwards, she herself took possession of Port Arthur. One good turn deserves another, and so, in the international expedition for the relief of the Legations in Peking, during the Boxer movement in 1900, the Tsar allowed himself to be jockeyed by the Kaiser

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into proposing that all the foreign forces in Northern China should be placed under a German Generalissimo, Field Marshal von Waldersee, who returned the compliment by giving the Russians a free hand in Manchuria. Germany, again, had no sooner signed an agreement with this country during the Boxer movement for the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire than, at the first hint from St. Petersburg, she hastened to repudiate all idea of its having any application to the Manchurian provinces of China, over which Russia was establishing a scarcely veiled protectorate. Directly and indirectly, German influence henceforth steadily elbowed Russia into a conflict with Japan which, it was hoped in Berlin, would not only divert all Russia's energies from Europe, but also lead to the ultimate conflict between Russia and Great Britain which was then still the certain hope of German statesmen.

Here, however, as in many other cases, the Emperor William overreached himself. From the days of the Holy Alliance onwards, the Russian and German sovereigns have been in the habit of entertaining much closer personal relations than usually exist between the rulers of two independent States. Apart, for instance, from the ordinary diplomatic representation, a special military plenipotentiary, accredited to the person of the sovereign, served as the medium for direct and extremely confidential communications, sometimes quite unknown to the Embassies. Moreover, in Russia, a large section of the Court and of the higher official world consists of Russians of German origin, many of them from the Baltic provinces, whose sympathies have not unnaturally been largely German. Even amongst pure Russians, the reactionary party

has always had much more in common with Imperial Germany than with the liberal Powers of Western Europe. All these forces were in turn mobilized by the Kaiser to urge Russia on to action in the Far East, and to encourage the belief that Japan either would shrink at the last from a conflict with the mighty Russian Empire, or would be easily crushed if she ventured upon the attempt. These forces carried the day, and brought on the Russo-Japanese war, but the result was not what the Kaiser had expected. Thanks very largely to the cordial understanding which had been restored between England and France, both Powers were able to stand out of the conflict, though France was the ally of Russia and Great Britain was the ally of Japan. The war was localized in the Far East, and Russia was defeated.

It was true that, as one result of the Japanese war, Russia's military forces were seriously crippled for years and her position, even in Europe, considerably weakened; but the bitter lesson which she learnt from her defeat was not at all that upon which the Kaiser had reckoned. In the first place, the Tsar Nicholas realized that the advice he had received from London before the war had been far sounder and inspired by far more genuine friendship than the advice he had received from Berlin; for the British Government had consistently warned him that Japan would certainly fight if pressed too hard, and that, if she fought, she might prove to be a very formidable foe. Then, again, the revolutionary movement in Russia, which had derived much of its strength from popular resentment at the Manchurian fiasco, had not ended in the complete triumph of reaction which the Kaiser and the pro-German party in Russia had expected. On the

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contrary, the constitutional reforms, the establishment of the Duma, the attempts to infuse a more liberal spirit into the bureaucracy, created new currents of thought throughout Russia, which were much more in sympathy with Western Europe than with Germany. Not only the most progressive parties in Russia, but even the moderate conservative parties welcomed from the first the possibility of a better understanding between Great Britain and Russia, not merely on international grounds, but because they were convinced that friendly relations between the two countries were bound to exert a favourable influence on the Russian internal situation. The reactionary parties, on the other hand, were those that persisted in the old distrust of England, and clung desperately to the time-honoured connexion with Germany.

Thus, for the first time, the Russian Government was induced to approach the question of a political understanding with Great Britain in an entirely new spirit. This country had often before, especially under Liberal administrations, made overtures to Russia for a settlement of existing differences in Asia; but until the Japanese war induced a more chastened spirit in St. Petersburg, such overtures never met with any genuine response. French influence, too, was now exerted in St. Petersburg for the removal of any further chances of conflict between her Russian ally and her British friend. In 1907, an Anglo-Russian agreement was signed for the settlement of the three principal questions concerning Central Asia, which had repeatedly threatened to embroil the two countries, and it not only removed the chief dangers of collision between them, but paved the way for more intimate relations than had existed for nearly a hundred years. To

Germany, the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 brought even more bitter disillusionment than had the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, because it was still more unexpected. The Kaiser felt that, just as he has already lost one of his trump cards in the removal of the old colonial jealousies between France and England, he was again losing another in the removal of the old Asiatic antagonism between Russia and Great Britain. So as, in 1905, Germany had made a desperate attempt to break up over Morocco the Anglo-French understanding before it had had time to consolidate, so, in 1908, a determined attempt was made to smash the Triple Entente between Great Britain, France, and Russia. The crisis arose with the formal incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Hapsburg dominions and the simultaneous proclamation of Bulgarian independence. I need not dwell here upon its vicissitudes. Austria-Hungary, who was primarily concerned, had practically carried her point by diplomatic pressure, but this did not satisfy the Kaiser. It was not enough that Russia, whose military organization had not yet recovered from the Japanese war, should be compelled to abandon the claims she had rather rashly advanced on behalf of her Slav clients. The Kaiser insisted upon her public humiliation, and a scarcely veiled ultimatum was delivered at St. Petersburg, which at that stage was quite needless except to advertise Germany's 'Shining Armour'.

The humiliation thus inflicted upon Russia was resented all the more keenly as it struck at the very point where the policy of the Russian Government most accurately reflected the sentiments of the whole nation. There is in Russia as in most other countries, and far more than in any democratic country, a chauvinist

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party whose ambitions find little echo in the nation as a whole, and that party has always been very strongly represented amongst the official classes, and not least in the Russian Foreign Office. The policy of Asiatic adventure upon which the Russian Government had entered was the policy of that party. The Russian people have always remained more or less indifferent to Persian or Tibetan or Far Eastern questions. Its heart was never even really stirred by the war against Japan. On the other hand, Russian policy in the Balkans, whether or not it was always prompted by disinterested solicitude for the little Slav brothers, always struck a responsive chord throughout Russia; and the people perhaps even more than the Government fiercely resented the slap in the face which Russia had received as a great Slav Power.

As between the two Sovereigns, the wire from Berlin to St. Petersburg had been almost irreparably damaged by the Kaiser's Shining Armour; but when, in theory, the supreme authority is concentrated, as in Russia, in the hands of one man, he is rarely able to exercise real control over any department of the State. Hence in Russia the curious administrative anarchy which often seems to prevail under autocratic rule, even after the events of 1909. Thus it came about that although the Tsar had from the beginning been a whole-hearted supporter of the understanding with England, German influence continued to make itself felt in many powerful quarters, and even in the Russian Foreign Office. In foreign policy, it was chiefly in connexion with Persia that the voice of the German tempter still frequently obtained a hearing, and partly under pressure, Russian diplomacy, it must be admitted, often put a severe strain upon the spirit if not the letter of the Anglo-

Russian agreement of 1907. Still more visible was the hand of Germany in the swing of the Russian pendulum towards reactionary methods at home ; but the more bitter the disappointment of the progressive parties in Russia over the developments of internal policy, the more steadfastly they clung to the maintenance of friendly relations between the Russian and the British Governments as a certain safeguard for what remained of their liberties. Events, meanwhile, were shaping themselves in the Balkan Peninsula in such a way as to force the hands of even the worst reactionaries, who, whatever else they might be willing to do, could not repudiate altogether the traditions of Russian policy in regard to the Slavs outside the Empire.

The small States of South-eastern Europe had taken to heart the lesson of 1908-9. They felt that their interests and even their independence were exposed henceforth to even greater danger from the ambitions of the two Germanic Powers than from their old enemy Turkey. Each of them began to set his own house in order, and a genuine attempt was made to compose their past differences and jealousies in order to meet the common enemy. Long-drawn negotiations between them resulted in the formation of a Balkan League composed of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro. All had not, probably, quite the same objects in view. Bulgaria and perhaps Greece had an eye chiefly to Constantinople. For Serbia and Montenegro, it was the Austrian menace that loomed largest. All, however, claimed special, if sometimes rival, interests in Macedonia, and it was Turkish misrule in Macedonia which ultimately brought the Balkan League into the field. The action, perhaps the very existence, of the League took Austria and Germany by surprise. The result of

its action was a still more unpleasant surprise for them. A victorious Balkan League was likely to prove a very formidable obstacle to Austro-Hungarian expansion to the Aegean Sea ; and Germany's prestige at Constantinople was specially affected by the fact that it was she who had made herself largely responsible for the organization and even for the equipment of the defeated Turkish armies. Germany, therefore, was quite ready to co-operate as peacemaker with Great Britain. The British Government was chiefly concerned to put an end to the war lest it should spread beyond its local limits. The German Government reckoned that, once peace was signed with Turkey, the Balkan League would quarrel over the division of the spoils and fall a prey to internal dissensions. It proved an accurate calculation. Russia tried at the last moment to defeat it by offering to act as arbitrator between the Balkan States. Serbia, whose exorbitant demands had gone far to provoke the conflict, could not reject the Russian proposal, for she, more than any other Balkan State, was dependent, in the last resort, upon Russian protection. But at Sofia the influence of the Germanic Powers prevailed, and King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, whose ambitions were still more inordinate, would not hear of arbitration, and himself cut the Gordian knot by initiating hostilities against his Serbian neighbours. Once more, the result was not what Germany or Austria-Hungary had expected and hoped. For Rumania, who had hitherto been regarded as a satellite of the Germanic Powers, suddenly emancipated herself from their influence. Under the pressure of her armies, as well as of defeats inflicted upon the Bulgarian armies by both Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria was compelled to acknowledge herself beaten ; whilst with Greece, Serbia, whom Austria had flouted

in 1909, emerged triumphantly from this fratricidal struggle.

Both in Vienna and in Berlin, it was felt that a severe blow had been dealt to the position of the Germanic Powers in South-eastern Europe, and that the situation could only be retrieved by taking action which would inevitably involve the risk of bringing Russia into the field. It was then that, for the first time, German statesmen began to talk about the 'Russian peril', and the impending conflict between German 'culture' and Russian 'barbarism'. In Vienna, the talk was more about Serbian insolence, and the necessity of chastising it. The murder of the Austrian heir apparent and his consort at Serajevo on June 28 provided the long-sought-for opportunity. That abominable crime overbore the old Emperor Francis Joseph's reluctance to sanction any kind of warlike enterprise, whilst the German Emperor, who had been a close friend of the Archduke, unquestionably felt it deeply, and as a personal injury not less than as a political misfortune. The counter-blow was dealt swiftly and brutally. The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, charging her with a deliberate conspiracy against the safety and integrity of the Hapsburg dominions, as well as with the actual connivance of some of her officials in the crime, demanded an abject and quite unparalleled surrender of Serbia's independence. We know now that, though the German Foreign Office may have been content to give a free hand to Austria without asking or wishing to be made acquainted with the details of the Austrian demands, it was not so with the German Emperor. His ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirschky, whose influence was throughout exerted for war, enjoyed his special confidence; through the am-

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bassador he knew exactly what the Austrian ultimatum was to be—an ultimatum carefully framed to secure not acceptance but rejection. Even so, under Russian advice, Serbia did accept it almost in its entirety; but even this sacrifice in the cause of European peace was of no avail. We know also, from the German official memorandum published after the outbreak of hostilities, that, though addressed to Serbia, the ultimatum was from the first directly aimed over her head at Russia. M. Sazonoff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was quick to realize that this was the real object which the two Germanic Powers had in view, but the whole Russian nation was equally quick to realize it. Popular feeling ran as high over the Austrian menace to Serbia as it had done in former days, when the issue was the emancipation of the Balkan Slavs from the Turkish yoke, and M. Sazonoff undoubtedly spoke for the Russian people as well as for the Russian Government when he at once declared that Russia could not allow Serbia to be crushed, and that she would rather face all the risks of war. In Austria there was at first an inclination not to take this warning very seriously. It was lightheartedly assumed that Russia would, at the last moment, flinch as she had done in 1909 before the Kaiser's 'Shining Armour'; and when it became clear that this time she was in grim earnest, a belated attempt was made to resume conversations with St. Petersburg, which were, in fact, still proceeding when the Kaiser precipitated the catastrophe by his two-fold ultimatum, to Russia and to France. Then, indeed, was the German wire to Petrograd irrevocably cut, and all the warnings of Bismarck's statesmanship cast to the winds.

Even from so brief a review of Russo-German relations,

it will be seen how little the present war has to do with any inexorable antagonism between German ' culture ' and Russian ' barbarism '. So long as Germany could successfully exploit for her own purposes all the worst elements in the governing classes of Russia and deflect Russian ambitions into channels which did not impede her own, German statesmen and the German press laid eloquent stress upon the old dynastic friendship and the community of conservative principles and of political interests between the two countries. But when the gradual movement towards progress in Russia itself began to undermine the buttresses of German influence, and when finally the exigencies of the Kaiser's World-Policy compelled him to make a frontal attack upon Russia's position as the great Slav Power of Europe, then German statesmen and their scribes in the German press suddenly discovered that it was no longer, as in the old days when Germany was helping to hypnotize Russia in the Far East, the Chinese and the Japanese that threatened the ' holiest possessions ' of European civilization, but that terrible Slav barbarism of which Russia was the monstrous embodiment. Well, if Russian barbarism were all that Germans in their new-fangled ' fear of Russia ' have depicted it to be, it might still stand comparison with the sort of German ' culture ' which has staggered humanity since the outbreak of this war. But the so-called ' barbarism ' which has suddenly provoked in Germany a righteous indignation too long dissembled to be very genuine, is largely the result of long-arrested development. It is too often forgotten that, whilst Western civilization was slowly but steadily emerging from the Dark Ages, the forbears of modern Russia provided for a couple of centuries the great breakwater against which the tide of Asiatic

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invasion repeatedly spent itself. Only then was Russia free to begin to tread the path on which the rest of Europe had already been striding forward. If we still owe the Russians of those remote days a debt of gratitude, it looks as if, before this war is over, Western Europe may have contracted a further debt towards their descendants of the present day for bearing a very large share in the preservation of Europe's liberties against the modern Huns.

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INDIA AND THE
WAR

BY
SIR ERNEST J. TREVELYAN

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INDIA AND THE WAR

THERE are many people in Great Britain who do not realize the significance of the dispatch of Indian troops to the war, and of the many offers of assistance which have been received from the rulers of the native States in India. India is now asserting its right to be treated as a portion of the Empire, and to take its share in the responsibilities of that Empire. It claims to be treated as a partner and not as a mere dependant.

How many Englishmen have more than the vaguest notions of the relations between India and England? They know nothing of the history of our acquisition of sovereignty in India, they know nothing of our administration of the country, how we have welded together so many discordant elements, how we have worked for happiness and order and how we have endeavoured to develop the country in the interests of its people. We have not, of course, forgotten our own interests, but our interests have coincided with those of the people. Now, as we will show hereafter, India is appreciating this fact and is anxious to join with us against the common enemy.

Even those who have had relations working in India have frequently inaccurate ideas on the subject. They look upon it merely as a hot and unhealthy place which furnishes a livelihood for younger sons who otherwise would be unable to get employment. They look upon it as a grand field for missionary enterprise, and as a useful producer of some of the necessaries of life,

such as wheat, rice, tea, sugar, jute, and other products of the earth.

The estimated population of the Indian Empire was 315,000,000 in 1911, in 1912 it imported £152,000,000 worth of goods and exported £171,000,000. As most of the imports are from Great Britain, many thousands of people in England practically depend upon India for their livelihood.

The peoples of India are of many different races and religions; 69 per cent. are Hindus, 21 per cent. Mohammedans, 3 per cent. Buddhists (nearly all in Burma); the remaining 7 per cent. include nearly 4,000,000 Christians, over 3,000,000 Sikhs, 1,250,000 Jains (a sect of dissenting Hindus), about 100,000 Parsees, and over 10,250,000, described as Animists, who believe in magic and strive to propitiate impersonal forces. India has 147 vernacular languages of extraordinary variety. Hindustani, which was the camp language of the Mohammedan invaders, is the *lingua franca* of India; but among the educated classes it has been superseded to a great extent by English.

England's first association with India began at the close of the sixteenth century, when the London East India Company was incorporated by Queen Elizabeth. It was not until the eighteenth century that this country acquired any sovereign rights in India. During that century Lord Clive, Warren Hastings, and other officers of the East India Company gradually extended the dominion of the English people. In 1858 the Crown took over the administration of the country. On November 1 of that year Queen Victoria issued a proclamation to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of India announcing her resolution to assume the government and the territories of India 'heretofore administered in trust'

by the Honourable East India Company'. Legislative Councils were then established and the constitution of the government was fixed by Acts of Parliament. Since that time the association of the people in the government of the country has been developed. Not only are the people represented in the several legislatures, but their leading men play an important part in the working of municipal and other public bodies.

Although the governing class is necessarily British and the higher appointments are in the main held by Britons, the bulk of the executive and judicial work is done by Indians. Indians also are to be found in the higher appointments. They are in the Executive Councils of the Viceroy and Governors, in the Boards of Revenue, and on the Benches of the High Courts. The legal profession of India is almost entirely composed of natives of the country. A large proportion of the medical profession is also indigenous, but its native members have been taught in medical schools by English doctors, and by others who have been trained in the European systems of medicine.

Some of the communities, especially the Hindus, Jains, and Parsees, are taking a prominent part in commerce; their merchant princes have acquired a great reputation for energy and charity. The Mohammedan community, for reasons which it is not necessary to detail here, has not been able to take such full advantage of English education as have the Hindus, but there are signs of their advancing upon similar lines. The present Law Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council is an Indian Mohammedan, and there are Mohammedans on all the Benches of the High Courts of Justice.

The instincts of a large number of the people, especially in Upper India, are martial. The Mahrattas, the Rajputs,

the Sikhs, and the Mohammedans of Upper India fought us in the past and they were worthy antagonists. Their descendants have fought with us and now assert their right to take their share in the perils that beset us.

Never has there been an occasion when India has been more united than at the present time. The moment that news arrived of the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany a wave of enthusiasm seems to have passed over not only the whole of the British Empire in India, but throughout Hindustan. There has not been a single note of discord. Every class and every race have shown their loyalty and their anxiety to take their share of the burdens and duties of citizens of the Empire. Sedition and disaffection have disappeared from the peninsula; it is not only where Britain rules that offers of men, of money and of help of every kind have been made spontaneously and ungrudgingly, but the independent rulers have to a man placed their troops and their wealth at the service of the Empire. The Maharaja of Nepal, an independent State with a population of about 5,000,000, has put the entire resources of his country at the disposal of the King-Emperor. His men furnish to England the Gurkha regiments, which are some of the best infantry in the world. The Raja of Mysore has sent for the use of the troops a sum of 50 lakhs of rupees; that is something between £300,000 and £400,000. The Ruler of the ancient State of Rewa writes to the Viceroy: 'What orders from His Majesty for me and my troops?' The Gaekwar of Baroda, one of the principal Mahratta States in India, offers all his troops and resources. The Rulers of Bharatpur and Akalkot make similar offers. The Raja of Pudukota offers 'all I possess', and expresses his anxiety to serve in any capacity and to raise a regi-

ment of his subjects. The Maharaja of Idar, the Rao of Cutch, the Maharaja of Bhaunagar, the Thakore Sahib of Limbdi, and the Nawab of Palampur have also placed the resources of their States at the disposal of the Government.

These messages are typical of the spirit which is to be found everywhere in India. The offers are not empty ones. It is perfectly clear that all Indians of intelligence and education now realize, if they did not do so before, that their own interests and those of the whole country are bound up with the interests of the British Empire.

It is not only from princes and rulers that help is offered. Newspapers show that all classes of the community are trying to find out what they can do to help the British. Meetings are being held by different communities at which not only are feelings of loyalty expressed, but offers of help are made. Generally the voice of the women of India is unheard, even in the case of political danger; but things are different now. Mr. B. N. Bose, a prominent member of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General of India, writes to *The Times* :

‘Sir,—As an Indian who came over to this country only temporarily, as a delegate of the Indian National Congress, I read this morning the message of our beloved Viceroy, of India’s loyalty and India’s co-operation in this great crisis of our life, with tears in my eyes. Our Indian sun stirs our blood to strong emotions.

We feel grateful to Mr. Bonar Law for his suggestion that this message should be published to the world, and may I add that Indian women have not only cheerfully parted with their sons, husbands, and brothers at the call of the King, but I have received

communications from India that many of them who are too humble to make their offer to the Viceroy are willing, if need be, to part with their personal jewelry and ornaments, things which in India constitute the women's insurance fund, as they did in bygone times when religion or honour was in danger.'

The supply of trained soldiers who are keen for war and who are the descendants of many generations of warriors is practically inexhaustible. The Gurkhas, the Sikhs, the Rajputs, the Mahrattas, the Mohammedan races of Northern India have in past times earned on many a stricken field the reputation of great warriors. The present representatives of those races are in no way inferior to their ancestors. Many of them have been trained in the British Army in India, and have fought side by side with British troops in all the wars which have been waged in India and the East. Afghanistan, China, Egypt have all experienced the valour and fighting capacity of our Indian troops. It is not alone upon our own Indian troops that we can now rely. Some of the Native States in India have large armies of trained soldiers whose swords are at our service.

Distinctions of race and creed have disappeared at the first suggestion of danger to the Empire. Hindus, Mohammedans, Parsees, and Buddhists are all uniting. The same news comes from every part of India. In Bengal volunteer forces are receiving large accessions to their numbers. Calcutta lawyers, most of whom are Bengalis, a race upon whom we have not so far depended for an army, have undertaken to raise a company of volunteers. The Calcutta *Bengali*, the well-known Indian newspaper, says this :

'Of the attitude of the people . . . we desire to say that behind the serried ranks of one of the finest

armies in the world, there are the multitudinous peoples of India, ready to co-operate with the Government in the defence of the Empire, which, for them, means, in its ultimate evolution, the complete recognition of their rights as Citizens of the finest State in the world. We may have our differences with the Government—and what people have not?—but in the presence of a common enemy, be it Germany or any other Power, we sink our differences, we forget our little quarrels and close our ranks and offer all that we possess in defence of the great Empire to which we are all so proud to belong, and with which the future prosperity and advancement of our people are bound up. India has always been loyal in the hour of danger.'

Similar articles are to be found in many other Indian papers written by Indians for Indians.

India has already dispatched to the seat of war two splendid divisions of infantry and one cavalry brigade, while three more cavalry brigades will follow immediately. This means 70,000 fighting men sent as a first instalment from India to the help of Great Britain. Some of the Indian Chiefs have been selected to accompany this Expeditionary Force. They are the veteran Maharajah Sir Pertab Singh, who has often fought with our troops before, and is a Major-General in the British Army; the Maharajah of Bikanir, who is every inch a soldier; the Maharajah of Patiala, who is the head of the Sikhs; and the Maharajahs of Kishengarh and Jodhpur, the Raja of Ratlam, and the Mohammedan Nawabs of Jaoram, Sachin, and Bhopal, the latter being the ruler of one of the principal Mohammedan States in India.

The message which the King-Emperor has sent to the Princes and Peoples of his Indian Empire was in

terms which will be appreciated by every Englishman. It was as follows :

‘ Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of My Empire in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to My Throne expressed both by My Indian subjects, and by the Feudatory Princes and the Ruling Chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the Realm. Their one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict has touched My heart, and has inspired to the highest issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked My Indian subjects and Myself. I recall to mind India’s gracious message to the British nation of good will and fellowship which greeted My return in February, 1912, after the solemn ceremony of My Coronation Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a noble fulfilment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked.’

Why is it that India is doing so much to help the British Empire in this time of need ? Is it from any particular affection for the English people ? Probably not. One cannot expect affection, although one may hope for mutual respect, between rulers and ruled when they are of entirely different races and creeds. It is because the peoples of India now recognize that their interests are bound up with the interests of the British Empire. Were the Empire to come to an end, India would become the prey of some other foreign nation whose rule would be very different from that exercised by us. Whatever our faults may be, we have done our best to give peace, prosperity, and justice to India.

India has never been a separate nation, the only

bond of union between the many races that inhabit Hindustan is that created by the existence of a foreign government. Until the present time there has been no unanimity on any occasion, but now a common danger has produced common action. We feel that we can depend upon India for help whenever we justly require it. India will not lose by the help given to us in our time of need. Bonds of friendship between Great Britain and its dependency will be strengthened, and Britons will realize more and more their duties to the inhabitants of their Indian Empire.

There has always been a feeling of good fellowship between British and Indian troops and also between Indian troops and their British officers. It is quite certain that in the present war there will be a repetition and increase of this good feeling. This war will probably lead to a better understanding between the people of Great Britain and the peoples of India. Some of the mendacious news in the German Press consisted of statements that India was in rebellion against the British Crown. So far from there being any truth in the statement such disaffection or sedition as recently existed amongst members of some of the classes of India now appears to have been sporadic. It has disappeared entirely. There is now no internal trouble which can embarrass the Government, and the financial and economic situation is exceptionally strong.

It is a proud day for us when we feel that the honest, straightforward work in the path of duty which our ancestors carried on in India is now bearing its fruit. It is the old story, nothing pays in the end so well as honesty and straight dealing.

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‘JUST FOR A
SCRAP OF PAPER’

BY ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A.

STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD

SECOND IMPRESSION

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‘JUST FOR A SCRAP OF PAPER’

IN the now historic meeting between Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador at Berlin, and the Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von Bethman-Hollweg, the latter expressed considerable surprise that Great Britain was about to enter into war with a friendly nation ‘just for a scrap of paper’. To do justice to the Chancellor, his surprise seems to have been very real and his agitation no less real. The fact that this surprise was real should be carefully noted by Englishmen. That the idea of the disarmament of the nations, or their partial disarmament, has not been agreeable to Germany is well known; but that she should consider that treaties solemnly entered into are not worth the paper on which they are written was, however, a revelation for which Europe was entirely unprepared.

On August 2, a German *ultimatum* was presented to Belgium. Provided no opposition was made to the passing of German troops through the country, Belgium’s independence would be respected. The news which reached England on August 3, that German troops, before the declaration of war, had violated the French frontier at four points and committed acts of war, was somewhat surprising. Their invasion of Luxemburg was in direct contravention of the Treaty of London which was concluded on May 11, 1867, and was signed by Great Britain, France, Russia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary. The invasion of Luxemburg was stated not to imply any hostile intentions against the Grand Duchy. That invasion threw a lurid light on the conception of honour and good faith

prevalent in Prussian circles, and therefore it is not surprising that a German *ultimatum* should have been presented to Belgium, though France had agreed to respect Belgian neutrality. As in the case of Luxemburg, but in a manner more binding, the neutrality and independence of Belgium had been solemnly guaranteed by Prussia, as well as by England, Austria, Russia, and France, in 1839. In August 1870 fresh guarantees of the neutrality of Belgium were obtained, from the French and German Governments, by Lord Granville, England being then prepared to resist, by force of arms, any infringement of that neutrality.

The surprise expressed by the Imperial Chancellor in his interview with Sir Edward Goschen was no doubt intensified, owing to the undoubted fact that it had been taken for granted, by the German Government, that the English ministry was fully engaged in Irish and domestic matters.

There were thus some excuses for the Chancellor's surprise. Belgium, in his opinion, would not suffer more than a temporary inconvenience from the passage of German troops through her territory. And further, it was unlikely that Belgium could offer any serious opposition without the support of Great Britain. Such support must have seemed absolutely impossible according to the information possessed by the German Chancellor.

England has for many years been infested by spies, who were to be found in every grade of British society, and who regularly notified their views of the political situation to the German authorities. Foreigners, however, have never yet been able to form correct estimates as to the course which Englishmen would take at a given crisis. Still, the reports of spies, and the speeches of ministers, together with the events of May, June, and July in Ireland, would seem to have fully justified the

Chancellor in his belief, that Ireland was on the verge of a civil war, which nothing could avert.

Moreover, the Chancellor did not in the slightest degree realize that a German invasion of Belgium would be regarded, to use the words of Mr. Gladstone, as ‘the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history’, and that these words expressed accurately the view held, not only by all English-speaking people, but by all those who have regarded the plighted word of nations as something which could not easily be disregarded.

Had, however, the Chancellor studied the history of Western Europe, or even glanced through its pages, he must have realized that Great Britain has always been keenly interested in the country now known as Belgium, no less than in the fortunes of Holland. Edward III’s entry into the Hundred Years’ War, in 1338, was due to a variety of causes; but one of the chief was the evident determination of the French king to dominate Flanders; and Edward’s policy in resisting that attempt has many points of resemblance with that adopted by the younger Pitt in 1792-3.

History does indeed, in a way, repeat itself. It is exactly a hundred years since Great Britain’s efforts to save Europe from subservience to the French Emperor were rewarded by the occupation of Paris, and Napoleon’s imprisonment in Elba; while, a century before Napoleon was consigned to his island prison, Great Britain had resisted and overthrown the ambitious schemes of Louis XIV, one of whose aims was French domination over Belgium and Holland. The European revolt against the aggressions of France had opened in 1688, and in 1689 William III entered upon that struggle against the ascendancy of the French nation which was so satisfactorily continued in Queen Anne’s reign. Again, just a century before the accession of William III, which was

in itself an event of overwhelming importance to the balance of power in Europe, the English navy, by defeating the great Armada, had not only saved Holland, but had struck a blow at Spanish ascendancy from which it never recovered. Thus, in the fourteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, Great Britain has steadily pursued a policy of incalculable advantage to Europe. Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV, and Napoleon had adopted an aggressive policy which proved intolerable to all their neighbours. With these monarchs the present German Kaiser must now be numbered, as a ruler whose later policy has been a continued menace to the peace of Europe.

All these sovereigns entirely failed to understand the British character, and the real aims and strength of the British nation. In his preparations for the invasion of England, Philip II made it evident that he was absolutely ignorant of the progress of the British fleet, due to the efforts of Hawkins, or of the importance to England of the independence of Holland. Louis XIV, too, confidently expected to establish his supremacy in the Channel, if not indeed to effect the invasion of England; while Napoleon showed all through his marvellous career an extraordinary ignorance of the importance of sea power.

The present German Kaiser has indeed proved superior to Napoleon in his recognition of the value of sea power, and has made prodigious efforts to place Germany on an equality with Great Britain in respect of naval strength. But he, like Napoleon and Louis XIV, has badly blundered in one most important respect; like them, he has entirely misunderstood the meaning of events in England—events which he imagined would either lead to civil war or to the prolonged weakness of the British Empire. Louis XIV was at first convinced that, using James II as his tool, he would be able to hamper

England by means of Irish disaffection. Disappointed in this calculation, he felt certain in 1701 that the dissensions of the English Parliament, and its dislike of William III, would prevent that monarch from embarking on a policy of serious opposition to France.

The situation in England, just before the Spanish Succession War, was indeed not very dissimilar from the state of things which we have lately witnessed in Parliament. On both occasions civil war must have seemed to a foreigner the only possible solution of the political situation. And yet no sooner had Louis threatened the independence of the Netherlands, than all parties forgot their differences, and presented a united front to France. After the Treaty of Amiens, Napoleon similarly convinced himself that the weak Addington ministry would never resent his policy of calmly ignoring the stipulations of that treaty, and of the Treaty of Lunéville lately concluded with Austria. By the latter treaty he had engaged to withdraw all French troops from Holland as soon as the war between France and England was concluded. No one was more astonished than Napoleon when he found that in consequence of his refusal to evacuate Holland, he was involved in a war with Great Britain, a war which only ended with his fall. He had evidently anticipated the non-renewal of hostilities for at least five years, during which interval he could build up a strong French navy, and investigate the possibilities of French expansion in India and Australia.

The danger to England from the occupation of Holland or Belgium by a great European Power had, as we have already remarked, been fully recognized from the days of Edward III, and had been resisted by successive British Governments. It seems not improbable that the present German Kaiser, like Louis XIV and Napoleon, had thought that the wrangles in the British Parliament

betokened national decay. The Kaiser and his advisers were of the opinion that England, entangled in civil war in Ireland, and occupied with party squabbles at home, would stand by while the German Empire crushed France and defeated Russia. Those tasks accomplished, the inevitable attack on England could be made whenever the moment seemed opportune to the war party in Berlin.

The liberties of Europe are now in as great danger as they were in the days of Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon, should England, France, and Russia not carry out their intention of continuing the war until the Kaiser has been compelled to renounce his aggressive policy, until his fleet and army have been rendered powerless, and the Kiel Canal neutralized.

Certainly, to most foreigners the history of English politics during the last few years must have seemed to foreshadow a long period of weakness, both at home and abroad. And now what is the situation? As in 1702 and as in 1803, domestic quarrels in England are postponed, all parties in Parliament are united, and Englishmen, relying on the justice of the cause for which they are contending, have entered in full confidence upon the greatest struggle in modern times. Like Napoleon, the Kaiser had counted on a period of peace with England for a few years, and while engaged on the invasion of France had no expectation of meeting with any opposition from a nation whom the Prussian war party has for many years openly despised. During the next few years, the defeat of the French nation would have brought immense relief to the financial situation in Germany, and would have rendered France incapable of aiding the 'contemptible' British Empire.

All these expectations have now disappeared, and with them the hopes of establishing German supremacy over Belgium and Holland, and of thus carrying out a policy

begun with the seizure of Schleswig and Holstein, the acquisition of Heligoland, the formation of a strong navy, and the construction of the Kiel Canal. The immediate cause of this sudden overthrow of these hopes and plans is to be found in the over-confidence of the Prussians, which was illustrated by the Chancellor's unaffected surprise at hearing that Great Britain would resent the temporary occupation of Belgium. To him the engagements made by Germany in 1839 and 1870 were not worth the paper on which they were written. Such treaties were mere ‘scraps of paper’, not deserving of the consideration of a great military power such as the Kaiser controlled, and could not be allowed to stand in the way of the diffusion of the *inestimable advantages of German civilization*.

Englishmen ought not to have been surprised at the attack on France by Germany nor at the violation of Belgian neutrality. Writers like Treitschke and Bernhardi have made no secret of their opinions, which for many years have been accepted and acclaimed in Germany. They have openly advocated the creation of a ‘new phase of Empire’ which implies the world-wide dominion of Germany. Germany's duty, according to Bernhardi, was to overwhelm France before she had time to develop the three-years system; and, France once humiliated, the annexation or complete submission of Holland and Belgium would follow. The Chancellor declared, in a speech reported in *The Times* on August 11, that he fully realized that the disregard of Belgium's neutrality was contrary to international law, but that, in view of the necessity of crushing the French nation in the shortest possible space of time, no other course was open to Germany.

Probably many Englishmen have not appreciated till quite lately the importance of the ties which bind us to Belgium, or the immense importance to England

of the independence of such states as Holland, Switzerland, and Belgium. By this time many Germans appreciate full well the immensity of the blunder—it might with more accuracy be styled a crime—of the invasion of Belgium. That invasion, if not protested against, would have rendered the position of Switzerland, of Holland, and indeed of all the minor states of Europe, most precarious; it would have destroyed all sense of security in Europe; it would have rendered treaties absolutely valueless; it would have laid Great Britain—without allies—open to well-deserved invasion. The future of Europe as a civilized continent hung upon Great Britain's attitude towards the 'scrap of paper'.

It is likely that, in the west and south of Germany, there will be found many who understand and appreciate the position, the only one possible, taken up by Great Britain; but, if so, their views are not those of the dominant Prussian war party. It is difficult for many Englishmen to realize that, though Germany is practically composed of a number of, one might almost say, nations, some of whom are far beyond others in civilization, it is ruled by a small clique. The Prussians control the governmental machine in Germany; and, as recent events have shown, they are still in somewhat the same stage of civilization as they were when Great Britain helped to rescue them from the domination of Napoleon. Their conduct on the march to Paris in 1814 was very similar to that which marked their attack on Belgium in last August, and which justifies their new and generally accepted designation of 'Huns'.

These Prussians have no respect for treaties, they have an openly expressed contempt for all other nations. The severity, if not brutality, of their military methods, renders it necessary for the more civilized nations to take stern measures, so that Europe shall never again be exposed to the attacks of such savages.

The German Chancellor has lived in a period when there is no longer any hope of the maintenance of a concert of Europe, which must depend for success on the willingness of all the Great Powers to accept its decisions. Bismarck, however, ‘in the interests of German unity, made the concert unworkable and left Europe faced once more with the era of unrestricted, international struggle.’ That era has been marked by violations of the Act of the Congress of Berlin, and of the Act of Algeciras. It has seen the Agadir incident, and last month the German invasion of Belgium. It is time that a fresh attempt should be made to enforce respect for international treaties, and to defeat the German principle that might, not right, is the foundation of European policy.

This war, upon which Great Britain has entered, will have many results, some of which can be anticipated with confidence. It may, perhaps, lead continental nations to understand the character and aims of the British nation. Even as late as September 7, a German newspaper, the *Vossische Zeitung*, buoyed up its readers with the possibility of an early change in the British Government, and it questioned whether a new ‘Cabinet of the stamp of John Morley would bind itself to the pledges of Grey and Asquith, or whether a successor of Poincaré would bind himself to the promises of the Bordeaux refugee’. Such nonsense, however, is taken seriously by many Germans. This only shows their extraordinary ignorance of the situation, and of the grim determination of all members of the British Empire to have done with the ‘mailed fist’ once and for all. ‘Just for a scrap of paper!’—The German Chancellor apparently thought that the violation of the Belgian frontier was justifiable simply because—‘rapidity of action was the great German asset’. *Necessitas non habet leges* was his opinion, and therefore treaties into

which Germany had entered were mere waste paper. It was, he declared, 'a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality'. The Chancellor evidently hoped that 'the fear of consequences' would deter Great Britain from taking action. On this point he was rapidly undeceived by Sir Edward Goschen, who explained that 'fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements'.

In spite of the 'Scrap of Paper' the Germans attacked Belgium. That in itself renders it impossible to expect loyalty to any treaty from Germany in the future. Moreover, by letting loose swarms of Huns upon defenceless towns like Louvain and Tirlemont and Dinant, and allowing them to destroy priceless art and architectural treasures, and generally to pillage and burn, Germany has shown Europe that her triumph and that of her 'Huns' would throw civilization centuries back, and would eliminate the word 'Honour' from all dictionaries. The colossal mistake made by the war party in Berlin, in deciding to ignore the neutrality of Belgium, now stands revealed.

By the invasion of that country the German armies did indeed gain a considerable military advantage, and were able during August and the early days of September to advance steadily on Paris. But in doing so they encountered from the Belgian, English, and French armies an unexpected resistance, while, at the same time, the shocking cruelties of their troops excited the indignation of the whole civilized world. The contempt of the magniloquent German Government for a 'scrap of paper' will bring untold, but well-deserved, misery on the German nation; it will disabuse the world of any doubt as to the strong ties which bind the British Empire together; it will ensure to Europe a long period of peace.

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THE VALUE OF
SMALL STATES

BY

H. A. L. FISHER, F.B.A.

VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD

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THE VALUE OF SMALL STATES

UPON the old controversy between Brutus and Caesar the last two generations in Germany have had no difficulty in coming to a decision. The republic is decidedly out of fashion, and with it the whole fabric of idealism upon which in 1848 republican conclusions were wont to be erected. The modern German is all for Caesarism, for a big state, a big army, a big navy, and for a long course of progressive national expansion under the dazzling guidance of the Hohenzollern house. Of the old gentle cosmopolitan feeling, which suffused the literature of the classical period, there is now not a trace surviving. *Weltbürgertum* has given place to the *Nationalstaat*, just as the delicate melodies of Mozart have been succeeded by the obstreperous and clashing brilliance of Strauss. The eloquence of Schiller is still popular, but the sentiment which inspired such a piece as the History of the Revolt of the United Netherlands is as dead in Germany as Kant's famous dream of Universal Peace. Realism is the fetish of the hour. Politics must be real or they are despised as shadows; and when a German speaks of *Realpolitik* he means a policy based on material interests, supported by brute force and liberated from the trammels of the moral conscience.

It is not surprising that the triumphs of German Caesarism in the world of fact and idea have led to a very general disparagement of the value and utility of small states. The argument may be gathered from

the pages of Treitschke or indeed from any of the numerous journalists who have drawn their political sustenance from that bitter and uncompromising apostle of imperial methods. It runs very much as follows. In a small state civic life must necessarily be petty, humble, unambitious. The game of politics must centre round small issues, and thus circumscribed in scope, loses the ethical value of scale. Great affairs envisaged on a large horizon have a power of stirring the passionate and imaginative elements in man, which are apt, save in the rarer cases, to respond to stimuli in proportion to their magnitude. Existence in a small state may be elegant, charming, idyllic, compatible with the production of literature and art, but it can never be swept by the great passions which move the world. A small state may create among its members a mild humdrum kind of affection for its history and institutions, but can never be a source of that triumphant pride and hope which lifts citizenship up to the plane of heroism. In a sense it may be said that the history of small states is wound up. They may linger on, preserved by the mutual jealousies of rival Powers or because it is worth nobody's while to attack them, but their bodies will be starved and anaemic and their souls mere echoes of the great movements of mind and emotion which are liberated, almost automatically, by the diurnal movement in great and powerful nations of the social and political machine. Sooner or later the small states will go. They will be absorbed in larger political aggregates. They will follow the line of historical development which has created the large modern states of Europe out of a mosaic of tiny and warring fiefs. And nobody will regret their demise, least of all the citizens themselves.

Indeed, from the point of view of peoples like the Belgians or the Dutch, the moment of inevitable absorption cannot be too rapidly hastened. Only then will they be compelled to discard trifles and to 'think imperially' of serious things. Their geography, political and intellectual, will be enlarged. The art of war will be earnestly practised. The spectator will suddenly become an actor. Great tides of national passion and aspiration will sweep into the tiny state, chasing away impurities, like the majestic ocean suddenly admitted in overwhelming might into a network of landlocked and stagnant pools.

The disciples of Caesarism will even proceed to contend that patriotism in its fullest sense is only possible to large nations. Great states march on, little states mark time. The movement of the great state is continuous and imposing, and, as in the case of other orderly developments, its future can be forecast with a certain degree of exactitude. Guided by the hand of God, the mighty organs which are the chosen vessels of the highest culture upon earth take up, one after another in due sequence, each item of their sacred and providential programme. Thus we have a long historic process ending in the formation of the Prussian kingdom, succeeded by another process leading to the establishment of the German Empire, and to be followed by a third process in the course of which the German Empire will become a world-power, not only supreme on the continent of Europe but exercising a predominant political influence over the whole surface of the globe. Great states have a destiny of which their citizens are conscious. *Et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt.* Men come and go, the seasons wax and wane, but each generation in its own brief allotment of life is sustained

by the consciousness that it works on a providential plan, fulfilling one of the grand and mysterious processes of God for the improvement of the world by the spread of German culture. So did the divines of the Dark Ages applaud the forced conversions of Charlemagne.

Even in matters of technical equipment Destiny is said to have decided in favour of the big battalions. It is freely argued in Germany that a perfect organization of educational machinery is only possible to the opulence and minute articulation of a great nation, for the more powerful the state, the richer will be the fund available for museums, art galleries, and libraries, and the larger the class capable of enjoying them. Great states in fact resemble great businesses which on a given expenditure of capital realize a higher rate of profit than their smaller rivals, command wider markets, and exercise a stronger power in barter and sale.

It is easy to understand how the Germans have arrived at this confident and unqualified conclusion as to the worthlessness of small states, seeing that their own late arrival into the circle of the Great Powers was due to the long continuance of that *Kleinstaaterei*, that small-state system, which attracts so much hostile fire from the ranks of the Prussian historians. The humiliations suffered by Germany at the hands of Napoleon, the glory of the War of Liberation, which may be called the first common act of the German people, the fatal relapse into the old system of loose impotent federation, and finally the foundation of the German Empire under Prussian hegemony—these sharply contrasted periods of national history all point to the same lesson, the paralysis bred of disunion and the power generated by unity.

Even now the disciplinarian conscience of Prussia

judges that the unity of Germany is all too imperfectly achieved. There are the separate states, there are the suppressed nationalities, there are the active and contentious political parties whose struggles impair the majesty of the Reichstag, and whose criticism weakens and perplexes the direction of imperial policy. When the Social Democrats, or the Poles, or the Catholics of the Centre embarrass the Government, good German imperialists look with envy at the social and religious cohesion of Great Britain. There is then no ground for wonder if, to the patriotic German of modern times, a contracted spirit of localism, only to be eradicated by a strenuous effort of the national will, seems to be the principal flaw in the political character of the German race, as it has undoubtedly been the chief source of German political impotence in the past. And we can easily see how Germans, realizing the evils of past disunion, and exercising that tendency to generalize which is inveterate in the Teutonic intelligence, come to the conclusion that the happiness and advance of mankind are bound up in the expansion of great states and in the disappearance of small ones.

It must be confessed that this general attitude is affected by considerations of a different order. Outside the limits of the German Empire lies a *Germania irredenta*, a line of small states inhabited in whole or part by men of German stock and once included in the imperial orbit.

‘Of the territory’, writes Dr. Rohrbach, ‘which belonged to the German Empire five hundred years ago and was inhabited by men of German stock, more than a third has been abstracted from modern Germany—the German lands of Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. If you add in the Livonian

territories from the Memel to the Gulf of Finland, where it is true the mass of the peasantry was not German, but where the townsfolk and the knights were German and the princes and nobility members of the Holy Roman Empire, then modern Germany is only half the size of Germany at the end of the Middle Ages. We leave out of our consideration those territories which at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century were only bound to the Empire by a loose connexion and belonged naturally to France and Italy, like the Free County of Burgundy, the duchies of Savoy, Milan, Mantua, Verona, and confine ourselves in the first place to territories inhabited by ancient German settlements, and secondly to the Slavonic lands of the East which were comprised in the German colonizing movement. To these Bohemia at that time belonged, for its penetration by German influence was only checked by the counter reformation. It was not till about 1400 that the Kingdom of Poland pushed the German frontier further west. Posen and a piece of West Prussia and Schleswig, though not entirely inhabited by Germans, constitute the only territorial gain which the modern German Empire has to show in comparison with the old Empire. But what are these gains in comparison with the losses! The ring of territories encircling modern Germany, inhabited by more than 20,000,000 men of German stock, politically and even in national sentiment estranged from German thought.'

To a person imbued with a belief in the historical mission of Germany this contraction of the imperial orbit, so accurately described by Dr. Rohrbach, is one of those disagreeable facts only to be fitted into a rational scheme of the Universe if they are destined to be speedily reversed. Sooner or later Providence must intend that the broken unity of the mediaeval German Empire should be reunited to the parent stock. And

so the argument descends from the high plateau of general ideas to the low ground of political appetite which is watered by the streams of national memory.

In view of this interpretation it is pertinent to ask what the world has gained from small states in the past, how far they justify their existence in the present, and whether they are likely to perform any valuable function in the economy of the future.

Almost everything which is most precious in our civilization has come from small states, the Old Testament, the Homeric poems, the Attic and the Elizabethan drama, the art of the Italian Renaissance, the common law of England. Nobody needs to be told what humanity owes to Athens, Florence, Geneva, or Weimar. The world's debt to any one of these small states far exceeds all that has issued from the militant monarchies of Louis XIV, of Napoleon, of the present Emperor of Germany. It may, perhaps, be objected that the apparition of artistic, literary, or scientific genius is an incalculable matter of hazard unaffected by the size of the political community in which the great man happens to be born, and that we are only entitled to infer from these examples that a small state may provide an atmosphere in which genius may thrive. It is, however, a relevant answer to much of the criticism now levelled in Germany against small states, to remind ourselves that in the particular points of heroic and martial patriotism, civic pride and political prudence, they have often reached the highest levels to which it is possible for humanity to attain, and that from Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, as well as from the illustrious school of Florentine historians and publicists, the world has learnt nine-tenths of its best political wisdom. America has particular reasons for gratefully

recognizing one of the smallest and most illustrious of the city states of Europe. The seed of modern democratic theory was sown in Geneva, and being scattered on the hither shore of the North American continent by small communities, organized on the model of Calvin, burgeoned into the great Republic of the West.

Nor is it fanciful, in estimating the causes which contributed to the peculiar brilliance first of the Greek and then of the Italian city state, to attribute some weight to the question of size. Indeed, if we do this, we shall only be echoing the voice of antiquity itself. In the famous passage in which he depicts the lineaments of the ideal state, Aristotle gives the opinion that a city so large that its citizens are unable to hear the voice of a single town-crier has passed the limits of wholesome growth. This conclusion was based on the view that every citizen must take a direct part in the political deliberations of the state to which he belongs. Indeed, had the states of antiquity exceeded the limits compatible with direct government, the world would have lost a good part of its political education. As it was, the contracted span of these communities carried with it three conspicuous benefits. The city state served as a school of patriotic virtue, not in the main of the blustering and thrasonical type, but refined and sublimated by every grace of instinct and reason. It further enabled the experiment of a free direct democratic government to be made, with incalculable consequences for the political thinking of the world. Finally, it threw into a forced and fruitful communion minds of the most different temper, giving to them an elasticity and many-sidedness which might otherwise have been wanting or less conspicuous, and stimulating, through the close mutual competition which it engendered, an

intensity of intellectual and artistic passion which has been the wonder of all succeeding generations and such as can never be reached in great states organized for the vulgarity of aggressive war.

So much at least will be generally conceded. The question for us, however, is not to assess our debt to the city states of the past, but to consider what arguments may be found for safeguarding the existence of the smaller nation states of the modern world. And first of all it is relevant to ask whether there may not be some advantage to humanity at large arising from the fact that certain communities are withdrawn by reason of the scale from the competition of armaments. To certain military minds in Germany it seems to be a lamentable thing that any community of human beings should be organized on a basis of peace, or that the policy of any Government should be steadily directed towards the preservation of its subjects from the horrors of war. Let us assume for a moment that this extravagant proposition is true, and that the Swiss, the Danes, the Dutch, and the Belgians would be greatly improved in their general morality if they were thrown into some big military empire with an aggressive world-policy and a Providential destiny to impose its culture on the world, and all the other familiar paraphernalia of the Potsdam philosophy. We have still to ask ourselves the question whether, even from the selfish point of view of the Great Powers who are blessed with the moral luxury of a conscript army, there may not be some convenience attaching to the continued existence of small oases of peace in a world nervously equipping itself for Armageddon? Has Italy no cause to be grateful to the Swiss Confederation? Would the Scandinavian kingdoms preserve their unruffled

neutrality if the Danish peninsula were swallowed up by Germany ? And has the disappearance of Poland really benefited the two greatest partitioning Powers whose past appetites have brought them the heritage of restless anxiety which belongs to the vigil of coterminous states ? Indeed it is not easy to measure the injurious consequences which have grown from the disappearance of that middle kingdom of Lotharingia which once served as a buffer between France and Germany, or from the extinction of the Polish nation at the close of the eighteenth century. By common confession European diplomacy suffers from nerves ; and the nervous tension is necessarily increased with every addition to the ranks of the rivals. The entanglements likely to give rise to conflict are proportionate to the number and weight of the Powers which stand inside the ring. Every ally who joins one or other of the coalitions brings with him a whole cluster of new interests which the coalition is bound to defend, and thereby increases the chance of war. Every Power which stands aside lessens the general strain and contracts the area of inflammable controversy.

But the advantages to be derived from the existence of small buffer states are subject to the clear condition that their independence and neutrality are respected. Let us consider for a moment what the world would have gained if the German Emperor and his advisers had all along regarded the violation of Belgian neutrality as an unthinkable crime. Not only would Great Britain be now at peace, but no general European war would have taken place at all. The challenge to Russia was thrown down by Germany because it was calculated in Berlin that by marching through Belgium the Germans could easily crush France before the

Russian peril became insistent. It is absurd to speak of the violation of Belgian neutrality as a 'bitter necessity' forced upon a reluctant country in an unforeseen emergency. It was, on the contrary, the deliberate groundwork for a careful edifice of aggressive diplomacy. The entire plan of the campaign against France was framed on the supposition that the Germans would march through Belgium. The whole scheme of operations against Russia was based on the belief that the total weight of the German military power could be thrown on the eastern frontier by reason of the rapid and crushing success which a German army, advancing through the Belgian gateway, would be able to achieve in France. And upon these two military calculations the ambitious edifice of German world-policy was built. All the plans of the General Staff were secretly framed on the supposition that Belgium would be treated as part of the German Empire in the event of war. It was with this prospect in view that Germany thought it safe to defy Russia in 1909 and to repeat the defiance in 1914. And though it would be difficult to set bounds to the military presumption of Germany, it may be safely assumed that if the Belgian doorway had been patently barred, the diplomacy of the German Empire would have been tuned to a more modest key. The moral of all this is clear enough. The small states should not be abolished: on the contrary, their neutrality should be supported by a guarantee so formidable that the strongest Power would never be tempted in future to infringe it.

We may test the value of these communities by another criterion. The Hague Tribunal has been the object of much silly depreciation, and the military parties in the world are never tired of giving voice to the contempt

in which they involve the whole principle of arbitration. It is true that the belief in the value of pacific solutions chiefly flourishes in small unmilitary states like Holland or in that large and imposing aggregate of small civilian states which goes by the name of the United States of America. And it is equally true that no nation has yet consented or, in the present state of public ethics, is likely to consent to refer matters affecting its 'vital interests, independence, or honour' to an International Tribunal. Nevertheless a considerable number of arbitration treaties have been concluded agreeing to refer differences to the Hague Tribunal; and in the course of the North Sea incident of 1904 the strained relations between England and Russia were greatly eased by the fact that the Hague Conference had already provided a method of procedure by which the dispute might be adjusted without loss of dignity to either side. Arbitration cannot banish war, but it can diminish the accumulation of minor grievances which, if untended, are apt to create that inflamed state of public opinion out of which wars easily arise; and in the case of larger disputes recourse to arbitration has at least the advantage of gaining time. Now the condition of mind which supports the principle of arbitration, and which provides facilities for recourse to it, is only made possible by the existence of communities organized for peace, and standing outside the armed and vigilant rivalries of the great continental Powers.

It is symptomatic of the Prussian spirit to disparage any manifestation of natural feeling which runs counter to the assumed necessities of a militant Empire; and so in books written even by such eminent and moderate men as Prince von Bülow, the late Chancellor of Germany, we find a fixed intention to suppress, so far as

may be, the national characteristics of the Poles, Danes, and men of Latin race who have been incorporated in the Empire. We in England, who have some experience of minor nationalities, cannot read of the recent developments of Prussian policy in Poland without feeling how unintelligent and oppressive it is, and how much better it would be in the interests of internal peace and consolidation, if Germany would throw her mind into a generous and liberal attitude towards the men of alien type whom she has absorbed by conquest. But it is part of the Prussian genius—if a drillmaster can have genius—to regard all variety, not only as troublesome, which it often may be, but as injurious, which it very seldom is. Indeed, one of the principal arguments in favour of the preservation of the small states of Europe (and the same argument applies to the preservation of the state system in America) lies in the fact that these small communities do vary from the set type which is imprinted by steady and powerful governments upon the life and behaviour of the larger Powers. The mere fact of this variety is an enrichment of human experience and a stimulus to self-criticism and improvement. Indeed, the existence of small states operates in the large and imperfect economy of the European system very much in the same way as the principle of individual liberty operates in any given state, preventing the formation of those massive and deadening weights of conventional opinion which impair the free play of individuality, and affording a corrective to the vulgar idea that the brute force of organized numbers is the only thing which really matters in the world.

The critic of small states may also fairly be asked what he means by the word 'civilization'. If civilization is a phrase denoting the sum of those forces which help to

bind men together in civil association, if it means benevolence, dutifulness, self-sacrifice, a lively interest in the things of the mind, and a discerning taste in the things of the sense, then there is no reason to think that these qualities are the special prerogative of great states. Indeed, there is a certain type of harsh and stoical patriotism which, by reason of its austere and arrogant exclusiveness, is inimical to the growth of civilized feeling. It is not confined to big states, for it was present in ancient Sparta ; nor is it the necessary accompaniment even of huge military monarchies. But it is the spirit of modern Prussia, a spirit consistent indeed with the heroic qualities of the barbarous ages, but lacking the sane and temperate outlook of civilized life. All through history the great enemy of human reason has been fanaticism. And there is no reason to believe that the fanaticism of a military state, served by the most destructive artillery in the world, is any bit less injurious to mankind than the spirit which for many centuries of history condemned the religious heretic to the torments of the stake.

It is difficult rightly to assess the contributions which the smaller states of Europe have made during the past century to the sum of human culture. Nor would a mere list of eminent men such as Ibsen and Maeterlinck, of whom every cultivated person has heard, or Gramme, the Belgian inventor of the dynamo, or Van 't Hoff, the famous Dutch chemist, prove more than the indisputable fact that intellectual life of the highest quality may be carried on in such communities. It is of course possible that, if Holland were forced into the German confederation, Dutch painting, which has now reached a level far higher than any attained in recent years in Germany, would suffer no eclipse, and that the Dutch universities would persevere in their work of scholarly theological

exegesis. It is possible that, under the same conditions, the wonderful perfection to which the little kingdom of Denmark has brought the arts of dairy-farming and agriculture would still be maintained. But it would depend entirely upon the degree of liberty and autonomy which a German emperor might be willing to concede, whether this would be so or not, whether the natural currents of hopeful energy would continue to flow or whether they would be effectually sealed up by the ungenial fiat of an alien taskmaster. Upon this it is unnecessary to speculate. But it is strictly pertinent to the argument to remember that the three small states, whose existence is closely and specially threatened by the expansion of Germany, have each developed not only a peculiar and strongly marked economy, but certain special excellences and qualities such as are most likely to be developed in an atmosphere of comparative tranquillity. Thus, apart from the school of landscape painting, the Dutch have set a model to the world in all that pertains to the scientific classification and management of archives, vanquishing in this particular even the French, whose organization of historical learning is so justly famed. Denmark, too, has its own speciality in a very perfect organism for co-operative production in agriculture.

Indeed, one of the advantages flowing from the existence of smaller states consists in the fact that they serve as convenient laboratories for social experiment—a point likely to be appreciated in America, in view of the great mass of material for the comparative study of social and industrial expedients which is provided by the enterprise of the American State legislatures. Such experiments as women's suffrage, or as the State prohibition of the public sale of alcoholic drink, or as a thoroughgoing

application of the Reformatory theory of punishment, would never be seriously discussed in large, old, and settled communities, were it not for the fact that they have been tried upon a smaller scale by the more adventurous legislatures of the New World. Man is an imitative animal, and a study of such an organ as the *Journal of Comparative Legislation* exhibits the increasing uniformity of the problems which confront the legislator, and the increasing monotony of the solutions which he finds to meet them. All over the world industrial, educational, penal legislation tends to conform to type. And within limits the tendency is the necessary and wholesome consequence of the unifying influence of modern industrial conditions. But our enlarged facilities for imitation present obvious dangers, and among them the fatal temptation to borrow a ready-made uniform which does not fit. Small states may fall into this pitfall as well as big ones, but at least their continued existence presents some guarantee for diversity of life and intellectual adventure in a world steadily becoming more monotonously drab in its outer garment of economic circumstance.

No historical state can be driven out of its identity without suffering a moral impoverishment in the process. The evil is not only apparent in the embitterment and lowering of the citizens of the conquered community, whether they are compelled to the agonies of a Polish dispersion, or linger on nursing their rights and wounded pride in the scene of their former independence, but it creates a problem for the conqueror which may very well harden and brutalize his whole outlook on policy. It is never good for a nation to be driven to the employment of harsh measures against any portion of its subjects.

Upon whatever plausible grounds of immediate expediency such measures may be justified, they invariably harden the tone of political opinion, and create an atmosphere of insensibility which spreads far beyond the sphere of the special case and occasion. The acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany is a case in point. The result of the forcible incorporation of these provinces in the German Empire has been bad for the governed and equally bad for the governors. Coercion is a virus which cannot be introduced into any part of the body politic without risk of a general diffusion of the poison.

It is no idle fancy to suppose that the kind of policy which the Prussian Government has thought fit to adopt towards the alien nationalities of the German Empire has reacted upon its treatment of those German parties whose views do not accord with the strict official convention. No Conservative English statesman would ever dream of denouncing English socialists as Prince von Bülow denounces the social democrats of Germany. But then no English statesman, Liberal or Conservative, would dream of treating any portion of the British Empire as Prince von Bülow treated the German Poles.

It is impossible accurately to assess the value to a nation of the self-esteem which is the legacy of its history. People who weigh everything in material scales may find nothing worth preserving in the historical consciousness of the small nations of Europe. They will argue that the Dutch, the Belgians, the Danes, the Swiss, might be incorporated in the German Empire not only without pain but with a positive accession of material comfort and wealth, and a larger political outlook in the future.

They will even deny that there need be any

moral impoverishment in an exchange of historical memories, under which the incorporated Dutchman would hook himself on to the German pedigree and count Bismarck and Moltke among his deities, while the Dutch sea-dogs of the heroic age would give their names to the cruisers and submarines of the incorporating Empire. In all such reasoning there is very little allowance for the facts of human nature or for the working of the moral principle in man. As no individual can break violently with his past without a moral lesion, so too the rupture of the historical continuity of a state carries with it an inevitable weakening and abasement of public ideals, which may continue for several generations. We need not labour to establish a principle which is grounded on such obvious facts of individual consciousness. But one historical instance may be adduced in support. When in 1580 Portugal was annexed to Spain, then reputed to be the most formidable empire in the world, she suffered a moral as well as a political eclipse from which she has never since recovered. Her nerve seemed to go and by swift stages she sank into listlessness and decay.

Nowhere is the shaping power of this historical consciousness more evident than in the peasant nations of the Balkan Peninsula. These rude and valiant democracies live upon the memories of the past to an extent of which sophisticated peoples have little notion. The great ballad which commemorates the battle of Kossovo, fought against the Turks more than five hundred years ago, is still one of the most important political influences among the southern Slavs. Nor has the memory of the empire of Stephen Dushan, under whom Serbia was the leading Power in the Balkans, ever been allowed to fade among the Serbs, despite tragedies sufficient to

break the spirit of a less stalwart race. To rob the Serbs of their political independence according to the present plan of the German Powers would be a measure difficult to surpass for cruel and purposeless futility. A race which had succeeded in preserving its historical consciousness through centuries of grinding Turkish tyranny would not be likely to renounce its past or its future under the guns of Austria. And even if the improbable came to pass, and a conquered Serbia were to become an obedient and contented fraction of the Austrian Empire, forgetful of heroic ballads and of a long tradition of hardiness and valour, would there be no loss of moral power in the process? To those who measure all virtues by the standard of civic virtue, by intensity of emotional and practical patriotism, the loss would be beyond dispute. A great incentive to the performance of unselfish action would be destroyed, a source of heroic and congenial activity would disappear never to be replaced. Under the hypothesis the Serbs would sink below the level of their blood kinsmen the Slovaks, who, despite the manifold oppressions of their Hungarian masters, still nurture a flame of protesting nationalism. From such political apostasy no nation could ever expect to make a complete moral recovery.

It may be objected that the whole process of European history is summed up by the absorption of the smaller in the larger states; and that if Hanover is reconciled to absorption there is no reason why Holland, Denmark, and Belgium should lodge a protest in advance against their impending fate. To this contention there is a simple answer. These outlying nations can only be brought into the German fold under compulsion. Their frame of mind is not German, their habits are not

German, their history for the last four centuries has served to multiply points of difference from Germany. They have no desire to submit themselves either to the military or to the financial system of the German Empire. They are not ashamed of their present condition, and are singular enough to hold that human happiness and goodness do not depend upon the size of an army or navy or a budget. It is enough that the citizen of each of these states can call his country his own. Patriotism has nothing whatever to do with spatial extent nor are emotions to be measured by square miles. Great empires are generally full of the variances of unassimilated and discontented men ; and though a country may be weak and small, it may yet be capable of inspiring among its inhabitants the noblest and purest forms of affectionate devotion.

Indeed, the supreme touchstone of efficiency in imperial government lies in its capacity to preserve the small state in the great union. If the British Empire has succeeded in retaining the affections of its scattered members, the result has been due to the wise and easy tolerance which has permitted almost every form of religious, political, and social practice to continue unchecked, however greatly they may vary from the established traditions of the English race. Thus in the Province of Quebec we suffer the existence of a French ultramontane state based on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, and preserving even to this day many of the social features of a French colony in the age of Louis XIV, a community more extreme in its ecclesiastical rigour than any Roman Catholic state in Europe, and in language, religion, and social habits presenting the sharpest contrast to the English provinces of the Dominion of Canada. The same careful deference

to the pre-existing conditions is shown in every part of our Indian administration, which carries tenderness to the religious scruples of the Mohammedans and Hindoos to a point of delicate solicitude, which no Government in the world has ever before attempted, and only the most practised experience can supply. These, however, are not the methods of the German Empire, nor can they be the methods of any empire which practises a uniform and universal system of military conscription. As soon as the words State and Army become coterminous, a philosophy of violent unification is set up within the body politic, which sooner or later carries everything before it, save the spiritual forces which cannot be broken by any machinery, however despotic and powerful. The Germans have not succeeded in winning either the Poles or the Danes or the Alsatians to their rule, because they have repeated the mistake which England made in Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and which England has never since ceased to lament. They have attempted to manufacture German citizens by violence ; and the history of Alsace-Lorraine under imperial rule has shown how little the policy of violence, however carefully it may be masked by specious political concessions, is availing to change the spiritual allegiance of a people. Indeed the case of Alsace-Lorraine supplies a fair indication of the misfortunes which would ensue upon the compulsory annexation of any one of the small states of Europe by a big military Power. It is not to be imagined that the forced union of these two provinces with Germany has been productive of material injury. On the contrary, they have shared in the expanding industry and commerce of the Empire, and any loss in population due to the emigration of the French has been more than compen-

sated by an influx of Germans. Nevertheless, they have been and continue to be unhappy under the Prussian yoke, Alsace more unhappy than Lorraine, but both sensible of the fact that while material interest binds them to Prussia, the voice of spiritual affinity unites them with the French Republic.

Statistics indeed prove that, even allowing for immigration, the Germans are still in a minority in the two provinces; but this fact in itself is not sufficient to account for the continuing attraction of the French Republic, despite the strong material inducements offered from the other side. The phenomenon indeed is worthy of attention. Here are two provinces which have never enjoyed political independence or the sense of cohesion which such independence confers. For the greater part of their history they have counted as members of the German confederation; for Alsace only became part of France in 1648, and Lorraine was not effectively incorporated in the French monarchy till 1764. And yet, though they have been replaced in their original German connexion, the natives remain French at heart. The explanation is simple. The French Revolution initiated these two provinces into the democratic ideals of the modern world, which the majority of the inhabitants still continue to prefer to the Prussian doctrine of blood and iron and to the methods of the Prussian garrison at Zabern.

The truth is that the quantitative estimate of human values, which plays so large a part in modern political history, is radically false and tends to give a vulgar instead of a liberal and elevated turn to public ambitions. There is no virtue, public or private, which cannot be practised as fully in a small and weak state as under the sceptre of the most formidable tyrant who ever

drove fifty army corps of conscripts to the slaughter. There is no grace of soul, no disinterested endeavour of mind, no pitch of unobtrusive self-sacrifice of which the members of small and pacific communities have not repeatedly shown themselves to be capable. These virtues indeed may be imperilled by lethargy, but they are threatened even more gravely by that absorbing preoccupation with the facts of material power in which the citizens of great empires are inevitably involved.

The great danger of Continental Europe is not revolution but servitude. This war could never have been possible if the intellect of Germany had been really free, if a servile Press supported by a system of State universities had not instilled into the vast mass of the German people ruthless maxims of Caesarism, for the most part repugnant to their real temperament and nature. There are other military autocracies besides Germany, and other countries in which political thought is fettered by the Government. But whatever may be their several shortcomings, the smaller states of Europe are not among the despots. Here at least men may think what they please, and write what they think. Whenever the small states may come up for judgement the advocate of human freedom will plead on their behalf.

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RUSSIA
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION

BY

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RUSSIA

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION

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IN this time of crisis, when the clash of ideas seems as fierce as the struggle of the hosts, it is the duty of those who possess authentic information on one or the other point in dispute to speak out firmly and clearly. I should like to contribute some observations on German and Russian conceptions in matters of culture. I base my claim to be heard on the fact that I have had the privilege of being closely connected with Russian, German, and English life. As a Russian Liberal, who had to give up an honourable position at home for the sake of his opinions, I can hardly be suspected of subserviency to the Russian bureaucracy.

I am struck by the insistence with which the Germans represent their cause in this world-wide struggle as the cause of civilization as opposed to Muscovite barbarism ; and I am not sure that some of my English friends do not feel reluctant to side with the subjects of the Tsar against the countrymen of Harnack and Eucken. One would like to know, however, since when have the Germans taken up this attitude ? They were not so squeamish during the ' war of emancipation ' which gave birth to modern Germany. At that time the people of Eastern Prussia were anxiously waiting for the appearance of Cossacks, as heralds of the Russian hosts who were to emancipate them from the yoke of Napoleon. Did the

Prussians and Austrians reflect on the humiliation of an alliance with the Muscovites, and on the superiority of the Code Civil, when the Russian Guard at Kulm¹ stood like a rock against the desperate onslaught of Vandamme? Perhaps by this time the inhabitants of Berlin have obliterated the bas-relief in the 'Alley of Victories' which represents Prince William of Prussia, the future victor of Sedan, seeking safety within the square of the Kaluga regiment!² Russian blood has flowed in numberless battles in the cause of the Germans and Austrians. The present Armageddon might perhaps have been avoided if the Tsar Nicholas I had left the Hapsburg Monarchy to its own resources in 1849, and had not unwisely crushed the independence of Hungary. Within our own memory, the benevolent neutrality of Russia guarded Germany in 1870 from an attack in the rear by its opponents of Sadowa. Are all such facts to be explained away on the ground that the despised Muscovites may be occasionally useful as 'gun-meat', but are guilty of

¹ *Kulm.* After the defeat of the Allies by Napoleon at Dresden in 1813, the French corps of Vandamme appeared in their rear. If it had succeeded in cutting the line of communications with Prague, the retreat of the Allies might have been turned into a rout. The First Division of the Russian Guard was ordered to stop Vandamme, and this it did at Kulm on August 29, although it was outnumbered by three to one and lost almost half its men in killed and wounded. On the next day, Prussian and Austrian troops came up, and Vandamme surrendered with the remainder of his corps. The battle was the turning-point in the campaign of 1813. The King of Prussia granted the Iron Cross to all those who took part in this desperate struggle; hence the Iron Cross was called the 'Kulm Cross' by the Russians.

² *Prince William of Prussia and the Kaluga regiment.* The future conqueror of Sedan first fought as a boy of seventeen at Bar-sur-Aube (February 27, 1814). In that battle he joined the Russian Fifth Infantry (Kaluga), a regiment of which he afterwards became an honorary colonel.

sacrilege if they take up a stand against German task-masters in 'shining armour'? The older generations of Germany had not yet reached that comfortable conclusion. The last recommendation which the founder of the German Empire made on his death-bed to his grand son was to keep on good terms with that Russia which is now proclaimed to be a debased mixture of Byzantine Tartar, and Muscovite abominations.

Fortunately, the course of history does not depend on the frantic exaggerations of partisans. The world is not a class-room in which docile nations are distributed according to the arbitrary standards of German pedagogues. Europe has admired the patriotic resistance of the Spanish, Tyrolese, and Russian peasants to the enlightened tyranny of Napoleon. There are other standards of culture besides proficiency in research and aptitude for systematic work. The massacre of Louvain, the hideous brutality of the Germans towards non-combatants—to mention only one or two of the appalling occurrences of these last weeks—have thrown a lurid light on the real character of twentieth-century German culture. 'By their fruits ye shall know them,' said our Lord; and the saying which He aimed at the Scribes and Pharisees of His time is indeed applicable to the proud votaries of German civilization to-day. Nobody wishes to underestimate the services rendered by the German people to the cause of European progress; but those who have known Germany during the years following the achievements of 1870 have watched with dismay the growth of that arrogant conceit which the Greeks called *ὕβρις*. The cold-blooded barbarity advocated by Bernhardi, the cynical view taken of international treaties and of the obligations of honour by the German Chancellor—these things reveal a spirit which

it would be difficult indeed to describe as a sign of progress.

One of the effects of such a frame of mind is to strike the victim of it with blindness. This symptom has been manifest in the stupendous blunders of German diplomacy. The successors of Bismarck have alienated their natural allies, such as Italy and Roumania, and have driven England into this war against the evident intentions of English Radicals. But the Germans have misconceived even more important things. They set out on their adventure in the belief that England would be embarrassed by civil war and unable to take any effective part in the fray ; and they had to learn something which all their writers had not taught them—that there is a nation's spirit watching over England's safety and greatness, a spirit at whose mighty call all party differences and racial strifes fade into insignificance. In the same way, they had reckoned on the unpreparedness of Russia, in consequence of internal dissensions and administrative weakness, without taking heed of the love of all Russians for Russia, of their devotion to the long-suffering giant whose life is throbbing in their veins. The Germans expected to encounter raw and sluggish troops under intriguing time-servers and military Hamlets whose ' native hue of resolution ' had been ' sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought '. Instead of that, they were confronted with soldiers of the same type as those whom Frederick the Great and Napoleon admired, led at last by chiefs worthy of their men. And behind these soldiers they discovered a nation. Do they realize now what a force they have awakened ? Do they understand that a steadfast, indomitable resolution, despising all theatrical display, is moving Russia's hosts ? Even if the Russian generals had proved mediocre, even if

many disappointing days had been in store, the nation would not have belied its history. It has seen more than one conquering army go down before it. The Tartars and the Poles, the Swedes of Charles XII, the Prussians of Frederick the Great, the Grand Army of Napoleon, were not less formidable than the Kaiser's array, but the task of mastering a united Russia proved too much for each one of them. The Germans counted on the fratricidal feud between Poles and Russians, on the resentment of the Jews, on Mohammedan sympathies with Turkey, and so forth. They had to learn too late that the Jews had rallied round the country of their hearths, and that the best of them cannot believe that Russia will continue to deny them the measure of justice and humanity which the leaders of Russian thought have long acknowledged to be due to them. More important still, the Germans have read the Grand Duke's appeal to the Poles and must have heard of the manner in which it was received in Poland, of the enthusiastic support offered to the Russian cause. If nothing else came of this great historical upheaval but the reconciliation of the Russians and their noble kinsmen the Poles, the sacrifices which this crisis demands would not be too great a price to pay for the result.

But the hour of trial has revealed other things. It has appealed to the best feelings and the best elements of the Russian nation. It has brought out in a striking manner the fundamental tendency of Russian political life and the essence of Russian culture, which so many people have been unable to perceive on account of the chaff on the surface. Russia has been going through a painful crisis. In the words of the Manifesto of October 17/30, 1905, the outward casing of her administration had become too narrow and oppressive for the

development of society with its growing needs, its altered perceptions of rights and duties, its changed relations between Government and people. The result was that deep-seated political *malaise* which made itself felt during the Japanese War, when Russian society at large refused to take any interest in the fate of the army ; the feverish rush for ' liberties ' after the defeat ; the subsequent reign of reaction and repression, which has cast such a gloom over Russian life during these last years. But the effort of the national struggle has dwarfed all these misunderstandings and misfortunes, as in Great Britain the call of the common Motherland has dwarfed the dispute between Unionists and Home Rulers. Russian parties have not renounced their aspirations ; Russian Liberals in particular believe in self-government and the rule of law as firmly as ever. But they have realized as one man that this war is not an adventure engineered by unscrupulous ambition, but a decisive struggle for independence and existence ; and they are glad to be arrayed in close ranks with their opponents from the Conservative side. A friend, a Liberal like myself, writes to me from Moscow : ' It is a great, unforgettable time ; we are happy to be all at one ! ' And from the ranks of the most unfortunate of Russia's children, from the haunts of the political exiles in Paris, comes the news that Bourtzeff, one of the most prominent among the revolutionary leaders, has addressed an appeal to his comrades urging them to stand by their country to the utmost of their power.¹

I may add that whatever may have been the shortcomings and the blunders of the Russian Government,

¹ *Bourtzeff, a prominent Russian revolutionary leader. I am glad to note that Bourtzeff fully endorses my view in a letter to The Times (issue of September 18, 1914).*

it is a blessing in this decisive crisis that Russians should have a firmly-knit organization and a traditional centre of authority in the power of the Tsar. The present Emperor stands as the national leader, not in the histrionic attitude of a War Lord, but in the quiet dignity of his office. He has said and done the right thing, and his subjects will follow him to a man. We are sure he will remember in the hour of victory the unstinted devotion and sacrifices of all the nationalities and parties of his vast Empire. It is our firm conviction that the sad tale of reaction and oppression is at an end in Russia, and that our country will issue from this momentous crisis with the insight and strength required for the constructive and progressive statesmanship of which it stands in need.

Apart from the details of political and social reform, is the regeneration of Russia a boon or a peril to European civilization? The declamations of the Germans have been as misleading in this respect as in all others. The master works of Russian literature are accessible in translation nowadays, and the cheap taunts of men like Bernhardi recoil on their own heads. A nation represented by Pushkin, Turgeneff, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky in literature, by Kramskoy, Verestchagin, Repin, Glinka, Moussorgsky, Tchaikovsky in art,¹ by Mendeleeff, Metchnikoff, Pavloff in science, by Kluchevsky and Solovieff in history, need not be ashamed to enter the lists in an international competition for the prizes of culture. But the German historians ought to have

¹ *Kramskoy, Verestchagin, Repin, &c.* Only a few names are selected almost at random. Of course, no description of pictures and no characterization of painters can convey any adequate impression. Those who wish to form an opinion of Russian painting should go to Moscow and pay a visit to the Tretyakoff Gallery.

taught their pupils that in the world of ideas it is not such competitions that are important. A nation handicapped by its geography may have to start later in the field, and yet her performance may be relatively better than that of her more favoured neighbours. It is astonishing to read German diatribes about Russian backwardness when one remembers that as recently as fifty years ago Austria and Prussia were living under a régime which can hardly be considered more enlightened than the present rule in Russia. The Italians in Lombardy and Venice have still a vivid recollection of Austrian gaols; and as for Prussian militarism, one need not go further than the exploits of the Zabern garrisons to illustrate its meaning. This being so, it is not particularly to be wondered at that the Eastern neighbour of Austria and Prussia has followed to some extent on the same lines.

But the general direction of Russia's evolution is not doubtful. Western students of her history might do well, instead of sedulously collecting damaging evidence, to pay some attention to the building-up of Russia's universities, the persistent efforts of the Zemstvos, the independence and the zeal of the Press. German scholars should read Herten's vivid description of the 'idealists of the forties'.¹ And what about the history of the emancipation of the serfs, or of the regeneration of the judicature? The 'reforms of the sixties'² are

¹ *The idealists of the forties.* They have been described by Herten in his *Byloe i Dumy (Past and Thoughts)* in connexion with intellectual life in Moscow. Both Westerners like Granovsky, Stankevitch, Ketscher, Herten himself, and Slavophiles like J. Kireievsky and Khomiakoff, are vividly characterized in this brilliant autobiography.

² *The reforms of the sixties.* They comprise the great reforms carried out with rare patriotism and insight during the early years

a household word in Russia, and surely they are one of the noblest efforts ever made by a nation in the direction of moral improvement.

Looking somewhat deeper, what right have the Germans to speak of their ideals of culture as superior to those of the Russian people? They deride the superstitions of the *mujikh* as if tapers and genuflexions were the principal matters of popular religion. Those who have studied the Russian people without prejudice know better than that. Read Selma Lagerloef's touching description of Russian pilgrims in Palestine¹. She, the Protestant, has understood the true significance of the religious impulse which leads these poor men to the Holy Land, and which draws them to the numberless churches of the vast country. These simple people cling to the belief that there is something else in God's world besides toil and greed; they flock towards the light, and find in it the justification of their human craving for peace and mercy. For the Russian people have the Christian virtue of patience in suffering: their pity for the poor and oppressed is more than an occasional manifestation of individual feeling—it is deeply rooted in national psychology. This frame of mind has been scorned as fit for slaves! It is indeed a case where the learning of

of Alexander II's reign. The principal were—the emancipation of the peasants (1861), the reorganization of the judicial system (1864), and the creation of Zemstvo self-government (1864). There was a number of other reforms besides—the University Statutes of 1863, the Press Law of 1865, the partial abolition of corporal punishment in 1863: and so forth. Many of these reforms have been adulterated by subsequent modifications; but the main current of progress could not be turned back, and there are no greater names in the history of Europe than those of N. Milutine, D. Milutine, Prince Cherkassky, J. Samarine, Unkovsky, Zarudny, and their companions.

¹ *Selma Lagerloef on Russian pilgrims*.—"Jerusalem," vol. ii, "On the Wings of the Dawn."

philosophers is put to shame by the insight of the simple-minded. Conquerors should remember that the greatest victories in history have been won by the unarmed—by the Christian confessors whom the emperors sent to the lions, by the ‘old believers’ of Russia who went to Siberia and to the flames for their unyielding faith, by the Russian serfs who preserved their human dignity and social cohesion in spite of the exactions of their masters, by the Italians, Poles, and Jews, when they were trampled under foot by their rulers. It is such a victory of the spirit that Tolstoy had in mind when he preached his gospel of non-resistance; and I do not think even a German on the war path would be blind enough to suppose that Tolstoy’s message came from a craven soul. The orientation of the so-called ‘intelligent’ class in Russia—that is, the educated middle class, which is much more numerous and influential than people suppose—is somewhat different, of course. It is ‘Western’ in this sense, that it is imbued with current European ideas as to politics, economics, and law. It has to a certain extent lost the simple faith and religious fervour of the peasants. But it has faithfully preserved the keynote of popular ideals. It is still characteristically humanitarian in its view of the world and in its aims. A book like that of General von Bernhardi would be impossible in Russia. If anybody were to publish it, it would not only fall flat, but earn for its author the reputation of a bloodhound. Many deeds of cruelty and brutality happen, of course, in Russia, but no writer of any standing would dream of building up a theory of violence in vindication of a claim to culture. It may be said, in fact, that the leaders of Russian public opinion are pacific, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian to a fault. The mystic philosopher,

Vladimir Solovieff¹, used to dream of the union of the Churches with the Pope as the spiritual head, and democracy in the Russian sense as the broad basis of the rejuvenated Christendom. Dostoyevsky, a writer most sensitive to the claims of nationality in Russia, defined the ideal of the Russians in a celebrated speech as the embodiment of a universally humanitarian type.² These are extremes, but characteristic extremes pointing to the trend of national thought. Russia is so huge and so strong that material power has ceased to be attractive to her thinkers. Nevertheless, we need not yet retire into the desert or deliver ourselves to be bound hand and foot by 'civilized' Germans. Russia also wields a sword—a charmed sword, blunt in an unrighteous cause, but sharp enough in the defence of right and freedom. And this war is indeed our *Befreiungskrieg*. The Slavs must have their chance in the history of the world, and the date of their coming of age will mark a new departure in the growth of civilization.

¹ *Vladimir Solovieff*. A talented philosopher, the son of the famous historian S. Solovieff. He was a professor at Moscow for a short time.

² *Dostoyevsky's speech*. It was delivered in Moscow in 1880, on the occasion of the unveiling of Pushkin's statue in that city.

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HOW CAN WAR EVER
BE RIGHT?

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GILBERT MURRAY

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HOW CAN WAR EVER BE RIGHT ?

I HAVE all my life been an advocate of Peace. I hate war, not merely for its own cruelty and folly, but because it is the enemy of all the causes that I care for most, of social progress and good government and all friendliness and gentleness of life, as well as of art and learning and literature. I have spoken and presided at more meetings than I can remember for peace and arbitration and the promotion of international friendship. I opposed the policy of war in South Africa with all my energies, and have been either outspokenly hostile or inwardly unsympathetic towards almost every war that Great Britain has waged in my lifetime. If I may speak more personally, there is none of my own work into which I have put more intense feeling than into my translation of Euripides' *Trojan Women*, the first great denunciation of war in European literature. I do not regret any word that I have spoken or written in the cause of Peace, nor have I changed, as far as I know, any opinion that I have previously held on this subject. Yet I believe firmly that we were right to declare war against Germany on August 4, 1914, and that to have remained neutral in that crisis would have been a failure in public duty.

A heavy responsibility—there is no doubt of it—lies upon Great Britain. Our allies, France and Russia, Belgium and Serbia, had no choice ; the war was, in various degrees, forced on all of them. We only, after

deliberately surveying the situation, when Germany would have preferred for the moment not to fight us, of our free will declared war. And we were right.

How can such a thing be ? It is easy enough to see that our cause is right, and the German cause, by all ordinary human standards, desperately wrong. It is hardly possible to study the official papers issued by the British, the German, and the Russian governments, without seeing that Germany—or some party in Germany—had plotted this war beforehand ; that she chose a moment when she thought her neighbours were at a disadvantage ; that she prevented Austria from making a settlement even at the last moment ; that in order to get more quickly at France she violated her treaty with Belgium. Evidence too strong to resist seems to show that she has carried out the violation with a purposeful cruelty that has no parallel in the wars of modern and civilized nations. Yet some people may still feel gravely doubtful. Germany's ill-doing is no reason for us to do likewise. We did our best to keep the general peace ; there we were right. We failed ; the German government made war in spite of us. There we were unfortunate. It was a war already on an enormous scale, a vast network of calamity ranging over five nations ; and we decided to make it larger still. There we were wrong. Could we not have stood aside, as the United States stand, ready to help refugees and sufferers, anxious to heal wounds and not make them, watchful for the first chance of putting an end to this time of horror ?

‘ Try for a moment ’, an objector to our policy might say, ‘ to realize the extent of suffering involved in one small corner of a battlefield. You have seen a man here

and there badly hurt in an accident ; you have seen perhaps a horse with its back broken, and you can remember how dreadful it seemed to you. In that one corner how many men, how many horses, will be lying, hurt far worse and just waiting to die ? Indescribable wounds, extreme torment ; and all, far further than any eye can see, multiplied and multiplied ! And, for all your righteous indignation against Germany, what have these done ? The horses are not to blame for anybody's foreign policy. They have only come where their masters took them. And the masters themselves . . . admitting that certain highly-placed Germans, whose names we are not sure of, are as wicked as ever you like, these soldiers, peasants and working-men and shopkeepers and schoolmasters have really done nothing in particular ; at least, perhaps they have now, but they had not up to the time when you, seeing they were involved in war and misery already, decided to make war on them also and increase their sufferings. You say that justice must be done on conspirators and public malefactors. But as far as the rights and wrongs of the war go, you are simply condemning innocent men, by thousands and thousands, to death, or even to mutilation and torture ; is that the best way to satisfy your sense of justice ? These innocent people, you will say, are fighting to protect the guilty parties whom you are determined to reach. Well, perhaps, at the end of the war, after millions of innocent people have suffered, you may at last, if all goes well with your arms, get at the " guilty parties ". You will hold an inquiry, with imperfect evidence and biased judges ; you will decide—in all likelihood wrongly—that a dozen very stupid and obstinate Prussians with long titles are the guilty parties, and even then you will not know what to do with them.

You will probably try, and almost certainly fail, to make them somehow feel ashamed or humiliated. It is likely enough that you will merely make them into national heroes.

‘And after all, this is assuming quite the best sort of war : a war in which one party is wrong and the other right, and the right wins. Suppose both are wrong ; or suppose the wrong party wins ? It is as likely as not ; for, if the right party is helped by his good conscience, the wrong has probably taken pains to have the odds on his side before he began quarrelling. In that case all the wild expenditure of blood and treasure, all the immeasurable suffering of innocent individuals and dumb animals, all the tears of women and children in the background, have taken place not to vindicate the right but to establish the wrong. To do a little evil that great or certain good may come is all very well ; but to do almost infinite evil for a doubtful chance of attaining something which half the people concerned may think good and the other half think bad, and which in no imaginable case can ever be attained in fullness or purity . . . that is neither good morals nor good sense. Anybody not in a passion must see that it is insanity.’

I sympathize with every step of this argument ; yet I think it is wrong. It is judging of the war as a profit-and-loss account, and reckoning, moreover, only the immediate material consequences. It leaves out of sight the cardinal fact that in some causes it is better to fight and be broken than to yield peacefully ; that sometimes the mere act of resisting to the death is in itself a victory.

Let us try to understand this. The Greeks who fought and died at Thermopylae had no manner of doubt that

they were right so to fight and die, and all posterity has agreed with them. They probably knew they would be defeated. They probably expected that, after their defeat, the Persians would proceed easily to conquer the rest of Greece, and would treat it much more harshly because it had resisted. But such considerations did not affect them. They would not consent to their country's dishonour.

Take again a very clear modern case : the fine story of the French tourist who was captured, together with a priest and some other white people, by Moorish robbers. The Moors gave their prisoners the choice either to trample on the Cross or to be killed. The Frenchman happened to be a Free-thinker and an anti-clerical. He disliked Christianity. But he was not going to trample on the Cross at the orders of a robber. He stuck to his companions and died.

This sense of honour, and the respect for this sense of honour, are very deep instincts in the average man. In the United States there is a rather specially strong feeling against mixture of blood, not only with the blood of coloured people but with that of the large masses of mankind who are lumped together as 'dagoes' or 'hunkies'. Yet I have noticed that persons with a dash of Red Indian blood are not ashamed but rather proud of it. And if you look for the reason, I suspect it lies in the special reputation which the Indian has acquired, that he would never consent to be a slave. He preferred to fight till he was dead.

A deal of nonsense, no doubt, is talked about 'honour' and 'dishonour'. They are feelings based on sentiment, not on reason ; the standards by which they are judged are often conventional or shallow, and sometimes utterly false. Yet honour and dishonour are real things. I will

not try to define them ; but will only notice that, like Religion, their characteristic is that they admit of no bargaining. Indeed we can almost think of honour as being simply that which a free man values more than life, and dishonour as that which he avoids more than suffering or death. And the important point for us is that there are such things.

There are some people, followers of Tolstoy, who accept this position as far as dying is concerned, but will have nothing to do with killing. Passive resistance, they say, is right ; martyrdom is right ; but to resist violence by violence is sin.

I was once walking with a friend and disciple of Tolstoy's in a country lane, and a little girl running in front of us. I put to him the well-known question : ' Suppose you saw a man, wicked or drunk or mad, run out and attack that child. You are a big man and carry a big stick : would you not stop him and, if necessary, knock him down ? ' ' No,' he said, ' why should I commit a sin ? I would try to persuade him, I would stand in his way, I would let him kill me, but I would not strike him.' Some few people will always be found, less than one in a thousand, to take this view. They will say : ' Let the little girl be killed or carried off ; let the wicked man commit another wickedness ; I, at any rate, will not add to the mass of useless violence that I see all round me.'

With such persons one cannot reason, though one can often respect them. Nearly every normal man will feel that the real sin, the real dishonour, lies in allowing an abominable act to be committed under your eyes while you have the strength to prevent it. And the stronger you are, the greater your chance of

success, by so much the more are you bound to intervene. If the robbers are overpoweringly strong and there is no chance of beating or baffling them, then and only then should you think of martyrdom. Martyrdom is not the best possibility. It is almost the worst. It is a counsel of despair, the last resort when there is no hope of successful resistance. The best thing—suppose once the robbers are there and intent on crime—the best thing is to overawe them at once ; the next best, to defeat them after a hard struggle ; the third best, to resist vainly and be martyred ; the worst of all, the one evil that need never be endured, is to let them have their will without protest. (As for converting them from their evil ways, that is a process which may be hoped for afterwards.)

We have noticed that in all these cases of honour there is, or at least there seems to be, no counting of cost, no balancing of good and evil. In ordinary conduct we are always balancing the probable results of this course or that ; but when honour or religion come on the scene all such balancing ceases. If you argued to the Christian martyr : ‘ Suppose you do burn the pinch of incense, what will be the harm ? All your friends know you are really a Christian : they will not be misled. The idol will not be any the better for the incense, nor will your own true God be any the worse. Why should you bring misery on yourself and all your family ? ’ Or suppose you pleaded, with the French atheist : ‘ Why in the world should you not trample on the Cross ? It is the sign of the clericalism to which you object. Even if trampling somewhat exaggerates your sentiments, the harm is small. Who will be a penny the worse for your trampling ? While you will live instead of dying, and all your family be

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happy instead of wretched ?' Suppose you said to the Red Indian : ' My friend, you are outnumbered by ten to one. If you will submit unconditionally to these pale-faces, and be always civil and obliging, they will probably treat you quite well. If they do not, well, you can reconsider the situation later on. No need to get yourself killed at once.'

The people concerned would not condescend to meet your arguments. Perhaps they can be met, perhaps not. But it is in the very essence of religion or honour that it must outweigh all material considerations. The point of honour is the point at which a man says to some proposal, ' I will not do it. I will rather die.'

These things are far easier to see where one man is involved than where it is a whole nation. But they arise with nations too. In the case of a nation the material consequences are much larger, and the point of honour is apt to be less clear. But, in general, whenever one nation in dealing with another relies simply on force or fraud, and denies to its neighbour the common consideration due to human beings, a point of honour must arise.

Austria says suddenly to Serbia : ' You are a wicked little State. I have annexed and governed against their will some millions of your countrymen, yet you are still full of anti-Austrian feeling, which I do not intend to allow. You will dismiss from your service all officials, politicians, and soldiers who do not love Austria, and I will further send you from time to time lists of persons whom you are to dismiss or put to death. And if you do not agree to this within forty-eight hours, I, being vastly stronger than you, will

make you.' As a matter of fact, Serbia did her very best to comply with Austria's demands ; she accepted about two-thirds of them, and asked for arbitration on the remaining third. But it is clear that she could not accept them all without being dishonoured. That is, Serbia would have given up her freedom at the threat of force ; the Serbs would no longer be a free people, and every individual Serb would have been humiliated. He would have confessed himself to be the kind of man who will yield when an Austrian bullies him. And if it is urged that under good Austrian government Serbia would become richer and safer, and the Serbian peasants get better markets, such pleas cannot be listened to. They are a price offered for slavery ; and a free man will not accept slavery at a price.

Germany, again, says to Belgium (we leave out for the moment the fact of Germany's special treaty obligations), ' We have no quarrel with you, but we intend for certain reasons to march across your territory and perhaps fight a battle or two there. We know that you are pledged by treaty not to allow any such thing, but we cannot help that. Consent, and we will pay you some compensation afterwards ; refuse, and we shall make you wish you had never been born.' At that moment Belgium was a free self-governing State. If it had yielded to Germany's demand, it would have ceased to be either. It is possible that, if Germany had been completely victorious and France quite unable to retaliate, Belgium would have suffered no great material injury ; but it would have taken orders from a stranger who had no right to give them, simply because he was strong and Belgium dared not face him. Belgium refused. It has had some of its principal towns destroyed, some thousands of its soldiers killed,

many more thousands of its women, children, and non-combatants outraged and beggared ; but it is still free. It has still its honour.

Let us think this matter out more closely. Our Tolstoyan will say : ‘ We speak of Belgium’s honour and Serbia’s honour ; but who is Serbia and who is Belgium ? There is no such person as either. There are only great numbers of people who happen to be Serbians and Belgians, and who mostly have had nothing to do with the questions at issue. Some of them are honourable people, some dishonourable. The honour of each one of them depends very much on whether he pays his debts and tells the truth, but not in the least on whether a number of foreigners walk through his country or interfere with his government. King Albert and his ministers might feel humiliated if the German Government compelled them to give way against their will ; but would the ordinary population ? Would the ordinary peasant or shopkeeper or artisan in the districts of Visé and Liège and Louvain have felt particularly disgraced or ashamed ? He would probably have made a little money and been greatly amused by the sight of the troops passing. Who will pretend that he would have suffered any injury that can for a moment be compared with what he has suffered now, in order that his Government may feel proud of itself ? ’

I will not raise the point that, as a matter of fact, to grant a right of way to Germany would have been equivalent to declaring war against France, so that Belgium would not, by giving up her independence, have been spared the danger of war. I will assume that nothing but honour was involved. In that form, this

question goes to the root of our whole conception of citizenship and the position of man in society. And I believe that our Tolstoyan friend is profoundly wrong.

Is it true, in a healthy and well-governed State, that the average citizen is indifferent to the honour of his country ? We know that it is not. True, the average citizen may often not understand what is going on, but as soon as he knows he cares. Suppose for a moment that the King, or the Prime Minister, or the President of the United States, were found to be in the pay of a foreign State, as for instance Charles II was in the pay of Louis XIV, can any one pretend that the ordinary citizens of Great Britain or America would take it quietly ? That any normal man would be found saying : ' Well, the King, or the President, or the Prime Minister, is behaving dishonourably, but that is a matter for him, not for me. I am an honest and honourable man, and my Government can do what it likes.' The notion is absurd. The ordinary citizen would feel instantly and without question that his country's honour involved his own. And woe to the society in which it were otherwise ! We know of such societies in history. They are the kind which is called ' corrupt ', and which generally has not long to live. Belgium has proved that she is not that kind of society.

But what about Great Britain herself ? At the present moment a very clear case has arisen, and we can test our own feelings. Great Britain had, by a solemn treaty more than once renewed, pledged herself to maintain the neutrality of Belgium. Belgium is a little State lying between two very strong States, France and Germany, and in danger of being overrun or maltreated by one

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of them unless the Great Powers guarantee her safety. The treaty, signed by Prussia, Russia, Austria, France, and Great Britain, bound all these Powers not to attack Belgium, move troops into it, or annex any part of it ; and further, to resist by armed force any Power which should try to do any of these things. Belgium, on her part, was bound to maintain her own neutrality to the best of her power, and not to side with any State which was at war with another.

At the end of last July the exact case arose in which we had pledged ourselves to act. Germany suddenly and without excuse invaded Belgium, and Belgium appealed to us and France to defend her. Meantime she fought alone, desperately, against overwhelming odds. The issue was clear, and free from any complications. The German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of August 6, admitted that Germany had no grievance against Belgium, and no excuse except 'necessity'. She could not get to France quick enough by the direct road. Germany put her case to us, roughly, on these grounds. 'True, you did sign a treaty, but what is a treaty ? We ourselves signed the same treaty, and see what we are doing ! Anyhow, treaty or no treaty, we have Belgium absolutely in our power. If she had done what we wanted, we would have treated her kindly ; as it is we shall show her no mercy. If you will now do what we want and stay quiet, later on, at our convenience, we will consider a friendly deal with you. If you interfere, you must take the consequences. We trust you will not be so insane as to plunge your whole Empire into danger for the sake of "a scrap of paper".' Our answer was : 'Evacuate Belgium within twelve hours or we fight you.'

I think that answer was right. Consider the situation

carefully. No question arises of overhaste or lack of patience on our part. From the first moment of the crisis, we had laboured night and day in every Court of Europe for any possible means of conciliation and peace. We had carefully and sincerely explained to Germany beforehand what attitude she might expect from us. We did not send our ultimatum till Belgium was already invaded. It is just the plain question put to the British Government, and, I think, to every one who feels himself a British citizen : ' The exact case contemplated in your treaty has arisen : the people you swore to protect is being massacred ; will you keep your word at a gigantic cost, or will you break it at the bidding of Germany ? ' For my own part, weighing the whole question soberly and without undue passion, I feel that in this case I would rather die than submit ; and I believe that the Government, in deciding to keep its word at the cost of war, has rightly interpreted the feeling of the average British citizen.

So much for the question of honour, pure and simple ; honour without regard for consequences. But, of course, situations in real political life are never so simple as that ; they have many different aspects and ramifications. And in the present case, though the point of honour happens to be quite clear, it seems probable that even without it there were compelling reasons for war. I do not, of course, for a moment mean that war was going to be ' profitable ' to Great Britain ; such a calculation would be infamous. ' I mean that, terrible as the consequences of our taking part in the war were sure to be, the consequences of our not doing so were likely to be even more profoundly and widely evil.

Let us leave aside, then, the definite treaty binding

us to Belgium. Apart from that, we were faced with a complicated question of statesmanship, of prudence, of patriotism towards our own country and towards humanity.

Germany has for years presented a problem to Europe. Since her defeat of France in 1870, she has been extraordinarily successful, and the success seems to have intoxicated her. This is a complicated subject, which calls for far deeper knowledge than I possess. I will merely try to state, as fairly as I can, the impression that has been forced on me by a certain amount of reading and observation. From the point of view of one who really believes that great nations ought to behave to one another as scrupulously and honourably as ordinary law-abiding men, no Power in Europe, or out of it, is quite blameless. They all have ambitions ; they all, to some extent, use spies ; they all, within limits, try to outwit each other ; in their diplomatic dealings they rely not only on the claims of good sense and justice, but ultimately, no doubt, on the threat of possible force. But, as a matter of degree, Germany does all these things more than other Powers. In her diplomacy, force comes at once to the front ; international justice is hardly mentioned. She spends colossal sums on her Secret Service, so that German spies are become a by-word and a joke. In the recognized sport of international treachery, she goes frequently beyond the rules of the game. Her Emperor, her Imperial Chancellor, and other people in the highest positions of responsibility, expound her ambitions and her schemes in language which would only be used by an irresponsible journalist in England or France. They discuss, for instance, whether the time has come for conquering France once more, and how best they can ' bleed her

white ' and reduce her to impotence. They explain that Bismarck and his generation have made Germany the strongest Power on the Continent. ' The will of Germany is now respected ' in Europe ; it rests with the present Emperor to make it similarly respected throughout the world. ' Germany's world-future lies on the sea.' They discuss whether they can build up a fleet strong enough to fight and beat the British fleet without Great Britain interfering. They discuss in public how many colonies, and which, they will leave to Great Britain when the great ' Day ' comes. They express regret, combined, as far as one can make out, with a little genuine surprise, that the ' brutal egoism of Great Britain ' should raise any objection to this plan, and they hope—openly and publicly—that her well-known weakness and cowardice will make her afraid to act. Since Great Britain has a vast number of Mohammedan subjects, who may possibly be stirred to disaffection, the German Emperor proclaims to ' the three hundred million Mohammedans who live scattered over the globe ' that whenever they need him, the German Emperor will be their friend. And this in 1898, in the middle of profound peace ! Professors in German Universities lecture on the best way of destroying the British Empire, and the officers' messes in the German Navy regularly drink the toast of ' The Day '. There is no need to explain what Day. The curious thing is that these plans are all expounded in public speeches and books—strange books, in which the average civilized sense of international justice or common honesty seems to have been left out of account, as well as the sense of common political prudence ; in which the schemes of an accomplished burglar are expounded with the candour of a child.

And all through this period, in which she plots against

her neighbours and tells them she is plotting, Germany lives in a state of alarm. Her neighbours are so unfriendly ! Their attitude may be correct, but it is not trustful and cordial. The Imperial Chancellor, von Bülow, explains in his book that there was only one time when he really breathed freely. It was in 1909, when Austria, his ally, annexed by violence and against her pledges the two Slav provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All Europe was indignant, especially Russia, the natural protector of the Slavs, and England, the habitual champion of small nationalities. But Germany put down her foot. The Kaiser ‘appeared in shining armour beside his ally’, and no power dared to intervene. Germany was in the wrong. Every one knew she was in the wrong. It was just that fact that was so comforting. Her army was big enough, her navy was big enough ; and for the moment the timid creature felt secure.

Lastly, we must remember that it is Germany who started the race for armaments ; and that while Russia has pressed again and again for a general limitation of armies, and England made proposal after proposal for a general limitation of navies, Germany has steadily refused to entertain any such idea.

Now, for some time it was possible to minimize all these danger-signals, and, for my own part, I have always tried to minimize them. There are militarists and jingoes in every country ; our own have often been bad enough. The German sort seemed unusually blatant, but it did not follow that they carried their country with them. The Kaiser, always impulsive, said on the whole more friendly things than unfriendly things. At any rate, it seemed wiser and more statesmanlike to meet provocation with good temper, and to try by

persistent friendliness to encourage all the more Liberal and reasonable elements in German public life. This policy seemed possible until the July of the present year. Then certain facts were forced upon us. They are all detailed in the White Paper and the other diplomatic correspondence.

We suddenly found that Germany and Austria, or some conspiring parties in Germany and Austria, had arranged for a great stroke, like that of 1909 on a larger scale. It was so obviously aggressive in its nature that their ally, Italy, the third Power in the Triple Alliance, formally refused to act with them. The Alliance only applied to a defensive war. The time had been carefully chosen. England was supposed to be on the verge of a civil war in Ireland and a new mutiny in India. France had just been through a military scandal, in which it appeared that the army was short of boots and ammunition. Russia, besides a general strike and internal troubles, was re-arming her troops with a new weapon, and the process was only half through. Even the day was chosen. It was in a week when nearly all the Ambassadors were away from their posts, taking their summer holiday—the English Ambassador at Berlin, the Russian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna, the Austrian Foreign Minister, the French Prime Minister, the Serbian Prime Minister, the Kaiser himself, and others who might have used a restraining influence on the schemes of the war-party. Suddenly, without a word to any outside Power, Austria issued an ultimatum to Serbia, to be answered in forty-eight hours. Seventeen of these hours had elapsed before the other Powers were informed, and war was declared on Serbia before all the Ambassadors could get back to their posts. The leading statesmen of Europe sat up all night trying for

conciliation, for arbitration, even for bare delay. At the last moment, when the Austrian Foreign Minister had returned, and had consented to a basis for conversations with Russia, there seemed to be a good chance that peace might be preserved ; but at that moment Germany launched her ultimatum at Russia and France, and Austria was already invading Serbia. In twenty-four hours, six European Powers were at war.

Now, the secret history of this strange intrigue is not yet known. It will not be known for fifty years or so. It is impossible to believe that the German nation would have backed up the plot, if they had understood it. It is difficult to think that the Kaiser would ; and the Austrian Foreign Minister, when once he returned, tried to undo the work of his subordinates. But somehow the war parties in Germany and Austria got the upper hand for one fatal week, and have managed to drag their countries after them.

We saw, as Italy had seen, that Germany had pre-arranged the war. We saw her breaking her treaties and over-running little Belgium, as her ally was trampling on little Serbia. We remembered her threats against ourselves. And at this very time, as if to deepen our suspicions, she made us what has been justly termed an 'infamous proposal', that if we would condone her treaty-breaking now, she would have an 'understanding' with us afterwards.

Suppose we had not been bound by our treaty to Belgium, or even our natural and informal friendship with France : what could we have done ? I wish to take no low ground ; I wish to face the question from the point of view of a statesman who owes a duty to his own country and a duty to Europe.

The one thing which we could not have done, in my opinion, was to repudiate our responsibility. We are a very strong Power, one of the strongest in the world, and here, under our eyes and within range of our guns, a thing was being done which menaced every living creature in Europe. The one thing that no statesman could possibly do was to say : ' This is no concern of ours. We will go our ways as usual.' It was perfectly possible to stand aside and proclaim our neutrality. But—apart from questions of honour—to proclaim neutrality was quite as grave a step as to proclaim war. Let no man imagine that he can escape blood-guiltiness by standing still while murder is committed before his eyes.

I will not argue here what the right decision would have been. It depends, unlike the point of honour, on a careful balancing of evidence and consequences, and scarcely any one in the country except the Government has sufficient knowledge to make the balance. For my own part, I should have started with a strong predilection for peace, even a fragmentary peace, but should ultimately have been guided chiefly by the public men whom I most trust. But, as things fell out, our Government was not forced to make a decision on this difficult ground at all, because Germany took a further step which made the whole situation clear. Her treatment of Belgium not only roused our passionate indignation, but compelled us either to declare war or to break our pledged word. I incline, however, to think that our whole welfare is so vitally dependent on the observance of public law and the rights of nations, and would have been so terribly endangered by the presence of Germany in a conqueror's mood at Ostend and Zeebrugge, not to speak of Dunkirk and Calais, that in this case mere self-

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preservation called us to fight. I do not venture to lay any stress on the hopes which we may entertain for the building up of a better Europe after the war, a Europe which shall have settled its old feuds and devised some great machinery for dealing with new difficulties as they arise, on a basis of justice and concord, not of intrigue and force. By all means let us hope, let us work, for that rebuilding ; but it will be a task essentially difficult when it comes ; and the very beginning of it lies far away, separated from the present time and the immediate task by many terrific hazards. We have no right to soothe our consciences concerning the war with professions of the fine and generous things that we are going to do afterwards. Doubtless Germany was going to make us all good and happy when she was once sure of our obedience. For the moment we can only think of our duty, and need of self-preservation. And I believe that in this matter the two run together : our interest coincides with our honour.

It is curious how often this is the case. It is one of the old optimistic beliefs of nineteenth-century liberalism, and one which is often ridiculed, that a nation's duty generally does coincide with its interest. No doubt one can find abundant exceptions, but I believe that in the main, for nations as for individuals, real palpable conscious dishonesty or wickedness is exceedingly unprofitable. This is a more interesting fact than it looks at first sight.

There are many poisons which are simply so nasty that, undisguised, they cannot be swallowed. No power could induce a man or dog to sip or lap a tablespoonful of nicotine or prussic acid. You might coax the dog with future bones, you might persuade the man that the

medicine was just what his health needed ; but their swallowing muscles would refuse to act. Doubtless, in the scheme of nature, the disgust is a provision which saves the race. Now I cannot help suspecting that, much more faintly and more fallibly, the vehement and invincible refusal which with man's sense of honour or religion meets certain classes of proposal, which look profitable enough on the surface, is just such another warning of Nature against poison. In all these cases discussed above, the Christian's martyrdom, the honourable man's refusal to desert his companions, it was not true to say, as we seemed to say, that advantage was on one side and honour on the other. Dishonour would have brought with it a subtler and more lasting disadvantage, greater in its sum than immediate death. If the Christian had sacrificed to the idol, what would his life have been afterwards ? Perhaps his friends would have rejected his example and been martyred ; he would be alone in his shame. Perhaps they would have followed his example, and through him the whole band of the ' faithful ' have betrayed Christ. Not a very enviable choice either way. Without any tall talk or high professions, would it not quite certainly be better for the whole Church and probably for the man himself that he should defy his persecutors and die ? And does not the same now hold for any patriotic Belgian or Serbian who has had a voice in his country's action ? The choice was not on the one hand honour and misery, on the other dishonour and a happy life. It was on the one hand honour and great physical suffering, on the other hand dishonour and a life subtly affected by that dishonour in a thousand unforeseen ways. I do not underrate the tremendous importance of mere physical suffering ; I do not underrate the advantage of living

as long a life as is conveniently possible. But men must die sometime, and, if we dare really to confess the truth, the thing that most of us in our hearts long for, the thing which either means ultimate happiness or else is greater and dearer to men than happiness, is the power to do our duty and, when we die, to have done it. The behaviour of our soldiers and sailors proves it. '*The last I saw of him was on the after bridge, doing well.*' The words come in the official report made by the captain of one of our lost cruisers. But that is the kind of epitaph nearly all men crave for themselves, and the wisest men, I think, even for their nation.

And if we accept this there will follow further consequences. War is not all evil. It is a true tragedy, which must have nobleness and triumph in it as well as disaster. . . . This is dangerous ground. The subject lends itself to foolish bombast, especially when accompanied by a lack of true imagination. We must not begin to praise war without stopping to reflect on the hundreds of thousands of human beings involved in such horrors of pain and indignity that, if here in our ordinary hours we saw one man so treated, the memory would sicken us to the end of our lives; we must remember the horses, remember the gentle natures brutalized by hardship and filth, and the once decent persons transformed by rage and fear into devils of cruelty. But, when we have realized that, we may venture to see in this wilderness of evil some oases of extraordinary good.

These men who are engaged in what seems like a vast public crime ought, one would think, to fall to something below their average selves, below the ordinary standard of common folk. But do they? Day after

day come streams of letters from the front, odd stories, fragments of diaries, and the like; full of the small intimate facts which reveal character, and almost with one accord they show that these men have not fallen, but risen. No doubt there has been some selection in the letters; to some extent the writers repeat what they wish to have remembered, and say nothing of what they wish to forget. But, when all allowances are made, one cannot read the letters and the dispatches without a feeling of almost passionate admiration for the men about whom they tell. They were not originally a set of men chosen for their peculiar qualities. They were just our ordinary fellow citizens, the men you meet on a crowded pavement. There was nothing to suggest that their conduct in common life was better than that of their neighbours. Yet now, under the stress of war, having a duty before them that is clear and unquestioned and terrible, they are daily doing nobler things than we most of us have ever had the chance of doing, things which we hardly dare hope that we might be able to do. I am not thinking of the rare achievements that win a V.C. or a Cross of the Legion of Honour, but of the common necessary heroism of the average men; the long endurance, the devoted obedience, the close-banded life in which self-sacrifice is the normal rule, and all men may be forgiven except the man who saves himself at the expense of his comrade. I think of the men who share their last biscuits with a starving peasant, who help wounded comrades through days and nights of horrible retreat, who give their lives to save mates or officers.¹ Or I think again of

¹ For example, to take two stories out of a score:

1. Relating his experiences to a pressman, Lance-Corporal Edmondson, of the Royal Irish Lancers, said: 'There is absolutely no

the expressions on faces that I have seen or read about, something alert and glad and self-respecting in the

doubt that our men are still animated by the spirit of old. I came on a couple of men of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who had been cut off at Mons. One was badly wounded, but his companion had stuck by him all the time in a country swarming with Germans, and though they had only a few biscuits between them they managed to pull through until we picked them up. I pressed the unwounded man to tell me how they managed to get through the four days on six biscuits, but he always got angry and told me to shut up. I fancy he went without anything, and gave the biscuits to the wounded man. They were offered shelter many times by French peasants, but they were so afraid of bringing trouble on these kind folk that they would never accept shelter. One night they lay out in the open all through a heavy downpour, though there was a house at hand where they could have had shelter. Uhlans were on the prowl, and they would not think of compromising the French people, who would have been glad to help them.'

2. The following story of an unidentified private of the Royal Irish Regiment who deliberately threw away his life in order to warn his comrades of an ambush is told by a wounded corporal of the West Yorkshire Regiment now in hospital in Woolwich :

'The fight in which I got hit was in a little village near to Rheims. We were working in touch with the French corps on our left, and early one morning we were sent ahead to this village, which we had reason to believe was clear of the enemy. On the outskirts we questioned a French lad, but he seemed scared and ran away. We went on through the long narrow street, and just as we were in sight of the end the figure of a man dashed out from a farmhouse on the right. Immediately the rifles began to crack in front, and the poor chap fell dead before he reached us.

'He was one of our men, a private of the Royal Irish Regiment. We learned that he had been captured the previous day by a marauding party of German cavalry, and had been held a prisoner at the farm where the Germans were in ambush for us. He tumbled to their game, and though he knew that if he made the slightest sound they would kill him, he decided to make a dash to warn us of what was in store. He had more than a dozen bullets in him, and there was not the slightest hope for him. We carried him into a house until the fight was over, and then we buried him next day with military honours. His identification disk and everything else was

eyes of those who are going to the front, and even of the wounded who are returning. 'Never once,' writes one correspondent, 'not once since I came to France have I seen among the soldiers an angry face or heard an angry word. . . . They are always quiet, orderly, and wonderfully cheerful.' And no one who has followed the war need be told of their heroism. I do not forget the thousands left on the battlefield to die, or the groaning of the wounded sounding all day between the crashes of the guns. But there is a strange deep gladness as well. 'One feels an extraordinary freedom' says a young Russian officer, 'in the midst of death, with the bullets whistling round. The same with all the soldiers. The wounded all want to get well and return to the fight. They fight with tears of joy in their eyes.'

Human nature is a mysterious thing, and man finds his weal and woe not in the obvious places. To have something before you, clearly seen, which you know you must do, and can do, and will spend your utmost strength and perhaps your life in doing, that is one form at least of very high happiness, and one that appeals—the facts prove it—not only to saints and heroes but to average men. Doubtless the few who are wise enough and have enough imagination may find opportunity for that same happiness in everyday life, but in war ordinary men find it. This is the inward triumph which lies at the heart of the great tragedy.

missing, so that we could only put over his grave the tribute that was paid to a greater: "He saved others; himself he could not save." There wasn't a dry eye among us when we laid him to rest in that little village.'

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INTRODUCTION

To reconstruct the picture of a modern battle the student must use several different kinds of information. (1) First in importance are the dispatches of the commanders at the front. These give the broad outlines of the struggle, but as a rule do not dwell on episodes ; they explain the strategical and tactical considerations which dictated certain moves, but say little about the actual fighting which ensues. (2) Second in importance, but often of far greater interest, are the narratives of men who were in the fighting line. These narratives seldom show much perception of the strategy of the battle, though they often elucidate the minor tactics of the combatants at particular points on the field. (3) Thirdly, we have often vivid accounts from non-combatants of scenes witnessed on the outskirts of a great battle, or in the course of sudden advances and retreats which bring the armies into a zone not evacuated by the civilian population. (4) Lastly, we have often to use official communications, drawn up at a distance from the field, but based on the interim reports of commanders. These often give details which are omitted in the final and formal dispatches.

In the following pages we give samples of these four sorts of narrative, to illustrate the operations of the British Expeditionary Force, under the com-

mand of Field Marshal Sir John French, during the retreat from Mons to the line Noyon-Chauny-La Fère (August 23-8, 1914). First of all we print (pp. 7-20) the dispatch of Sir John French which is dated September 7; this supplies the outline narrative to which all our other documents are supplementary. With it must be studied a statement published a week earlier by the War Office (pp. 20-3), which is founded upon the interim reports of Sir John French, and which is useful because it gives some details omitted from his formal dispatch. Next we give a group of soldiers' letters (pp. 24-36), chiefly relating to the early stages of the retreat. Many such letters might have been given, but these will serve as examples of our most picturesque source of information. Lastly, we give a diary (pp. 36-9) of an onlooker at Tournai, who witnessed the beginning of the German flank movement towards the British left, and the efforts of the gallant French Territorials to delay that movement. These French troops were sent forward by General d'Amade from the direction of Arras to relieve the pressure on the British Force. He was the only French commander supporting our left flank, and his work is appreciatively mentioned by Sir John French. It is a curious fact that he became aware of the German flanking movement about twenty-four hours before it was known at Mons. About the same interval of time elapsed between the French evacuation of Charleroi on the English right and the communication of this important fact to the English Commander-in-Chief. Hence our troops were exposed on Sunday, August 23, to

the danger of an attack on both flanks simultaneously. Fortunately no attack appears to have been delivered from the direction of Charleroi; and that from Tournai was delayed for some hours by the great gallantry of a French Territorial battalion, under General de Villaret, as described in our document. This battalion was eventually captured; but the good work which it had begun was continued by other bodies of the troops which General d'Amade had under his command.

The theatre of the English operations is described in some notes added to the maps which we print below (facing p. 21). The exact composition of the English force cannot be given at present; but some facts are disclosed by Sir John French. The infantry was grouped in two Army Corps; the First Corps operating on the east (the English right) under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig; the Second Corps on the west (the English left) under General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. There was one Cavalry Division under Major General Allenby; and the 5th Cavalry Brigade operated independently under Brigadier-General Sir Philip Chetwode.

The numbers of the force so constituted are not given. But we are told of five Infantry Divisions in all. The First Division formed the right, the Second Division the left of the First Corps; the Third Division (under Major-General Hubert Hamilton) formed the right of the Second Corps, and the Fifth (under General Sir Charles Fergusson) its left. The Fourth Division (under General Snow) was pushed up by train to Le Cateau on August 23

and reinforced the Second Corps on the morning of the 25th. Earlier than this, on the morning of August 24, the Second Corps had been reinforced by the 19th Infantry Brigade coming up from the line of communications. An Infantry Brigade is one-third of a Division. We may take the normal strength of the Infantry Division at 18,000 men, of a Cavalry Division at 9,250 men. It results that, on Sunday, August 23, the English force numbered at least 72,000 men of the Infantry Division, and 9,250 men of the Cavalry Division (possibly over 10,000 cavalry, if Sir Philip Chetwode's Brigade was not part of the strength of General Allenby's Division). On August 24, the arrival of the 19th Infantry Brigade may have brought up as many as 6,000 men; and on August 25 the arrival of General Snow's Division may have added 18,000 men. Against this Army, which can never at any given moment have much exceeded 100,000 men, the German General Staff launched five Army Corps, containing at least 250,000 combatants. In artillery, as we are told by Sir John French himself, the English were outnumbered by at least four to one. Under these circumstances, the retreat, in spite of the heavy losses suffered, stands out as the finest British feat of arms since Waterloo. It was a retreat in which the assailants suffered infinitely more than the assailed, and were completely unsuccessful as to their main object; which was to outflank the Expeditionary Force and to pin it against the fortress of Maubeuge.

THE RETREAT FROM MONS

I

War Office, September 9, 1914.

THE following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, British Forces in the Field:—

7th September, 1914.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report the proceedings of the Field Force under my command up to the time of rendering this despatch.

POSITION AT MONS, AUGUST 22-3.

1. The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at its destination in this country well within the scheduled time.

The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the Force during Saturday, the 22nd, to positions I considered most favourable from which to commence operations which the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the campaign.

The line taken up extended along the line of the

canal from Conde on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as follows :—

From Conde to Mons inclusive was assigned to the Second Corps, and to the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.

In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the Cavalry Division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward reconnaissance was entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir Philip Chetwode with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send forward a few squadrons to assist in this work.

During the 22nd and 23rd these advanced squadrons did some excellent work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took place in which our troops showed to great advantage.

DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN ATTACK, AUGUST 23.

2. At 6 a.m., on August 23rd, I assembled the Commanders of the First and Second Corps and Cavalry Division at a point close to the position, and explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the immediate situation in front of us.

From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's Army Corps, with per-

haps one Cavalry Division, were in front of my position; and I was aware of no attempted out-flanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observation of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate.

About 3 p.m. on Sunday, the 23rd, reports began coming in to the effect that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened.

The Commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some high ground south of Bray, and the 5th Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche, moving slightly south: the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.

The right of the 3rd Division, under General Hamilton, was at Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the Commander of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre behind Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 p.m., I received a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph, telling me that at least three German Corps viz. a reserve corps, the 4th Corps and the 9th Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve

French divisions and the 5th French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur.

BRITISH RETIREMENT TO BAVAI-MAUBEUGE LINE,
AUGUST 24.

3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be reconnoitred. This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extended west to Jenlain, south-east of Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildings made the siting of trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire in many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.

When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German threatening on my front reached me, I endeavoured to confirm it by aeroplane reconnaissance; and as a result of this I determined to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th.

A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout the night, and at daybreak on the 24th the 2nd Division from the neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the 1st and 2nd Divisions, whilst the 1st Division took up a supporting position in the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second Corps retired on the

line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The 3rd Division on the right of the Corps suffered considerable loss in this operation from the enemy, who had retaken Mons.

The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially entrenched themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 p.m. Towards midday the enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left.

I had previously ordered General Allenby with the Cavalry to act vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavour to take the pressure off.

LOSSES OF 2ND CAVALRY BRIGADE

About 7.30 a.m. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles Fergusson, commanding 5th Division, saying that he was very hard pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message General Allenby drew in the Cavalry and endeavoured to bring direct support to the 5th Division.

During the course of this operation General de Lisle, of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyse the further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up by wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the Brigade.

SUPPORTS BROUGHT UP FROM VALENCIENNES.

The 19th Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the Line of Communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22nd and 23rd. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.

With the assistance of the Cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great losses in doing so.

At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the 19th Brigade in position between Jenlain and Bry, and the Cavalry on the outer flank.

FURTHER RETIREMENT TO CAMBRAI-LE CATEAU-
LANDRECIES LINE, AUGUST 25.

4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.

I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat exhausted, and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped, therefore,

that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me effecting my object.

The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion of the troops.

The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were ordered to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5.30 a.m.

Two Cavalry Brigades, with the Divisional Cavalry of the Second Corps, covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the Cavalry Division with the 19th Brigade, the whole under the command of General Allenby, covered the west flank.

The 4th Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday, the 23rd, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a Brigade of Artillery with Divisional Staff were available for service.

I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his right south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road south of La Chaprie. In this position the Division rendered great help to the effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position.

Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been partially prepared and entrenched, I had grave doubts—owing

to the information I received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy against me—as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.

Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II.) to envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the Corps Commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could towards the general line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.

The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the retirement.

Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of the Forêt De Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had intended that the Corps should come further west so as to fill up the gap between La Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further in without rest.

The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9.30 p.m. a report was received that the 4th Guards Brigade in Landrecies was heavily attacked by troops of the 9th German Army Corps who were coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought most gal-

lantly and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his 1st Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent messages to the Commander of the two French Reserve Divisions on my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his Corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were able at dawn to resume their march south towards Wassigny on Guise.

By about 6 p.m. the Second Corps had got into position with their right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighbourhood of Caudry, and the line of defence was continued thence by the 4th Division towards Seranvillers, the left being thrown back.

During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the Cavalry became a good deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General Allenby had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.

The 4th Division was placed under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Second Army Corps.

On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting of three divisions, under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way back from

Bavai, which was my "Poste de Commandement" during the fighting of the 23rd and 24th, I visited General Sordêt, and earnestly requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction from his Army Commander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable for the reasons given to afford me any support on the most critical day of all, viz. the 26th.

At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second Corps and the 4th Division.

At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face of such an attack.

I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable of movement.

The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank ; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any way.

There had been no time to entrench the position

properly, but the troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.

The Artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the Artillery, which had itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the Cavalry in the further retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation.

Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit.

I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the Army under my command on the morning of the 26th August could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation.

The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chauny-La Fere, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's pursuit.

On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordêt and the French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially assisting my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.

General D'Amade also, with the 61st and 62nd French Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras on the enemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British Forces.

This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23rd August, and which really constituted a four days' battle.

At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present despatch.

I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British Forces have suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the fact that the British Army—only two days after a concentration by rail—was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German Army Corps.

It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the two General Officers commanding Army Corps; the self-sacrificing and devoted exertions of their Staffs; the direction of the troops by Divisional, Brigade and Regimental Leaders; the command of the smaller units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned officers and men.

I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable work done by the Royal Flying

Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.

Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in destroying five of the enemy's machines.

I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable assistance I received from the General and Personal Staffs at Headquarters during this trying period.

Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General Staff; Major-General Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and all under them have worked day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill, self-sacrifice, and devotion; and the same acknowledgment is due by me to Brigadier-General Hon. W. Lambton, my Military Secretary, and the Personal Staff.

In such operations as I have described the work of the Quartermaster-General is of an extremely onerous nature. Major-General Sir William Robertson has met what appeared to be almost insuperable difficulties with his characteristic energy, skill and determination; and it is largely owing to his exertions that the hardships and sufferings of the troops—inseparable from such operations—were not much greater.

Major-General Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant-

General, has also been confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in connection with disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of casualty lists. He has been indefatigable in his exertions to meet the difficult situations which arose.

I have not yet been able to complete the list of officers whose names I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for services rendered during the period under review ; and, as I understand it is of importance that this despatch should no longer be delayed, I propose to forward this list, separately, as soon as I can.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief,
British Forces in the Field.


II

The following statement, issued by the Secretary of State for War, was published in the newspapers of August 31, 1914 :—


Although the official dispatches from Sir John French on the recent battles have not yet been received it is possible now to state in general outline what the British share in the recent operations has been.

There has, in effect, been a four days' battle—on the 23rd, 24th, 25th, and 26th of August. During the whole of this period the British troops, in conformity with the general movement of the French

MAP I



MAP II



INDEX OF PRINCIPAL PLACES ON MAP II

- Arras.** A French industrial town, strongly fortified, with a population of 20,000.
- Avesnes.** A French manufacturing town of less than 5,000 inhabitants.
- Bavai.** A French village with iron works and marble quarries.
- Binche.** A small Belgian town of 10,000 inhabitants between Mons and Charleroi.
- Cambrai.** A French cathedral and industrial town, strongly fortified, with a population of 24,000.
- Charleroi.** A strongly fortified Belgian town on the river Sambre, a centre of coal-mining, iron-founding and various manufactures; the population is 20,000.
- Condé.** A small fortified town, important as a centre of the coal trade.
- Douai.** A strongly fortified French industrial town with a population of 30,000.
- Dour and Frameries.** Small Belgian towns of 10,000 inhabitants each, centres of coal-mining in the Mons district.
- Landrecies.** A French market town of less than 3,000 inhabitants.
- Le Cateau.** A French town, of historical associations, but slight actual importance; population 10,000.
- Maroilles.** A French village of less than 2,000 inhabitants, famous for its cheese.
- Maubeuge.** A French town (strongly fortified) with a population of 12,000; a centre of iron-founding and hardware manufactures.
- Mons.** A Belgian town in the province of Hainault with a population of about 25,000; a centre of coal-mining, iron, and glass works; connected with Condé and the river Scheldt by a canal, to the south of which the English Second Corps was stationed on August 23.
- Orchies.** A small French market town, with a population under 4,000.
- St. Amand.** A French manufacturing town, with a population of 12,000.
- Solesmes.** A French town with a population of 6,000 inhabitants, a centre of textile industries.
- Tournai.** A Belgian cathedral town, with spinning industries, and a population of 35,000.
- Valenciennes.** A French fortified and manufacturing town, with a population of about 28,000.

armies, were occupied in resisting and checking the German advance and in withdrawing to the new lines of defence.

The battle began at Mons, on Sunday, during which day and part of the night the German attack, which was stubbornly pressed and repeated, was completely checked on the British front.

On Monday, the 24th, the Germans made vigorous efforts in superior numbers to prevent the safe withdrawal of the British Army and to drive it into the fortress of Maubeuge. This effort was frustrated by the steadiness and skill with which the British retirement was conducted, and, as on the previous day, very heavy losses, far in excess of anything suffered by us, were inflicted upon the enemy, who in dense formation and in enormous masses, marched forward again and yet again to storm the British lines.

The British retirement proceeded on the 25th with continuous fighting though not on the scale of the previous two days, and by the night of the 25th the British Army occupied the line Cambrai-Landrecies-Le Cateau.

It had been intended to resume the retirement at daybreak on the 26th, but the German attack, in which no less than five Corps were engaged, was so close and fierce that it was not possible to carry out this intention until the afternoon.

The battle on this day, August 26th, was of the most severe and desperate character. The troops offered a superb and most stubborn resistance to the tremendous odds with which they were confronted,

and at length extricated themselves in good order, though with serious losses and under the heaviest artillery fire.

No guns were taken by the enemy except those the horses of which were all killed, or which were shattered by high explosive shells.

Sir John French estimates that during the whole of these operations, from the 23rd to the 26th inclusive, his losses amount to 5,000 or 6,000 men. On the other hand the losses suffered by the Germans in their attacks across the open, and through their dense formations, are out of all proportion to those which we have suffered.

In Landrecies alone, on the 26th as an instance, a German Infantry brigade advanced in the closest order into the narrow street, which they completely filled. Our machine guns were brought to bear on this target from the end of the town. The head of the column was swept away, a frightful panic ensued, and it is estimated that no less than 800 to 900 dead and wounded Germans were lying in this street alone.

Another incident which may be chosen from many like it was the charge of the German Guard Cavalry Division upon the British 12th Infantry Brigade, when the German Cavalry were thrown back with great loss and in absolute disorder. These are notable examples of what has taken place over practically the whole front during these engagements, and the Germans have been made to pay the extreme price for every forward march they have made.

Since the 26th, apart from Cavalry fighting, the

British Army has not been molested. It has rested and refitted after its exertions and glorious achievements.

Reinforcements amounting to double the loss suffered have already joined. Every gun has been replaced and the Army is now ready to take part in the next great encounter with undiminished strength and undaunted spirit.

To-day the news is again favourable. The British have not been engaged, but the French armies, acting vigorously on their right and left, have for the time being brought the German attack to a standstill.

Sir John French also reports that on the 28th the 5th British Cavalry Brigade, under General Chetwode, fought a brilliant action with the German Cavalry, in the course of which the 12th Lancers and Royal Scots Greys routed the enemy, and speared large numbers in flight.

It must be remembered throughout that the operations in France, vast though they are, are only one wing of the whole field of battle. The strategic position of ourselves and our Allies is such that whereas a decisive victory to our arms in France would probably be fatal to the enemy, the continuance of resistance by the Anglo-French armies upon such a scale as to keep in the closest grip the enemy's best troops can, if prolonged, lead only to one conclusion.

APPENDIX A

By the courtesy of the *Evening News* and *The Times* we are able to give extracts from two narratives of soldiers who were in the front line at Mons. The first writer (a private in the 1st Royal West Kent Regiment) was in action to the north of the Mons-Condé canal. The second, a sapper, was on the canal and south of it. Both writers describe the retreat; but the details which they give are of little importance.

I

It was Sunday, the 23rd August, that we were at Mons, billeted in a farmyard, and we were having a sing-song and watching people home from church.

At about 12.30 an orderly had gone down to draw dinners when an aeroplane appeared overhead, throwing out some black powder. After this, shrapnel burst overhead, acquainting us of the fact that the Germans were in the vicinity.

All was confusion and uproar for the moment, because we were not armed and our shirts and socks were out to wash, that being the only chance we had to get them washed.

It did not take us long, however, to get in fighting trim and to go through the town of Mons to the scene of operations, which was on the other side of a small canal that adjoined.

Here we found the A Company of the Royal West Kents engaged in a hard tussle in keeping off the enemy until support arrived. The A Company had been engaged in outpost duty, so that they were the first to meet the enemy. The A Company lost very heavily here, losing all the officers except one.

BLOWING UP THE BRIDGE.

This was Lieutenant Bell, who showed great valour in going out to bring in the wounded. Most of the damage was done by the shells, although at times the enemy were within three hundred yards of our troops.

We arrived in the nick of time and took up position in a glass-blowing factory. We loopholed the walls and held that position until darkness set in. With darkness upon us we fixed our bayonets and lay in wait in case the enemy made an attempt to rush us.

About 11 p.m. we received orders to retire over the canal. Two sections of C Company were left to keep the enemy in check whilst the remainder of the battalion retired. After all had crossed, the bridge was blown up, so that we were likely to be left in peace until the Germans could find a means of crossing the river.

The two sections of C Company that had been left behind, unfortunately, could not retire over the bridge before it was blown up, and they had to find their own ways and means of getting across. Most of them managed to do so.

We retired from the town of Mons and got into open country, but we still kept on moving throughout the night. When daylight arrived we saw that Mons had been practically blown away, and that the Germans were also firing at times at the hospital.

Throughout the morning we continued to fight a rear-

guard action. We did not leave off trekking until six in the evening.

VANQUISHED GERMAN AIRMAN.

About eight o'clock all lights were ordered to be put out and no noise to be made, and we all lay down for a well-earned rest, putting out pickets in case of surprise. About an hour before dawn we were all ordered to stand to arms, and the column was once more engaged in a retiring movement.

There was one interesting sight I saw as the column was on the march, and that was a duel in the air between French and German aeroplanes. It was wonderful to see the Frenchman manoeuvre to get the upper position of the German, and after about ten minutes or a quarter of an hour the Frenchman got on top and blazed away with a revolver on the German.

He injured him so much as to cause him to descend, and when found he was dead. The British troops buried the airman and burnt the aeroplane.

During that day we were not troubled by any more German aeroplanes, and about 5 p.m. a halt was ordered, and we took things comfortably, hoping to have a rest until daylight came again. We were fortunate enough not to be disturbed that night, and at dawn we again stood to arms, and we found the Germans close upon our heels.

The column got on the move, and several regiments were ordered to entrench themselves. We found it very hot and fatiguing work with such small tools to use. We soon found, however, that where there's a will there's a way, and quickly entrenched ourselves so as to be protected from the artillery fire.

It was not long before the German artillery found our trenches and gave us rather a warm time. Our own artillery

had to open fire at 2,100 yards, which was very close for artillery. I saw a battery in front of us put right out of action.

ALL THAT WAS LEFT OF THEM.

There were only about six men left amongst them, and they were engaged in trying to get away the guns. This disaster was due to the accurate shell-firing of the German artillery.

In their efforts the brave gunners were not successful, owing to their horses being killed. It was interesting to see an officer engaged in walking round the guns and putting them out of action, or, in other words, seeing that they would be of no use to the Germans. This action required a great deal of bravery under the circumstances, because the enemy continued to keep up the heavy firing.

Much bravery was also displayed by wounded comrades of the battery helping one another to get out of the firing line.

About this time the enemy were advancing, owing to the superiority of numbers, and hand-to-hand fighting had taken place in the right trenches, the Argylls and several other regiments being engaged, but the nearest the enemy came to us at this point was about 500 yards.

Owing to the artillery fire being so heavy, and the British being in such comparatively small numbers, the officer in charge of my company deemed it wise to retire. It was rather too late, however, and he said to the men that were in the trenches: 'Now, boys, every man for himself.'

FIRING ON A HOSPITAL.

Having got these orders, we were not long in doing a retiring movement and trying to save our own skins.

It was hard to see my own comrades being cut down like corn owing to the deadly shrapnel firing.

I myself was wounded at this point by a bullet from a Maxim gun. I staggered at the time, thinking my hand had been blown off, but I recovered and kept on the run, and got in a trench, where I bandaged myself up. From there I continued to retire on my own, as I had lost touch with my section.

I ran into the General Commanding, and he asked me what was the matter with me. I told him I was wounded, and he said, 'For God's sake, man, don't go into the hospital: they are blowing it up now!' I did not want telling that twice, and I started to track down country to get into touch with the column, where I knew the ambulance men were, and they would dress my wound.

II

WE were in action all day—fifteen hours of it. We blew up barges lying up the canal. About 12 o'clock we had to get the charges together, and several were laid. While we were laying them we were under fire all the time. But the Germans could do anything but hit us. The shells were flying all round. One of our fellows, a lance-corporal of the Dorsets, if he killed one German he killed 2,000. He was using a Maxim, and was at it all day. He was supposed to be the crack shot of the Army. There were so many Germans all around that we didn't know whether we were shooting dead men or not. The lance-corporal was as cool as anything. Our infantry were firing from about 350 yards range all day. We were quite close enough up. After we had laid the charges, we got back under cover.

At night we had barbed wire to put across the road. We got up pretty close to the German lines, for we could

hear them talking. Later on we had six bridges to blow up. The centre bridge was to go up first, and we were to get over quickly after we had laid the charge. While we were waiting—there were ten of us—we saw a chap from the West Kents coming over, and we told him to jump for his life. The fuse was actually burning at the time, and I guess he broke all the records for jumping. When we ran over the bridge there were some German snipers in some trees trying to hit us. After we left we came to some telegraph wires which had been shot away and had fallen across the street. We had to cut the wires away with our bayonets.

On Wednesday morning we went to a village near Le Cateau, and there we had to loophole all the houses, so that the infantry could fire from them. After fortifying the town we left it and went on to another place, where there was a church. We saw the Red Cross flying there, and knew it had been turned into a hospital. Our wounded were being taken in there in dozens, but the Germans shelled it and the place was knocked to pieces. Some of the wounded were got out, but not all. We left there and then had to go and do some trenching. We were hampered by our picks and shovels. We could see some cavalry in the distance under cover, but shells were flying all around them. They got away, but the horses must have had to run like deer.

The soldiers take everything quite coolly. You would have thought they were at a football cup-tie. They were lying in the trenches with German shells flying all around, and they would make bets as to how many Germans they would kill and had killed during the day. They were laughing and joking all the time. A party of the King's Own went into one battle shouting out, 'Early doors this way! Early doors, ninepence!' There were chaps, too,

coming in and having their wounds dressed, and going off again to have another go at the Germans. Our men fought simply grand. At Landrecies, while our men were lying in the trenches there were a couple of fellows playing marbles with bullets from shrapnel shells which had burst around them.

The officers are grand. They do everything they can for our comfort. They are always looking after our chaps, and I cannot speak highly enough of them. The men, too, seem pleased to think that they are doing their duty to the officers.

APPENDIX B

THE two following accounts (which we are allowed by the courtesy of *The Times* and the *Observer* to reproduce) relate to the fighting of Monday, August 24, and subsequent days. They are given by men who were on the extreme left of the British position, south of Mons; probably both were attached to the 19th Infantry Brigade, which was sent up from Valenciennes on the 24th to support the Second Corps. The first narrator is a sergeant in a Welsh regiment; the second a gunner.

I

On Monday morning, we found ourselves in a valley just three miles south of Mons. We could not see the town, but on a slope and a thousand yards in front of us was a long line of British batteries shelling the enemy in the town. The Germans replied, and, evidently guessing that the artillery had infantry

support, sent many shells bursting over the hill in our direction.

We entrenched ourselves, some 13,000 of us. The German cavalry came swooping down. There were at least three brigades, about 9,000 men. We put up a good fight, but we had to retire, and did so in an orderly style, covered by a strong fire from our artillery.

As we did so, the whole German attack developed. At least one Army Corps and a half were moving along our left flank as fast as they could—some 60,000 men or more. We were now with the rest of our brigade, but it was impossible to meet such a strength of the enemy. All we could do was to fall back, as there was no help for us from our right flank.

Our orders to retire came from head-quarters, and formed part of a well-considered plan to draw on this rash advance of the German right wing in extended line. Covered by our guns, we eventually reached —.

I cannot praise too highly the conduct of the rank and file. They had fought a long series of desultory combats and had been under heavy shell fire, and, what to them was far worse, a constant series of thunder-showers. And yet they marched over thirty miles with a cheery confidence, singing nearly all the way. Much of it was a night march, and yet I only heard of one man who fell out and did not report himself by next morning. We reached — at midnight and were billeted there.

There was little rest for us, however, as most of us moved out at an early hour on Tuesday morning to a line of low hills on the east, which seemed to offer a fine position. Our numbers had been strengthened during the night.

We were entrenched on the hills with our field artillery and also our batteries, which were excellently placed.

This time the Germans got the range well. They did not take their usual blundering sighting shots, but plumped right on to our lines. They were admirably helped by aeroplanes, which flew low enough to sight our positions, but still out of range. We tried to wing them, but failed. Later, however, we got one down, and I was told, though I did not see it myself, that the whole aerial fleet was put out of action by our guns.

At 11 o'clock in the morning the German enveloping movement of which they are so fond began again, but our cavalry appeared and they promptly retreated.

II

We fought our way to Mons. Five infantry regiments were already there, and had advanced to attack the Germans, who were entrenched. The latter were too strong for them, and our men were severely mauled. We took up a position on the left flank, and we opened fire at a range of 1,000 yards. Our aim was very good, but it took the Germans a long time to get the range. They are good artillery men but bad shots. Then the German artillery opened fire heavily. The infantry had to wait while we made a clearance for them, and they did not get along for two hours.

There were eight or nine Germans to every Englishman. As fast as we killed them they came on, but we succeeded in pulling down the odds. We retired to Donicourt, and when three parts of the way up the hill the traces of my gun broke and fetched the gun down on top of me. I could not move until a Frenchman took me along and put me in the hospital at St. Quentin.

The gunner mentioned that the British captured a German gun at Donicourt. One of his comrades, he said, had his

legs blown off, and the limber waggons were full of British wounded. 'The Germans are frightened of the bayonet,' he added, with a laugh. 'They're a foul lot. When they catch any of our wounded they cut their wrists with their bayonets to prevent them using rifles, or jam them on the ground with the butts of their rifles.'

The gunner declared that the German losses were three times as heavy as the British, and was confident that the Allies would be successful. 'I want to get back to the front as soon as the doctor says I'm fit to man a gun. I don't want to stop here.'

APPENDIX C

AN interesting glimpse of the fighting round Cateau is given in the following narrative. The narrator, a soldier in the Connaught Rangers, was apparently stationed west of Cateau on Tuesday, the 25th; his Division, the 4th, under General Snow, was engaged in repelling the German flank attack from the direction of Cambrai. We are indebted to the courtesy of the *Evening News* for leave to reproduce this account.

'A GRAND TIME.'

It was a grand time we had, and I wouldn't have missed it for lashins of money. It was near to Cambrai when we had our best time.

The Germans kept pressing our rear-guard all the time, and at last our colonel could stand it no longer, so the word was passed round that we were to give them hell and all. There were at least five to one, and we were in danger of being cut off.

With that up got the colonel. 'Rangers of Connaught,'

says he, 'the eyes of all Ireland are on you to-day, and I know you never could disgrace the old country by allowing Germans to beat you while you have arms in your hands and hearts in your breasts.

'Up then and at them, and if you don't give them the soundest thrashing they ever got, you needn't look me in the face again in this world or the next.'

And we went for them with just what you would know of a prayer to the Mother of our Lord to be merciful to the loved ones at home if we should fall in the fight. We charged through and through them until they broke and ran like frightened hares in terror of hounds.

After that taste of the fighting quality of the Rangers they never troubled us any more that day.

APPENDIX D

THE following account (which we print by the courtesy of *The Times*), gives a good picture of the method in which the British Force held its own during the temporary halts on the retirement. The place of this particular action is not indicated; but it is vividly described. The narrator is a non-commissioned officer.

A CHARGE OF THE HUSSARS.

As the Germans came into view in the open in front of our hastily dug trenches our men opened on them with a steady fire that never once went wide, and we could see clean-cut gaps in the tightly packed ranks as the hail of lead tore its jagged way through them. They were a game lot, however, and kept closing up the gaps in their ranks as though they were so many marionettes. Flesh and blood cannot stand this sort of thing for ever, and after a while

they began to come along with less confident step. Then they halted for a few minutes, gazed about them in a dazed sort of way, and ran like hares. Their place was taken by another bluish-grey mass behind them, and this body came on in much the same way until they too had had as much as they could stand, and then there was another bolt for the rear.

This advancing and retreating went on for hours, each retirement unmasking a fresh body of men, and by the time they were close enough to hurl themselves on our trenches it was an entirely fresh mass of men, who had suffered little from our fire. As they scrambled up they seemed cocksure of themselves, but they had forgotten our men posted under cover on their right, and just as they were steadying themselves for one last rush at us a withering fire was opened on them, and at the same time we cleared the way for the Hussars, who were at them right and left as soon as the fire of our men ceased.

Hell's fury blazed from the eyes of the trapped Germans as they tried to grapple with their new foe, and we stood there silent spectators, lest we should hit our cavalry. It only took them a few minutes to make up their minds, and, with a blood-curdling wail that I shall remember to my dying day, they ran as though all the fiends were after them. They were cut down like chaff, and it was at this point that most of the prisoners were taken by our men. Rifles, bandoliers, caps, and everything else that could be cast off was sacrificed to speed, and many of the scared men outpaced easily the tired horses of our Hussars.

Later, during a lull in the fight, we went out to collect their wounded lying near our trenches, and you would hardly believe the fury that was manifested against us. I think they hate us ten times worse than they hate the French, and that is saying a lot. Those of them who talk

English tell us that had it not been for our interference they would have been in Paris now dictating terms of peace, and that is why they hate us so.

APPENDIX E

THE following (which we print by the courtesy of *The Times*) is the diary of a civilian who witnessed the fighting in Tournai on Monday, August 24, between the flank-guard of the German right wing, which was marching in the direction of St. Amand to attack the English left at Valenciennes. The French troops who attempted to hold Tournai were part of a Territorial corps which had hurried up by forced marches. They were opposed by picked troops in superior numbers, and were ultimately captured on the retreat from Tournai.

TIME TABLE OF THE BATTLE.

7 a.m., Monday, August 24.—A French advance guard entered Tournai, and at once took position in the northern suburb. They had a 'section' of 'Dragoons' and four companies of the 84th Territorial Regiment, 1,000 in all, led by Brigade-General Marquis de Villaret. These men had left Orchies at 3 a.m., a march of eleven miles, and needed rest, which many of them only found in the grave. Hardly had they halted when a German column was signalled north-west, on the Renaix road, one mile only from the French outposts. The conflict was imminent, and General de Villaret posted infantry 'sections' at all street corners and railway viaducts.

At 8 a.m. the guns began to thunder so near and so loud that we thought all the time they were part of the French

artillery. A sergeant near my door told me his major was already killed, and we saw his horse led back across the station square, pierced everywhere in body and limbs, spilling floods of blood.

8.30 a.m.—The French are holding the whole town south of the Brussels-Calais line, behind the big station buildings, sidings, and fences. They had retreated already from the suburb, leaving the northern side of the railway to the Germans, but tried to keep two bridges that lead into Tournai from both sides of the station. A man came running and warning the sergeant that the Germans were crawling along the fences just over the railway, and going westwards unseen to turn the French left.

9 a.m.—The rifle reports become so frequent that I rush home and take my wife, children, and servants to the cellar. No more civilians are to be seen in the streets or avenues; the French themselves have disappeared. The artillery fire has ceased, but we hear the shooting of rifles so much nearer. My poor folks are helplessly frightened.

9.30.—I remember that a window has been left open in our bedroom, and that usually brings trouble, the invaders always pretending to have been shot from private houses. I run upstairs to shut it, and what I saw at that very moment I shall never forget. The square was quite deserted, the sun shining brightly on carefully closed houses and windows. The shooting was incessant, bullets fell everywhere, on the cobblestones, on the pavements, on the garden balustrades, raising almost undiscernible little flakes of dust. Suddenly I stood amazed, unable to move, fascinated by this novel sight; from the far end of a boulevard there came crawling along the trees grey shadows, some holding bicycles, some shooting as they walked on.

Before I had time to realize who they were the station square garden was full of them, taking cover under the

bushes, behind the statues, shooting towards all the streets that converge to that place. One darted to jump over the railing; I distinctly saw a bullet prick the ground close to his foot. He jumped aside and fell behind a big lamp-post. Was he wounded? I did not stop to watch; for the first time I felt my curiosity too unsafe indeed. I ran down to join my family, all crying and praying, a most desolate scene, amongst our little babies horrified by our distraction, although unconscious of the real horrors that were taking place in front of our house.

10 a.m.—We could see a part of the action through the kitchen window, always dreading that bullets might find us, as we heard ricochets on all the outside walls. Then we suddenly listened to a new and strange sound, the most nerve-racking of that distressing morning, and saw the Maxim guns driven to all street corners successively. Their quick, continuous reports recall a very loud motor-cycle engine. We had to endure that horrid noise for more than one hour, ever thinking of the deadly havoc they ought to make at the other end of the boulevard. Louder still there rang the hoarse commands of officers and non-coms., the running and marching of new platoons, the stamping of their heavy boots. How we feared they should break our door open, loot the house, and maltreat us; and yet we had not heard of Louvain, and that they could reach such wanton barbarity.

What struck me was the wonderful discipline of these men during the two hours of fighting I witnessed, most of all the great prestige of the non-com. officers, their firm and imperious handling of their detachments, truly an invaluable asset for such an offensive force. So much greater was their responsibility for relaxing that ascendancy and letting loose their furious slaves to drink and loot.

The grey-clad Germans now and then ventured out of

cover, running cleverly from corner to corner, and, to say the truth, appeared quite courageous and fearless under the firing of the French, now making a last stand before the bridges of the Scheldt. And these old Vendée Territorials of forty, pressed by young and picked men of a choice Regular corps, also did wonders indeed, for they bravely held their ground a whole morning against artillery and Maxims, of which they had none, and only gave way when surrounded by German reinforcements pouring from all sides.

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
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FRENCH POLICY SINCE 1871

THE foreign policy of France, since 1871, is a fascinating subject. The history of France has always been the history of her foreign policy ; for it is in their dealings with foreign friends and enemies that the French people have expressed most clearly their ambitions and ideals. Not that the thoughtful Frenchman has ever been indifferent to problems of domestic government and social organization. It was the French statesman Colbert who, as long ago as the seventeenth century, first reduced to a system the protection by the State of native industries. The wave of enthusiasm for democratic government, which swept over Europe in the early nineteenth century, spread outwards from France. More recently French thinkers have taken a foremost place among the pioneers of industrial co-operation and of socialism. But it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convince the French people as a whole that the supreme duty of the State is merely to secure good and just government for all its subjects, or an equitable distribution of material wealth. From the French point of view, a state which pursued no other objects would be as contemptible as a private individual who cherished no ambitions beyond those of earning an assured income and of leading a comfortable existence.

The Frenchman holds that the State, no less than the individual, should seek renown (*la gloire*) in performing

'deeds of noble note'. The French conception of glory has been modified from one age to another, sometimes for the worse, sometimes for the better. But, until comparatively recent times, the noble deeds expected of a powerful French Government were always deeds of war, to be accomplished in the name of some cherished national idea. Under Louis XIV the nation fought for natural frontiers, under Louis XV for colonies and commerce. The statesmen of the French Revolution roused their fellow countrymen to the most astounding military efforts by announcing that France would compel all other nations to be free in the same sense as herself. Under Napoleon I, and more obscurely under his nephew, Napoleon III, France aspired to impose her suzerainty by force of arms upon the whole of Western Europe. Since 1871 times have changed, and with them the temper of France. In the last forty-three years she has produced some visionary soldiers who dreamed of a new French ascendancy in Europe; but their vapourings have been nowhere more mercilessly satirized than in their own country. The French people are wise enough to know that they can no longer hope to overrun Europe, imposing their authority or their ideas of government at the point of the bayonet. They do not hope for this, and they have even ceased to wish that it were possible.

Still it is not to be expected that old traditions should be entirely extirpated in a moment, even by such a catastrophe as the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. That disaster made it imperative for France to maintain a huge military establishment, as a safeguard against future attacks; therefore, since 1871, the majority of Frenchmen have still been trained as soldiers, and still the influence of French military leaders upon national policy

is sometimes greater than the wisdom of their counsels. The French nation, as might be expected of a military nation, are keenly sensitive to any slight; they have not always avoided the mistake of supposing that any opposition to their cherished schemes must be the outcome of malevolence. They have ceased to think of war as the obvious means of furthering national interests; but they are by no means so pacific as the Anglo-Saxon peoples, who have hitherto dispensed with conscription. The foreign policy of France still strikes the average Englishman as too audacious and too restless. The French are less cautious than ourselves in counting the cost of foreign enterprises; what we call common prudence they would call want of spirit. And they are the more disposed to run great risks for relatively slight advantages, because they still believe that their national credit depends upon their foreign policy. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in a French Government is expected to pursue a policy which is not only safe and dignified, but something more. He must have a clear-cut programme, which holds out the promise of tangible results (for the French mind is attached to the concrete), and which at the same time is based upon some broad principle of right, or some far-reaching theory of the proper course of national development. Frenchmen do not demand that their foreign policy should be aggressive, in the sense of constituting a menace to other civilized states. But they are imbued with the idea that great states always are, and always must be engaged in competition, in a race for the acquisition of allies, of markets, of spheres of influence. They would feel humiliated if they thought that France was dropping out of the race from want of foresight, from timidity, or from lack of interest. It is not the

prize of victory which they value so much as the consciousness that their country is honourably distinguished in the competition.

Once we have grasped the French point of view, we have surmounted the chief difficulty under which an Englishman labours when he tries to understand French policy. There are other difficulties, and they are not to be underrated. The materials upon which to found a thorough judgement are not yet available. It is probable that France is bound by secret treaties, the nature of which we can only guess. The published treaties to which she is a party will not be fully intelligible until we know much more about her aims in subscribing to them, and her share in framing their provisions. These, however, are difficulties which beset us equally when we turn from France to the consideration of the foreign policy of any other modern state. The peculiar difficulty, in studying French diplomacy, is to apprehend and to keep in mind the French point of view; it is so different from that of the Englishman, whose insular position leads him to think of foreign relations as a regrettable necessity, and to demand of his statesmen that they shall only intervene in foreign complications when some very obvious and very pressing interest is at stake. For England, perhaps, this is the wiser rule of action. But the course which is safest for an island power may be highly dangerous for a continental power; and a theory of the mission of the State which suits the Anglo-Saxon temperament may be altogether unsuitable to Latin peoples. We should not only endeavour to understand how a Frenchman thinks about foreign policy; we should also do our best to appreciate the reasons which make him differ so widely from ourselves upon this topic.

Remembering then that, in a Frenchman's eyes, there is a world of difference between activity and aggression, between stealing a march upon a rival and aiming a blow at his existence, between winning a race and inflicting an injury, let us attempt to form some judgement of French foreign policy in the last forty years or so. Has it been aggressive? Has it carried competition to the point of wanton and unforgivable provocation? Has the mainspring of it been the desire to revenge upon the German Empire the disgraces and the losses of 1870? Or has it aimed at restoring French prestige, in a less dangerous way, by discovering and developing new fields for French influence? These are questions which cannot be answered with dogmatic confidence until the archives of all the Great Powers have been thrown open. But they are questions on which it is important that we should form a provisional judgement from such material as is available. For they concern the honour and the trustworthiness of a cherished ally.

These questions can best be answered in a brief historical survey. It is a complicated story that we have to tell; but it becomes simpler if one observes that there are three well-marked phases through which French policy has passed since 1871; and that in each successive stage there is one national interest which exercises a predominating influence upon the minds of French statesmen and determines their attitude towards other powers.

(1) From 1871 to 1880 the key-note of French statesmanship was expressed in the words, *Recuperation and Reorganization*. In these years the Republic, as it exists to-day, was founded and endowed with a fixed constitution. The Republic rapidly paid off the enor-

mous indemnity (£240,000,000) which the victorious German Empire had exacted. The army and the defences of the eastern frontier were put upon a satisfactory footing; and these were only the more striking manifestations of the new spirit of reform which was in the air. The nation, no less than the Government, set to work with amazing energy and success to build up national prosperity on new foundations. The French put away their old illusions and vaingloriousness; they cultivated the clearness of thought and thoroughness in action which had given victory to the Germans. It was for France a time of melancholy, of regrets, of stern self-examination, but any patriotic Frenchman, as he looks back upon the work of those ten years, must feel that there never was a more creditable period in the history of his people.

In foreign policy France did little during the years 1871-80. She stood in constant dread, perhaps exaggerated dread, of a new attack from Germany. The French people would never formally acknowledge the title of the German Empire to Alsace and Lorraine; it was hardly to be expected that they should, while the population of the ceded provinces remained obstinately French in sympathies—as it does to this day in Alsace at least, if not also in Lorraine. But on the whole the French people were wise enough to obey the warning of Gambetta, their most popular statesman in those days, who said: ‘Think of it (*Revanche*) always and never speak of it.’ A German historian complains that the German Empire, from the day of its birth, has always been ‘burdened with a French mortgage’, that is, with the danger implied in the latent hostility of France; and Bismarck taught his countrymen, only too well, the lesson that, for their own safety, France must be kept

in a state of weakness. France, however, did not allow herself the dangerous luxury of translating her natural resentment into action. There was, it is true, a prospect of a new Franco-German war in 1875; but it arose from a feeling, which prevailed in German military circles, that France had been let off too lightly in 1871, and that it was advisable to 'bleed her white'. War was averted by the intervention of Russia and of England; and Bismarck's apologists now allege that he never intended to do more than scare the French out of any thoughts of revenge which she might still be harbouring. Whatever his intentions, he had certainly acted in such a way as to give France every reason for strengthening her defences and for watching the slightest move of Germany with deep suspicion.

(2) In 1881 the French showed the world that they had at last recovered confidence and strength. That year saw the French occupation of Tunis and the beginning of the new colonial policy which, from that date to 1904, was the main interest of French statesmen. For twenty-three years France was engaged in acquiring and developing tropical or sub-tropical territories, partly in Africa and partly in the Far East. These new possessions were, and are, as Bismarck once sardonically remarked, 'colonies without colonists'. Since she lost Canada in the eighteenth century France has never aspired to become, like Great Britain, a mother of new nations. Indeed, if she had the aspiration, she would find it difficult to provide the emigrants, or to secure a land in the temperate zones where they could settle. But both in Africa and in Asia she has copied with remarkable success the model afforded by the Indian Empire.

At the fall of Napoleon there remained to France, of all the colonies which she had established in the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries, only a few trading posts in India, a few of the West Indian Islands, the islets of St. Pierre and Miquelon off the coast of Newfoundland, and Cayenne (French Guiana) on the east coast of South America. When France began to think once more of colonial enterprises, it was to the Mediterranean that she first turned her gaze. Between 1830 and 1847 Algeria was completely subdued; and it was no mere accident that the Suez Canal was originally planned in France and was finally constructed (1859-69) by De Lesseps, a retired French diplomat. Napoleon III probably dreamed, as his uncle Napoleon I had dreamed, of a French protectorate in Egypt; he and his advisers certainly hoped that the Suez Canal would make the Mediterranean a highway for French trade with the Far East. Under Napoleon III France acquired Cochin-China, thus staking out for herself a considerable sphere of influence in Asia. But Napoleon III was distracted between many and conflicting schemes; there was no consistent plan in his colonial enterprises.

The Republic, in and after 1881, pursued a more energetic colonial policy than Napoleon III, because it was not distracted by any hopes of aggrandizement on the European mainland. Tunis was the first considerable prize to be gained (1881); and Tunis was occupied with the goodwill of England. At the European Congress of Berlin (1878) Lord Salisbury said to the French representative: 'Do what you think fit in Tunis; England will offer no opposition.' Neither did Germany oppose the occupation. In fact Bismarck had prompted Lord Salisbury's offer, in the hope of diverting France from the pre-occupation of *Revanche*. It seemed a remarkable piece of good fortune, an omen of returning prosperity, that such a prize could be obtained

without exciting the jealousy of the two powers whom Frenchmen regarded as most jealous of their nation.

The occupation of Tunis has indeed proved a landmark in the history of French colonial enterprise; though, like many other notable events, it has not produced the consequences which were predicted at the time. Tunis did not become a stepping-stone to Egypt, for reasons which we shall narrate hereafter; and, now that Italy has occupied Tripoli, to the east of Tunis, it is improbable that France will ever succeed in drawing nearer to the Nile delta. On the other hand, the possession of Tunis gave France a stronger claim to the Sahara and the Western Sudan, when the powers interested in the partition of Africa agreed to recognize the 'doctrine of the hinterland', the principle that any power which possesses the sea-coast is entitled to the inland districts of which that coast is the natural outlet. Further, it was in Tunis that the French first proved the value of a remarkably flexible and inexpensive system of colonization—the method of establishing a protectorate which allows the native forms of government to continue, under careful supervision, but gives the fullest opportunities for 'peaceful penetration' by the explorer and the merchant. It is a method which France has applied on an extensive scale since 1881. In 1885 she applied it to Madagascar in the Indian Ocean, and to the states of Tonkin and Annam in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. Quite recently (1912) she has applied it to the larger half of Morocco.

It is easier to pass a sweeping condemnation on such a method than to recognize the fact that, under certain circumstances, it affords the only way out of an intolerable position. Protectorates of this kind have too often been created to protect imaginary interests, to exploit unoffending populations, or to gain a monopoly of

commerce. But they are often as beneficial to the country which is annexed as to the power which annexes; with one or two glaring exceptions, they have always meant the establishment of better justice, better police, and greater security of person and of property. Every one must admit that Egypt, for example, is infinitely better governed under the British supremacy than she had been at any time since the Mohammedan conquest; and the history of independent Morocco between 1904 and 1912 is the best apology for the protectorate which France has now established in that country. Nor is it true to say that these protectorates, however justly exercised, are always founded upon an unjust usurpation. No one objects when the subjects of a civilized power begin to settle and to trade in a country like Tunis or Morocco. Every one agrees that, if these settlers are ill-used by the native government, their mother-country has the right to demand redress, and, if necessary, a reform of the laws and institutions which have produced oppression or have failed to prevent it. Why then should it be called unjust if, in the last resort, when protests have proved ineffectual, the offended power undertakes to reform and to supervise the offending government? No doubt the colonizing powers of Europe have sometimes alleged a grievance which did not exist, or have made a mountain of a molehill, in order to justify the establishment of a protectorate. But each case must be judged upon its merits; and we have no right to denounce France as a robber simply because she has become the protector of numerous uncivilized or half-civilized communities.

This, however, is a digression. If the French policy of protectorates has created difficulties between France and other powers, this is not because those powers disapprove

of the system, which they are equally ready to apply when opportunities occur, but because they complain that France has usurped a right of intervention which properly belonged to themselves, or that she has protected her own interests by destroying those of her rivals. The occupation of Tunis led at once to a complaint of this kind from Italy, who regarded Tunis as lying within her lawful sphere of interest, both on the score of geographical position and also because Italians were heavily interested in the foreign trade with Tunis. It was natural too that a country which had been a Roman province, and was now politically derelict, should be claimed as a suitable outlet for the trade and the colonial ambitions of the young Italian kingdom. Since France turned a deaf ear to these complaints, Italy proceeded to form the Triple Alliance with Austria and Germany (1882); and she was encouraged by her powerful allies to prosecute the feud. Until 1898 there was constant friction between Italy and France. Mutual ill will found expression in a war of tariffs, and in 1888 the two powers were on the brink of war.

Happily that crisis was averted, the feud has been healed; and Italy is now indemnified with Tripoli for her disappointment in Tunis. Still we must call it an ominous feud. It showed how inevitably the race for new markets and new spheres of influence was leading the European powers into quarrels which reacted on the European situation. Of such disputes France has had more than her full share—not because she has been more lawless than her rivals, but because she has been more energetic and adventurous. In the last thirty years no country has produced so many pioneers who have worked heart and soul to extend the influence of their native country by systematic exploration. There is something romantic,

indeed we might almost say fantastic, in the rapid extension of French power over the hinterlands of North-West Africa. Sometimes France has appropriated with surprising avidity a desert diversified by small and rare oases. Sometimes she has based a claim to more fertile districts upon the possession of a tiny outpost, hundreds of miles beyond the effective jurisdiction of any of her colonial governors. But she has not been singular in her methods. Her fault, if it be a fault, has consisted in the adroit circumvention of slower-witted rivals. Germany has never forgiven France for the skill with which France enveloped and hemmed in the German colony of the Cameroons, although the French success was ratified in 1894 by a convention between the two governments.

But until 1904 the most serious colonial rivalry of France was that with England. It was stimulated no doubt by memories of older quarrels in the eighteenth century. Frenchmen felt that, both in Canada and in India, the English had reaped where they had not sown. France entertained profound suspicions of English colonial policy, imagining that England was restlessly and insatiably ambitious of new conquests. These suspicions were strengthened by the English occupation of Egypt (1882), which was begun as a temporary measure of precaution, to protect the great European interests in that country when they were threatened by a native revolution, and which has continued ever since. As a matter of fact the suspicions were unfounded. Mr. Gladstone, the Prime Minister of that day, was sincerely anxious to keep England clear of the complications which were bound to follow if we interfered in Egypt. He desired the joint intervention of all the interested powers; and England only undertook the

task single-handed when every power, France among the rest, had declined to share in it. England remained in Egypt with the intention of restoring the native system of government to tolerable efficiency; but, before she had completed the work of reorganization, the new and formidable problem of the Sudan was thrust upon her; and though the solution of this problem was brought nearer by the capture of Khartoum (1898), the evacuation of Egypt has been indefinitely postponed.

It was long before France could bring herself to accept the English occupation as something more than a temporary expedient. As late as 1898 a singularly bold attempt was made by a French explorer, Major Marchand, to occupy the basin of the White Nile. The French flag was hoisted at Fashoda just when the English forces were entering Khartoum, three hundred miles lower down the river. The English refused to recognize the legitimacy of the French occupation, and the dispute was at length settled in England's favour; but not before it had threatened to produce a war in Europe. Happily this episode, which both countries have agreed to forget, was the last rumble of a storm-cloud which for sixteen years had overhung every frontier, from Western Africa to Eastern Asia, where French and English interests came into close contact. As Italy had become reconciled to France, so France entered by degrees upon friendlier relations with England.

The causes of the Anglo-French reconciliation were manifold. Undoubtedly one cause was the respect which each nation felt for the characteristic virtues of the other. One is tempted to say that the English and the French were predestined to be allies. No nations could be more unlike; but the very unlikeness made for mutual

respect. Englishmen have always admired the elasticity of the French temperament and the idealism of French policy. Frenchmen, on their side, have not been slow to recognize the pacific and reasonable character of the English, their readiness to accept a compromise and to abide loyally by an agreement. In the colonial sphere it has often happened that English interests have clashed with those of France. But a way of settlement, honourable to both parties, has always been discovered; and France has never had occasion to complain that England regards the prosperity of a competitor as an insult or a menace.

(3) The third period, from 1904 to 1914, has been remarkable for the steady and deliberate preparations of France to face the German peril. For at least ten years her statesmen have not only feared invasion, but have been pretty well informed of the plan of campaign which the German General Staff would pursue. Indeed the more militant of German newspapers, and the leading exponents of German strategy, have not troubled to disguise the intentions of the German governing class. The only doubts in French minds have been as to the date at which the German plan would be put in execution, and the exact nature of the pretext which would be alleged. It was, however, reasonable to expect that the blow would be struck when German military and naval expenditure had reached the maximum permitted by the state of the public revenue; and that the occasion would be found in the Franco-Russian alliance which the Pan-German party have affected to treat as a crime against European civilization.

The Russian alliance was in fact projected and concluded during the years 1891-7, when France asked for nothing more than freedom from continental embarrass-

ments and the fullest opportunity of developing French interests in Africa and Asia. Russia stood in need of loans from French financiers. France on her side felt that a Russian alliance would protect her against Germany, and might be a valuable support in her colonial rivalries with England. Some such measure of insurance was necessary to France; her population was becoming stationary, her colonial policy required the maintenance of a strong navy, and her military resources, relatively to those of Germany, were rapidly declining. But even in Bismarck's time the German Empire had watched with apprehension the growth of the Russian power on its eastern flank; and this apprehension was intensified as German statesmen, after Bismarck's fall, committed themselves more and more deeply to the support of Austrian designs in the Balkans. It was impossible for Russia to tolerate the prosecution of those designs, which involved the destruction or the mutilation of small Slavonic states. Germany and Austria-Hungary were steering a straight course towards a racial war of Teuton against Slav. They counted themselves superior to Russia in military organization, and were not afraid so long as Russia stood alone. But they feared that the Dual Alliance of France and Russia would be too strong for them; and they vented their irritation upon France.

From 1897 it was apparent that an armed conflict, of the Triple Alliance or its two Teutonic partners against the Dual Alliance, was well within the range of possibility. Neither Russia nor France desired a continental war; but their union was the most dangerous obstacle which German and Austrian projects of expansion had hitherto encountered. The one redeeming feature of the situation, from the German point of view, was that England also viewed the Dual Alliance with some

apprehension—as was shown by the fact that the English standard of naval construction was fixed, for some time after 1897, with reference to the combined strength of the French and Russian navies. It was fortunate for France that Germany was encouraged, by the outbreak of the South African War, to develop a new naval policy which could only be explained on the assumption that she intended, sooner or later, to strike directly or indirectly at British interests. The events of the present year, and especially the terms of the now notorious German bid for British neutrality, suggest that the immediate object of the German fleet-laws was to prepare for an attack upon French colonies. But undoubtedly the remoter object was the ruin of the British Empire; and the consciousness of a common danger brought England to the side of France just at the moment when Russia, owing to her war in the Far East with Japan (1904), was incapacitated from helping her ally. In the year 1904 England and France publicly made up their differences on the chief points which had hitherto kept them apart—the question of French fishing rights off Newfoundland, the question of the English occupation of Egypt, the question of French intervention in Morocco.¹ The most important features of the settlement were that the French withdrew their old demand for the evacuation of Egypt by some fixed date;

¹ Two of these disputes were old, the last was of comparatively recent date. France had now become mistress of the hinterlands behind Morocco, and her trade interests in that country had developed. She felt that the time was at hand when she could no longer tolerate the state of anarchy which seemed normal in Morocco. England was the other power largely interested in Moroccan trade, and feared at first that France would find means of excluding all merchants but her own, when Morocco had been made French.

and that the English agreed to leave the French a free hand in Morocco, so long as all nations were permitted to trade there on equal terms, and the Straits of Gibraltar were left open. But these written terms of agreement were of less importance than the silent understanding that it might be desirable, in the near future, for France and England to form a closer alliance.

Since 1904 the Anglo-French Entente has been twice robustly, not to say rudely, tested by the statesmen of the German Empire, who have spared no pains to sow mistrust between the two great colonizing powers. In 1905 and 1911 Morocco served as the pretext. In the first of these years the German Emperor announced that he would not recognize any arrangement concerning Morocco which prevented him from treating directly with the Sultan; in 1911 a German warship was sent to seize the Moroccan port of Agadir, on the pretext that the safety of German commercial interests was imperilled by the disorders of Morocco. It is probable that Germany coveted Morocco; a German minister is said to have declared that Agadir, once occupied, would never be evacuated. The country was the most promising of those which still remained to be occupied by some European state. But it is certain that Germany expected England to desert France on each of these occasions, and that such a desertion would have ended the Entente. On each occasion England stood firm, and Germany experienced a diplomatic rebuff which was keenly resented by all German parties except the Socialists. Under cover of the Entente, France was enabled to establish the Protectorate over Morocco, which she had so long desired. Italy and Spain, who next to England were the powers most concerned, have accepted this arrangement; some arrangement of the kind was

imperative if any Europeans were to continue trading in Morocco.

On the whole Germany had no cause to complain of the terms upon which she was twice allowed to escape from a false position. The dispute of 1905 was adjusted, amicably enough to outward appearance, by the international conference of Algeciras. In 1911 German honour was salved by some French concessions concerning the boundary-line between the French Congo and the Cameroons. Germany, it is true, had demanded much more than she obtained; she had asked for the coast-line of the French Congo, and the territory behind it as far as the river Sangha. But enough was conceded by the French ministry of the day to arouse feelings of lively dissatisfaction in the French legislature. In 1912 the French Government continued the work of conciliation by coming to an arrangement with Germany about the boundaries of Togoland and the French Sudan. But it is clear that, after 1911, if not earlier, the German colonial party came to the conclusion that France was their superior in the art of 'peaceful penetration', and that the short way of establishing a German colonial power was to strip France of her African territories.

France has not been blind to this danger. Like England, she has often, in the past few years, given foreigners the impression of being wholly absorbed in party politics and of wilfully turning her back upon the European situation. But in France, as in England, though party differences are clamorously expressed, there is a broad basis of agreement on which all parties take their stand when the national existence is in question. Whatever have been the quarrels of French politicians in domestic questions, they have worked

harmoniously and unobtrusively against the common foe. They have not done so in any spirit of *Revanche*. They have not boasted, and they have not threatened; and they have shown their conviction that France was unequal to the task of an aggressive war. It was not until the eleventh hour, in 1913, that they agreed to increase the strength of the army, and to demand three years of military training (instead of two) from every conscript; and this step was only taken in answer to the sensational German Army Bill of the same year—a Bill, it may be mentioned, which frightened Belgium into adopting universal military service.

Until 1913 the preparations of France were mainly diplomatic. Her Foreign Ministers have been eminently pacific since 1905, when M. Delcassé was relegated to the background as being a statesman too brilliant and original for the national safety. This was no ordinary concession to German susceptibilities; for M. Delcassé is the most distinguished Foreign Minister whom the Republic has produced. His successors have occupied themselves in clearing up old differences with foreign powers, more particularly with Italy and Spain. In 1906 France and Italy agreed that each would respect and would defend the interests of the other in Ethiopia; and, significantly enough, both agreed to defend the interests of England in Egypt and in the basin of the Nile. In 1912 France and Italy made a further agreement concerning their interests in Morocco and in Libya; and in the same year Spain, by the Treaty of Madrid, acquired a protectorate over definite zones in Morocco in exchange for a recognition of the French protectorate over the remainder of the country. The effect of these transactions has been to establish friendly relations between

the three Latin powers of the Western Mediterranean. They have made it clear that they neither invite nor desire the intervention of Germany in their disputes; Spain and Italy will not allow themselves to be used, as the cats'-paws of German colonial policy, to molest a sister nation. Italy and France will not tolerate a German or an Austrian descent upon the Nile valley. It is to agreements of this kind that German publicists refer when they complain that the German people is being strangled in a network of diplomacy. The complaint will only become justifiable when the right to steal is recognized by European public law.

But these agreements of the Latin peoples among themselves, instructive as they are, only helped France negatively, by releasing her from embarrassments which might have hampered her in a war of life and death. It is to the Entente with Russia and with England that she has looked, and not in vain, for actual support. Until 1909 the weak spot in her armour of alliances was the absence of any direct understanding between her two chief supporters. She had one set of agreements with Russia, another set of agreements with England. She felt that she could certainly depend on Russian help, and that England, though not definitely committed in the same way as Russia, could not afford to stand neutral while French territory or French colonies were being appropriated by another power. But there was no guarantee that England and Russia would work harmoniously together when both were ranged upon the side of France. From 1904 to 1909 it was a leading object of French foreign policy to secure this guarantee. There can be no doubt that French influence was largely responsible for the gradual reconciliation of England and Russia in those years, for the growth of a feeling in

both countries that their Asiatic interests, hitherto the main cause of disputes, were by no means irreconcilable. In 1905 England acted as a mediator between Russia and Japan ; in 1907 England and Russia came to an agreement respecting their claims in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Finally, in 1909, the Tsar paid a ceremonious visit to England ; and from that moment the Triple Entente became a new and vital factor in the European situation. The immediate effect was that France found herself able to concentrate practically the whole of her fleet in the Mediterranean, where it would be ready to defend her North African colonies. For it was understood that, if the three powers found themselves jointly engaged in a war against a common enemy, Russia would guard the interests of her allies in the Baltic, and England would be responsible for holding the North Sea and the English Channel.

There can be no doubt that the Triple Entente has operated as a bar against some cherished hopes of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Since 1909 it has been the fixed intention of Germany, if not also of Austria-Hungary, that France should be made to pay heavily for her presumption in building up this coalition. Apparently Germans think that the Triple Entente exists largely, if not entirely, to thwart German colonial ambitions, and to promote those of France.

To such suspicions we can only answer that no proof of them is offered, and that they are not confirmed by any facts which are generally known. There is evidence that French statesmen have feared a war with Germany as one of the greatest evils that could befall their nation. There is evidence that France has been relatively less prepared than Germany for the present war. We do not contend that France has pursued

a policy of peace at any price ; but the events of 1905 and 1911 are in themselves a proof that she has been prepared to pay a high price to avert the ill will of Germany. In the colonial sphere, as we have shown, France has pursued an active and sometimes an audacious policy. She has quarrelled over colonial questions with other powers besides Germany. But her differences with England, with Italy, with Spain, have been amicably settled by compromises not invariably too favourable to France. Her colonial policy has been one of competition, but not of war to the knife ; and she owes her most brilliant successes not so much to her diplomacy as to the industry of her traders and the self-devotion of her explorers. Her rivals, with one exception, have not found it necessary to remain her enemies, to treat her prosperity and the prosperity of her colonies as an insult and a wrong. Germany is the exception ; and Germany has no reason to complain if France has woven a network of alliances to protect herself against the overt and covert threats to which she has been exposed in the last generation.

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WAR AGAINST
WAR

BY

A. D. LINDSAY

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WAR AGAINST WAR

THE war in which we are now engaged has been called 'a war against war'. It is certain that most people in this country have not wished this war but have looked on it as a hateful necessity, and combine with a determination to see the war through a resolve to do all that can be done to prevent such a war recurring. We feel it an intolerable disgrace to Christendom that this thing should have happened. We recognize that for the general condition of Europe which made such a war possible we may, along with other nations, have been partly to blame, yet we hold that in the immediate situation we were guiltless and that it made most for the eventual peace of Europe that we should fight. In that sense we are making war against war, and we can endure all the suffering and horror which war involves if we can sustain ourselves with the hope that we shall make a recurrence of such things impossible for our children, that we shall once for all do away not only with actual wars like the present, but with the restless peace which preceded it, with the wasteful rivalry in armaments, with the uneasy searching after alliances and the balance of power.

It is well therefore that we should ask ourselves what ground we have for our hope, and how we can best realize it. For there are some who say that such a hope is an illusion; that if we cherish the comfortable belief that

we are making war against war we are only refusing to face the facts; that our belief is based on hypocrisy and blindness. Let us therefore examine the arguments of those who hold that war against war is a delusive ideal.

Our critics are of two very different schools. There are those who hold that it is of no use trying to abolish war, for war between nations must always exist; there are others who believe that war is unnecessary and futile but that it cannot be abolished by war (that were to cast out Satan by Satan), but only by our all recognizing the horror and futility of war and refusing to fight. The first would probably approve the present war but laugh at our description of our ideal. The second would approve our ideal but condemn unsparingly the method we have taken to attain it. We must therefore ask ourselves whether or no there need necessarily be war between nations, and if there need not, whether war itself can ever be a weapon against war, can ever help to make war impossible or at least improbable; if impossible it can never be made. These questions clearly concern the elementary principles which govern the relations of states to one another or the elements of international policy.

We need not deal with our two classes of critics separately. For if we examine the arguments of the first class, we shall probably find that we shall be compelled by the way to answer those of the second.

The supporters of the doctrine that wars are inevitable may be divided into those who hold that war is an evil, though one that cannot be avoided, and those who like General von Bernhardt and some writers and preachers in this country do not want to abolish war. Such persons as the latter must not be confused with those

who hold that in certain circumstances war is desirable. Most of us might agree to that but deplore the circumstances which called for war. General von Bernhardt thinks that it would be a catastrophe to mankind if war were abolished; he believes that the natural relations of nations to one another are enmity and competition, which, unlike the envy and competition of individuals, have no higher power to control them, and thinks that such enmity and competition are good in themselves.

The question whether war is in itself a good thing need hardly be discussed. It has plausibility only when war is identified with any kind of competition or struggle and justified on biological grounds. A moment's consideration will show that the growth of civilization and peace has not eliminated struggle and competition, but changed their nature. Progress consists largely in raising the terms on which competition is carried on, and the qualities in which men compete; and in the higher forms of competition co-operation plays a greater and greater part, and the success of one competitor means less and less the death or ruin of the other. We think it a good thing that there should be rivalry between German and French and English culture, and that the best should prevail, but we think that it ought to prevail because it is the best culture, not because those who have made it happen to be more ruthless in war or less scrupulous about treaties than are others.

Now though there may be much that is ignoble as well as much that is noble in the rivalry and competition of peace, no one would deny that the life of a modern nation at peace is better than it would be in a state of internecine strife. No one can disagree with Hobbes's famous description of a time of war where every man's hand is against his neighbour's;

‘In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.’

The most inspiring facts in modern war, the common devotion and patriotism of a whole nation, are possible only because that nation has been at peace with itself. If it fights to defend its culture, that culture is possible only through peace; for in war, as Thucydides said, we lose that ‘margin of everyday life’ in which culture can flourish. There is no sense in defending war as a good thing in itself. Even General von Bernhardi does not desire war between the component parts of Germany. All Germans would agree that the united Germany of the end of the nineteenth century is preferable to Germany of the ‘Thirty Years’ War.

Further, there can be no sense in saying that men *must* make war on each other, as though that were a fundamental element in their nature. For as we look back in history we can see how within the area now occupied by any of the great nations continual internecine strife has given place to settled and orderly government. It is true that we have not made civil war absolutely impossible. Orderly and constitutional government demands of a people a certain mutual forbearance and respect for mutual rights in which under stress of circumstances they may fail. Nevertheless no one would say that if we determined so to act that our children should never suffer the horrors of civil

war, we were following an illusory ideal. Rather we feel that, thanks to the political good sense of our ancestors, that ideal is already practically realized and we are the children who are benefiting by it.

If towns and districts which once lived in a state of war with one another can without giving up their local individuality, unite to form one nation under orderly and peaceable government, why cannot nations in turn give up war among themselves? Why should the relations between men of different nations be different from those between the men who now form one nation? These are the questions which those who disbelieve in the possibility of putting an end to war, have got to answer.

There are two kinds of answers given to such questions, based on very different considerations and very different conceptions of the state.

It is said sometimes that war is a relation between states and not between individuals, and that the relations between states are and must necessarily be different in kind from those existing between individuals; that the sole aim and duty of the state is and must be the acquisition of power. Within the state, the upholders of this doctrine would say, there ought to be justice and respect for law and indeed all the virtues. For only so are common life and culture possible. But the state is the supreme bond of social life. Beyond it there can be nothing. Security and culture having been given to the individual inside the state, each state is self-sufficing and has no need of law in its relations with its neighbours. The world is thus thought of as a collection of independent sovereign states, who acknowledge no common law and who are engaged in a constant struggle for power amongst themselves. The choice before every

nation is, in Bernhardi's words, 'world power or downfall'. Every nation must strive after power in order that it may impose its civilization and ideas upon the world. This ideal, when stated with Bernhardi's downrightness, is so repellent that it is difficult to have patience to answer it. It is an obvious abomination. Many of us have been familiar with it in the writings of German professors but have never imagined that any one could really believe that sort of stuff. The apparent obsession of the German mind with this astounding doctrine is a portent which we can only wonder at and deplore.

For look at the doctrine a little more closely. In the first place, this attempt to distinguish entirely between the relations between individuals and between states is obvious nonsense. The power of Germany over Alsace Lorraine or over Belgium means, if it means anything at all, that a certain number of human beings, Belgians or Alsatians, are forced to act in various ways against their inclinations at the commands of other individuals, not because they admire or respect these individuals but from fear of the consequences of disobedience. The will of Germany is decided by the wills of individual Germans. It is being exercised at this moment upon individual Belgians, with what results of suffering and anguish to the victims and of brutalization to the oppressors we are every day learning. The power of one nation over another which can be gained by war means this and nothing else than this, in whatever various forms it may be exercised. If we believe that it is not good for one man to have arbitrary power over others, if we believe that slavery is bad for the master as well as for the slave, we must believe it to be equally bad for one

nation to rule over another against its will. To adapt Lincoln's words: No nation is good enough to rule over another nation without that other's consent.

Further, the strength of a nation to exercise dominion over other nations is very limited. We sometimes think of a nation becoming a world-power by steady increase of the territory it possesses, and there seems no reason at first why such a process should not go on indefinitely. But a nation's strength depends upon the individuals who compose the nation, and their readiness to make all those efforts and sacrifices which the exercise of power demands. The number and readiness of such individuals is not increased simply by changes in the map. A nation cannot grow stronger by conquest if it has to hold down those it conquers. Conquest makes it stronger only if it puts those it conquers on some kind of level with itself and manages to inspire them with its ideals. The Prussian domination of Germany has apparently meant that most Germans have been inspired with Prussian ideals and united Germany is stronger than was Prussia alone. But then Prussia did not conquer Germany. The Prussian possession of Poland and of Alsace Lorraine has not had the same effect, and the efforts of Germany to hold down those provinces have not strengthened but weakened her. The self-governing dominions and India are a source of strength to the British Empire just because or in so far as they share and approve of England's political aims. If they did not so share, if we had tried to treat them merely as possessions which gave us strength to exercise our will on other nations as we pleased, the Empire would have been the source of fatal weakness that the Germans, arguing logically from profoundly mistaken premisses, imagined that it would be. The ideal of world-power is thus an impossible as well

as an evil ideal. That does not mean, as some writers imply, that there is therefore no need to resist it. It is impossible just because it must drive so many men to resist it; and an evil ideal may be unattainable in its completeness and yet may lead to endless suffering, misery, and wrong in its partial fulfilment.

So much for the doctrine that the sole aim of nations is power. But if we have disposed of that doctrine, we have not thereby shown that states are or ought to be governed in their relations to one another by the same principles of conduct as are individuals. Many persons who would not subscribe to Bernhardt's views still hold that ordinary moral obligations do not apply to nations. They hold either that the behaviour of nations is governed by mysterious forces, sometimes described as fate or destiny, or that it is the duty of nations to look after their own interests, and that when the interests of nations conflict there is bound to be war. Such persons would describe the conflict between Germany and England either as the result of both countries following their destiny, or as due to the fact that both Germany and England had to pursue their own interests; it was Germany's interest to expand, it was England's to stop that expansion, and hence war had to come.

Talk about national destiny is usually nonsense. It implies that nations have no intelligent control over their actions. It is commonly only a hypocritical way of excusing actions for which there is no decent excuse. It is true that the outcome of national actions depends upon the joint effect of a large number of factors, which cannot all be known to the statesman who commits the nation to action, and that therefore a statesman has much less power of anticipating accurately the outcome of actions than has a man who is acting for himself in

ordinary life. That, however, does not acquit him or the nation which follows him of responsibility for his deliberate actions: rather it increases that responsibility. Even Bismarck has borne witness to that. In a famous passage in his *Reminiscences* he dissents from what is known as the policy of a 'preventive war', the policy that a nation ought to make war at a time that is favourable to itself if it thinks that otherwise war will be made on it in the future. He opposed that policy 'in the conviction that even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one, and that we cannot see the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical development according to one's own calculation'. If his successors had remained faithful to his teaching, we should not have had this war.

The second view that nations must follow their own interests is more plausible because it is the duty of *statesmen* to think primarily of the interests of their country, and it is from studying the actions of statesmen in international relations that we tend to form our opinion of the real nature of such relations. The truth is that the statesman, having power to commit the nation to action, is acting on behalf of or as a trustee of the nation. His line of action is therefore restricted. He has no right of himself to sacrifice his country's interests because he thinks it right to be generous. As a trustee his first duty is to his country. But statesmen are not the only persons in such a position. We are all familiar with the position of a trustee. We admire the man who sacrifices his own interests to others, we do not so admire the man who sacrifices to others the interests of his family or of those for whom he is trustee. That does not mean that a trustee has no moral obligations to other men. He has no right to assume that those for

whom he is acting are prepared to be generous : he must assume that they are prepared to be just. Further, the fact that we have some one acting in our name does not absolve us from the responsibility of seeing that his actions are right. On the contrary, it throws the responsibility on us.

The fallacy arises from the fact that we constantly think of men who are not acting collectively as nations, as though they were acting as isolated individuals. But men are very seldom in a position when they can so act. A nation is not a collection of isolated units. We are limited by all manner of ties, family, kinship, religion, nationality, citizenship, and our duties to our fellow men are affected by the existence of these ties. Men have special duties to their family, to their fellow trade unionists, to their coreligionists, and inasmuch as the interests of these several associations may conflict, it is often hard for a man to know how to reconcile conflicting claims. Family loyalty, church loyalty, trade union loyalty seem often to set at enmity men who as individuals are really good friends. No one, however, really thinks that these different loyalties cannot be reconciled, or that because we can see no reconciliation between conflicting groups, that therefore to one of the groups we have no duties. No one thinks that the best citizen is the man who has no loyalty to his family, his church, or his trade union. The possibility of conflict between these various claims is a problem for the statesman, but we do not think it an insurmountable problem. The relation of nations to one another is analogous to the relation of families to one another. Family loyalty may become a danger to the state if it means entire disregard of all other obligations, but it may and ought to be the bulwark of the state. And

state loyalty must be added to it, not substituted for it. Loyalty to our country may endanger international peace if it means disregard of all other nations. It need not do that, and we become 'Good Europeans' if we think of Europe not instead of but as well as our own country.

We may claim now to have answered the doctrine that states are quite different from individuals and are therefore not governed by moral obligations in their relations to one another, and that war is therefore a necessity. Let us now turn to a second line of argument.

This second argument is that peace, the decent observance of law and respect for mutual rights are possible within a state only because they are preserved by the force of the state. Law, according to this argument, can only exist when there is force to protect it. There can therefore be no such thing as international law, because there is no power supreme over the separate states which could compel observance of law. So long, then, as separate states exist, there can be nothing but enmity between them, and the only hope of universal peace is that one state should be powerful enough to compel all the others to obedience. We have lately been given two very good instances of this argument by German professors. *The Times* of September 11th contained a brief report of a lecture on the war delivered at Charlottenburg by Professor von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. He is reported to have said that the present war showed how useless international law was without a superior power to enforce it, and that the only hope for the world was that Germany and Austria should win and *dictate peace and the observance of law to Europe*. Professor Ostwald, a famous German

scientist, has written to a friend in America a letter on the war in which he says :

‘ According to the course of the war up to the present time (he was writing very early in September) European peace seems to me nearer than ever before. We pacificists must only understand that unhappily the time was not yet sufficiently developed to establish peace by the peaceful way. If Germany, as everything now seems to make probable, is victorious in the struggle, not only with Russia and France, but attains the further end of destroying the source from which for two or three centuries all European strife has been nourished and intensified, namely the English policy of World Dominion, then will Germany, fortified on the one side by its military superiority, on the other side by the eminently peaceful sentiment of the greatest part of its people and especially of the German Emperor, dictate peace to the rest of Europe. I hope especially that the future treaty of peace will in the first place provide effectually that a European war such as the present can never again break out.’

These utterances are worth noting, for they are the views of two very eminent and fine Germans on how to make ‘ war against war ’. We on our side may perhaps have a dream similar save in our choice of the country which shall play the principal rôle. Such an ideal seems at first sight feasible. Did not Rome by force dictate peace to Europe ? has not England dictated it to India ? Why should not Germany or Great Britain dictate peace to Europe ? All such dreams are vitiated by the most fruitful source of fallacy in international politics, the refusal to look at the situation from the point of view of other nations. Professor Ostwald at one and the same time thinks that England’s world dominion has been the source of all war, and that Germany’s world dominion would produce peace. The

elementary fact about the European situation is that there are a number of European nations who are more or less equal and, what is just as important, who think that they are.

If Europe can only be given peace by force, it can never be given peace, because no one state in Europe is strong enough to hold down the rest. Professor Wilamowitz-Moellendorff talks of Germany *and Austria* enforcing peace; we, if we are honest, talk of the *Allies*. That means that we assume that two or more independent nations can act together without being themselves held down by force. And if two or three are able to observe mutual obligations, why not a dozen? Even two nations can only hold together if they observe law and justice in their mutual relations. In the Roman Empire and in India one strong homogeneous state enforced peace on a number of smaller disunited states. That is possible. The conditions are entirely different when, as in modern Europe, the great nations are more or less equal.

And as we had occasion to notice before, no nation can ever permanently hold down another nation or nations by *force*. If its empire is to last, it must rest on the consent of those it governs. The British Empire is united now, and is able to use united force in this war, just because the nations which make it up have not been kept down by force. We are rejoicing in the support of the Empire in the very year that we learned, somewhat to our disappointment, that we had no power to enforce in South Africa our views of the proper treatment of labour leaders.

These obvious facts show that there is something wrong with the theory that law rests upon force. It may perhaps be worth while looking more closely at

the part played by force in the state. For if we understand what binds men together in a law-abiding society, we may see how states may be bound together to a common observance of law.

At first sight it looks as though law did obviously depend upon force. All states use force to compel the obedience to law, and the use of force is often looked upon as the peculiar characteristic of the state. No one, unless he be a theoretical anarchist, imagines that states and the ordered life they make possible could exist if they entirely refused to use force to compel obedience to law. This seems but a short step from saying that the state depends upon force, and that the setting up of an irresistible force is the necessary step to the making of a state. The opinion is widely held that force is at least the ultimate basis of the state. But whose is the force on which the state depends? It is not the Government's, for they are in a minority; nor even the force of what are called the forces of the administration, for their force depends on their having been organized and supported by the action and authority of other people. We all know that no government can enforce a law which its whole people is determined to break. If we then say that the force at the basis of the state is the force of the majority of its inhabitants, we must see that the majority has force to use only because it is prepared for concerted action. Force does not organize men who would otherwise be at enmity with one another. It is itself brought into being by organization, by the power and readiness of the people to act together to respect certain principles and to enforce certain laws. Force does not make government possible. On the contrary it is the mutual trust and sense of a common interest which makes possible the force which govern-

ment uses. At the same time it is important to notice that the use of force is necessary to a government. For although it is in the general interest that men should keep the law and respect their obligations to one another, occasions continually occur when an individual might profit by disregarding his obligations, and profit more just because other men kept their obligations to him. It is this conflict between the private interests of individuals and the general interests of the community which makes force necessary. Force seems to be the basis of the state because the state must be prepared to enforce the law on any member of the state who may violate it, but the state can only use its force because most of its citizens support its action and do not wish to violate its law : in other words, because most of them do not need to be controlled by force.

The argument then that international law can have no validity because there is no power above the different states to enforce it is invalid. For law does not depend upon force but upon respect for law. International law is of much narrower scope than state law and less effective, because there is yet little mutual trust and little power of common action between members of different states. Common political action is possible only between men who to some extent understand, respect, and trust one another. Such mutual trust and respect is of slow growth, especially between men who are organized in different groups, with different history and traditions and to some extent different ways of life. That is the real difference between the problem of political union in a nation and in Europe. The elements which go to make up a nation have behind them a long tradition of common understanding and of a sense of belonging together. The nations of Europe have behind

them a long tradition of enmity and jealousy. Some modern writers have thought that the enormous increase in economic relations between different nations which has marked the last two generations is of itself creating that mutual trust which will make war impossible. That is, I think, a vain hope. Economic relations give us an opportunity to understand and know each other better, but they also produce new sources of rivalry. For it is of the nature of economic relations that they can be entered into by men who are in spirit more rivals than co-operators, and who have no real purpose in common.

Are we then to wait for peace till in course of time we come fully to understand and respect all men? That were to wait for the millennium. If the state had waited for mutual understanding amongst all its members, it would have waited till law and the state itself was unnecessary. The sense of common interest and the respect of mutual rights at the basis of many states is weak enough, but an orderly society is secured in so far as that respect for rights is formulated in law and enforced by the organized force of the community. The common principles of action on which modern Europe has been able to agree are not very elaborate or far-reaching. They are none the less precious for that. The only way to make war impossible is at one and the same time to do all we can to increase common understanding between different nations, and in the meantime to keep safe the position we have reached by the strengthening and enforcing of the public law of Europe, such as it is.

Modern Europe, with its distrustful rival nations, might not unjustly be compared to the Iceland of the Sagas. Iceland in the tenth century was a land of independent vikings, living each on his farm, owning no

political superior. They are proud, distrustful of one another, and intensely warlike. Yet they are kept from utter barbarism by their respect for law. The Iceland of the Sagas has an elaborate law with no State to enforce it. It depends entirely on public opinion, on a bad man's knowledge that if he breaks the law, not only his enemies but men with whom he had no quarrel will be against him. They will not let him marry into their families if he wants to, they will not help him if he gets into a difficulty, and if he shows more than usual disregard of the law they will combine to make an end of him, though they themselves may get no immediate profit from so doing. There is a famous passage in *Burnt Njal Saga* describing the coming of Christianity to Iceland and the dissensions that arose from the conflict of Christian and Pagan law. All Iceland came together to the Hill of Laws, and the speaker of the laws was asked his opinion. 'Thorgeir (that was his name) lay all that day on the ground, and spread a cloak over his head, so that no man spoke with him; but the day after men went to the Hill of Laws and then Thorgeir bade them be silent and spoke thus: "It seems to me as though our matters were come to a deadlock, if we are not all to have one and the same law; for if there be a sundering of the laws, then there will be a sundering of the peace and we shall never be able to live in the land."'

If it was possible for the vikings of Iceland to submit to a common law though there was no power outside themselves to force them to do it, it should not be impossible for the nations of Europe. In no other way can we hope for lasting peace. For in this way alone we claim for ourselves nothing more than we allow to other nations. We have been told in the past that peace was best preserved by our being so strongly armed

that no one dare attack us. But because every nation acted on such advice, Europe became an armed camp where peace was almost as burdensome as war, and where the militarism was encouraged and fostered by which this war has been produced. We have also been told that we must preserve the balance of power in Europe. The doctrine of the balance of power implies that nations are natural rivals and enemies and make treaties with one another only for their own advantage. It is natural for a diplomacy which aims at the balance of power to regard treaties as having no real binding force. They are made purely in the self-interest of the nations who enter into them ; when circumstances change and they no longer serve the interests of one of these nations, their whole basis and reason is gone. The balance of power too, when the powers balanced are ponderous and unwieldy and the equilibrium unstable, has a way of being upset by circumstances over which we have no control. This war has largely been brought about by Germany's efforts to correct the balance of power which the Balkan wars had disturbed to her disadvantage. Further, while all nations think they are trying to create a balance of power, they are really seeking an over-balance in their own favour. That they cannot possibly all get, and hence must arise rivalry and eventually war. Common respect for public law alone calls not for rivalry but for common action. The neutrality of the small states of Europe like Belgium was agreed to by the joint act of the Great Powers of Europe, not in the interests of this or that Power but in the interests of European peace. In fighting to defend that agreement, in fighting for the public law of Europe, we are fighting to give peace its only sure foundation. To this doctrine Mr. Asquith has recently

in his speech at Dublin given expression. I cannot end this paper better than by quoting his words :

‘I should like if I might for a moment, beyond this inquiry into causes and motives, to ask your attention and that of my fellow-countrymen to the end which in this war we ought to keep in view. Forty-four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used these words. He said : “The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics.” Nearly fifty years have passed. Little progress, it seems, has yet been made towards that good and beneficent change, but it seems to me to be now at this moment as good a definition as we can have of our European policy.

‘The idea of public right, what does it mean when translated into concrete terms? It means, first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States and of the future moulding of the European world. It means, next, that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller nationalities, each for the life of history a corporate consciousness of its own. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, and Scandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan States—they must be recognized as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful neighbours, more powerful in strength and in wealth—exactly as good a title to a place in the sun. And it means finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clashing of competing ambition, for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise, the substitution for all these things of a real European partnership based

on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will. A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not or will not be realized either to-day or to-morrow. If and when this war is decided in favour of the Allies it will at once come within the range, and before long within the grasp, of European statesmanship.'

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